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ABSTRACT
The Defense Fuel Supply Center is the primary buying agent
for most of the petroleum used by the Department of Defense
and other Government agencies. Purchasing nearly 200 million
barrels of oil per year, the Fuel Center's costs have varied
dramatically depending upon the market price of oil. One
creative idea for stabilizing costs and reducing price risk
exposure is to hedge purchases in the cash market with the use
of futures contracts.
This thesis examines and assesses the ramifications of
futures trading in light of current procurement practices,
market conditions, and trends, in an effort to answer the
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This chapter provides basic background and identifies the
primary thesis objectives. It also presents the research
questions that will become the primary focus of this research
effort. This chapter defines the scope, limitations, and
assumptions that have been used to develop this thesis, and
also explains the research methodology. Finally, this chapter
briefly describes how the thesis is organized and what is
addressed in each of the following chapters and appendices.
B . BACKGROUND
The Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) is the primary
purchasing agent for most of the fuel requirements within the
Department of Defense (DoD) and other Government agencies
(DFSC, 1992, pp. 1-33). In this strategically important role,
DFSC has grown to become the single largest customer of
petroleum in the world (Hart, 1990, p. 34).
While DFSC is the single largest customer, it has
procurement handicaps that prevent it from buying oil
effectively and efficiently in a world of unpredictable
prices. These handicaps reduce flexibility, and add enormous
expense to the price that the Government must pay for the
petroleum it needs
.
The amount of fuel purchased over the past few years has
been steadily declining. Despite this fact, DFSC's costs have
continually varied between one and ten billion dollars per
year, with costs depending heavily on the market price of oil
(DFSC, 1992, p. 9).
Since this tremendous market price exposure is not
adequately addressed by current contracting methods, an
examination of alternative approaches is worthwhile. One
creative idea is to allow DFSC to trade in the futures market.
C. OBJECTIVES
This thesis simply seeks to answer the question of whether
should DFSC should trade in the futures market. The goal is
to discover whether such a commercially based strategy
designed to reduce unpredictable price exposure, is viable or
even wise for DFSC given its environment. This thesis
concludes that it is.
In order to adequately answer this question, this thesis
first examines DFSC. It explains DFSC's organization and
identifies some of the weaknesses of current procurement
practices in light of market conditions, and economic as well
as political trends. It then examines the structure and
function of the futures market to explain how it operates.
The thesis then examines the factors that drive the underlying
prices of oil in order to explain their importance and linkage
to the futures market. It looks at ways of assessing futures
performance, in an attempt to develop feasible futures trading
strategies. Finally, it examines futures trading in terms of
its strategic fit to determine if a futures trading strategy
is plausible.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following research questions provide the primary focus
of this thesis:
1. Primary Research Question
• Should the Defense Fuel Supply Center trade in the futures
market?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
• What are the potential benefits of the Defense Fuel Supply
Center trading in the futures market?
• What are the potential problems of the Defense Fuel Supply
Center trading in the futures market?
• What contracting practices or changes would be required to
implement a futures trading strategy?
• What are the price drivers in futures contracts and how do
they compare with the underlying commodity spot market?
• What are potential ways of measuring futures trading
performance?
• Does futures trading have a strategic fit within the
Defense Fuel Supply Center?
E. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The primary and specific focus of this thesis is to
evaluate whether futures trading is viable or wise for DFSC.
However, this thesis also addresses the driving factors which
DoD officials should consider in assessing the opportunities,
and limitations of applying this widely used commercial
practice to a public sector environment.
Although other alternative strategies will be mentioned,
this thesis will not evaluate the merits or problems of any
other strategy under consideration. This thesis will only
seek to provide depth of understanding in futures trading and
associated issues.
The general assumption is made that the reader has little
knowledge of DFSC or futures trading beyond what has already
been mentioned. The assumption is also made that the reader
has at least a basic awareness of general management
principles, and Government contracting practices.
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research for this thesis was started in September of 1992
and concluded in December of 1993. An extensive review of
available literature was conducted on the subjects of general
economics, oil price behavior and industry history, Government
budget policy trends and forecasts, DoD trends and forecasts,
futures and options trading mechanics, market history and
theory, risk management, fundamental and technical market
analysis, market trends and forecasts, corporate finance,
strategic planning, auditing and cost accounting, general
business management, Total Quality Management, Government
procurement reform, and Federal and State Law.
Over 30 hours of personal interviews were conducted with
people from DFSC, the Department of Energy (DOE), the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the New York
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), Congressional Staff, and the
States of New York, Texas, and Massachusetts.
On site interviews were held at DFSC, and the Washington
D.C. offices of DOE, CFTC, and NYMEX. Available records and
private memoranda from these organizations were closely
examined. An on site visit was also made to the New York
NYMEX offices and trading floor, located in the lower stories
of the recently bombed World Trade Center Building in Lower
Manhattan.
Additionally, DFSC and NYMEX provided over 30 floppy
diskettes of historical price data in Lotus 1-2-3 format.
This information can be made available for follow on research
upon request and with written permission from DFSC and NYMEX.
Finally, a roundtable discussion on possible legislative
language to authorize futures trading was held with the
graduating Acquisition and Contract Management class of the
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.
6. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The following provides a brief description of the
remaining chapters and appendices:
• II. DEFENSE FUEL SUPPLY CENTER BACKGROUND - This chapter
provides an overview of current DFSC business activities
and procurement practices, and describes some of the
problems they create. It also explains the range of new
procurement strategies under consideration, and offers
opportunities for further research.
• III. EXAMINATION OF THE FUTURES MARKET - This chapter
describes the futures market and explains how it is
structured, and regulated. It also explains how it
functions, and is used by different segments of the
market
.
• IV. FACTORS AFFECTING THE UNDERLYING PRICES OF OIL - This
chapter describes the primary factors that drive prices in
both the spot and futures markets. This chapter also
explains the primary differences that exist between the
two most popular methods of market analysis. It also
explains the connection between futures market prices and
the spot prices of the underlying oil commodities they
represent.
• V. ASSESSING FUTURES PERFORMANCE - This chapter looks at
potential ways of assessing and measuring futures trading
performance. It explains basic trading strategy design,
and offers an example of a workable strategy that could be
used as a guide for more sophisticated strategy
development
.
• VI. ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC FIT - This chapter examines
futures trading in terms of its strategic fit to the
relevant public sector environment. It describes the
importance of strategic fit, and uses a public sector
based strategic planning model to determine whether
futures trading has a particular strategic fit within
DFSC. This chapter examines some of the barriers to
futures trading and describes what would be required for
implementation. This chapter also provides sample
legislative language as a guide for developing proposals
to authorize futures trading within DoD.
• VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - This chapter
provides a brief review summarizing the intent and general
focus of the various topics discussed throughout the
thesis. It also offers specific conclusions and
recommendations based upon an interpretive assessment of
the research completed. Finally, it addresses and answers
each of the research questions originally posed, and
recommends areas for further research.
• APPENDIX A - GROUND FUELS DIVISIONS - This appendix
provides statistical business information for two
operating divisions within DFSC.
• APPENDIX B - SPECIALTY FUELS DIVISION - This appendix
provides statistical business information for an operating
division within DFSC.
• APPENDIX C - NATURAL GAS DIVISION - This appendix provides
statistical business information for an operating division
within DFSC.
• APPENDIX D - SPECIALTY ACQUISITIONS DIVISION - This
appendix provides statistical business information for an
operating division within DFSC.
• APPENDIX E - BULK FUELS DIVISION - This appendix provides
statistical business information for an operating division
within DFSC.
• APPENDIX F - GLOSSARY OF TERMS - This appendix provides a
copy of a futures trading glossary developed by the New
York Mercantile Exchange and geared toward the general
public.
• APPENDIX G - FUTURES CONTRACT SPECIFICATIONS - This
appendix provides a copy of standardized futures contract
specifications for commodities traded on the New York
Mercantile Exchange.
• APPENDIX H - SELECTED PRICE DATA - This appendix provides
selected historical price information that was used to
develop sample trading strategies for Chapter V.
H. SUMMARY
This thesis seeks to answer the question of whether DFSC
should trade in the futures market. The primary goal is to
discover whether this strategy would be viable or wise. The
research questions presented will act as the primary focus for
the remainder of this thesis, while the chapters described
will provide the structure. Additional information, such as
business statistics, key terms, contract requirements, and
selected data, is provided in the appendices listed.
II. DEFENSE FUEL SUPPLY CENTER BACKGROUND
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This chapter describes the basic context of DFSC's current
operations and provides a foundation for further examination.
It provides an overview of DFSC's current organizational
structure and summarizes many of the major business activities
for which DFSC is responsible. Some contextual perspective is
given to current procurement practices and some of the
problems they create. Reasons are given for looking at new
procurement strategies, while the range of new ideas is
briefly discussed. Finally, opportunities for further
research are identified.
B. ORGANIZATION AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY
1. Primary Role
The Defense Fuel Supply Center is the primary
inventory manager and purchasing agent for most of the fuel
requirements within the Department of Defense (DoD)
.
Additionally, it provides similar services to many non-DoD
activities including the Postal Service, Veterans
Administration, General Services Administration, and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. It also services most
of the major departments of the Federal Government including
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Interior,
Justice, and Transportation. (DFSC, 1992, pp. 1-33)
In this strategically important role, DFSC has grown
to become the single largest customer of petroleum in the
world. On average it purchases more than half a million
barrels 1 of fuel products each day for DoD and other Federal
agencies. (Hart, 1990, p. 34)
2 . External Chain of Command
Organizationally, DFSC is a subordinate activity of
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) . Figure 1 shows how DFSC
fits into DLA's structure. (Defense Logistics Agency Command
Support Office, 1993)
Within the broader chain of command, DLA reports
directly to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) , with dotted line relationships to both the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Acquisition Heads of the various Armed
Services. It provides both general materiel and contract
management support, as well as weapon systems support for all
of the Armed Service branches. (Freeman and Gandy, 1989)
Major subunits under DLA include the Offices of
Materiel Management, Comptroller, Corporate Administration,
General Counsel, and Acquisition. The Office of Acquisition
performs a variety of general procurement and contract
management services, and is further divided into Defense
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Figure 1 DFSC within DLA
10
Contract Management Districts (DCMDs). Each DCMD provides
contract management support services to a particular
geographic region of the United States. (Defense Logistics
Agency Command Support Office, 1993)
The Office of Materiel Management coordinates Supply
Management, Distribution, and a number of Inventory Control
Points (ICPs). The Supply Management function is organized
through various Service Centers. These Service Centers
include the Defense National Stockpile Center, the Defense
Logistics Services Center, and the Defense Reutilization and
Marketing Service. The Distribution function is organized
through Distribution Regions that geographically manage
Eastern and Western zones. The ICPs are organized around
broad types of commodities. (Defense Logistics Agency Command
Support Office, 1993)
Each ICP is responsible for procuring and managing
broad categories of items commonly used by all of the Armed
Services as well as numerous Federal and Civil agencies. The
Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) manages medical
materials, clothing, textiles, and subsistence items (Customer
Assistance Handbook, 1991, pp. 28-32). The Defense Industrial
Supply Center (DISC) manages common hardware items, industrial
accessories, and various engine components. The Defense
Electronics Supply Center (DESC) manages electrical
connectors, semiconductor devices, and electronic components.
The Defense General Supply Center (DGSC) manages various
11
machinery, appliances, furnishings, instruments, chemicals,
and miscellaneous printed materials. The Defense Construction
Supply Center (DCSC) manages excavation equipment, guns,
construction materials, diving equipment, and water
purification equipment. Finally, the Defense Fuel Supply
Center (DFSC) is responsible for managing a full spectrum of
energy products including jet fuels, gasolines, gasohol,
distillates, residuals, bulk lubricants, coal, crude oil,
natural gas, and synthetic fuels. (Department of Defense, pp.
39-40)
3. Internal Organization
Figure 2 illustrates DFSC's internal structure. The
Defense Fuel Supply Center has its own Office of Counsel, as
well as many other Directorates for specific support functions
including Supply Operations, Alternative Fuels, Quality
Assurance, Information Systems, Resources Management, Finance
and Accounting, and Personal Staff. (Defense Logistics Agency
Command Support Office, 1993)
Of particular interest is the Office of Market
Research and Analysis. This department employs numerous
industry economists, market analysts, and Strategic Petroleum
Reserve experts. They provide extensive analytical,
theoretical, and practical support, as well as training for
both procurement strategy development and program execution.
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Figure 2 Defense Fuel Supply Center
13
received extensive training in the field of economic analysis.
All possess advanced degrees, while some boast many years of
analytical experience. Christopher Lee, the current
Department Director, holds a Ph.D. in Economics and has been
reputably published in numerous Defense and oil industry
journals. In fact, most of the employees in this office have
been published in similarly respected journals. 2
The procurement function resides within the
Directorate of Contracting and Production where most of the
actual buying occurs. Primarily, this department employs GS-
1102 Contract Specialists who receive three years of general
DoD procurement training as well as specialized training in
petroleum commodity buying. The typical buyer enters DFSC
with a four year Bachelors degree and starts work as a GS-5
grade Procurement Trainee. Unfortunately, this office has a
high turnover rate. Many of these buyers will transfer or be
promoted to other Government Procurement Activities within
three or four years after joining DFSC. (DFSC, 1991, p. 23)
The Directorate of Contracting and Production is
divided into various support functions and divisions
specializing in commodity acquisition. The major support
functions include Competition and Pricing, Operations Support,
and Contract Review. The actual buying offices include the
2 Interview between C. Lee, Director of Market Research and
Analysis, Defense Fuel Supply Center, Alexandria, VA, and the
researcher, 23 August 1993.
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Divisions of Ground Fuels, Specialty Fuels, Natural Gas,
Special Acquisitions, and Bulk Fuels. (Defense Logistics
Agency Command Support Office, 1993)
The two Ground Fuels Divisions buy coal and bulk
lubricants, as well as fuels specific to Army Posts, Marine
Camps, and Naval Stations, for both domestic and overseas use.
The Specialty Fuels Division buys domestic and overseas bunker
fuels for ships, and into-plane contracts for refueling
military aircraft at commercial airports. The Natural Gas
Division buys natural gas products for DoD as well other
Federal and Civil agencies. The Special Acquisitions Division
buys fuels for alongside aircraft refueling at Naval Air
Stations, provides small purchase and base contracting
support, conducts special studies of commercial activities,
and manages petroleum inventories at both Government Owned
Contractor Operated (GOCO) and Contractor Owned Contractor
Operated (COCO) storage facilities around the world. Finally,
the Bulk Fuels Division buys most of the jet fuels, motor
gasolines, diesel fuels, and fuel oils used both domestically
and overseas by DFSC's customers. (DFSC, 1992, pp. 23-56)
4. Business Activity
Appendices A through E provide more detailed
information on the unique business activities of each of the
buying divisions mentioned. In terms of general business
activity however, jet fuels comprise the largest portion of
15
petroleum products purchased by DFSC. Consisting of naphtha
based products like JP-4 and kerosine based products like JP-5
and JP-8, jet fuels make up more than 70 percent of the
aggregate volume of petroleum products purchased each year.
Distillates make up nearly 25 percent, with aviation gasolines
(AVGAS), motor gasolines, and heavy residuals making up the
balance. (DFSC, 1992, p. 7-8)
As should be expected with continually shrinking
budgets, total purchases have declined in recent years.
Volumes of all petroleum based products bought have declined
by almost 50 percent in less than ten years. Table I gives a
breakdown of total volumes purchased for each of the various
petroleum products managed since 1986. (DFSC, 1992, p. 7-8)
TABLE I BARRELS PURCHASED
BARRELS PURCHASED
(in millions)
1986 1988 1990 1992
AVGAS .3 .1 .1 .1
Jet Fuel 141.8 146.0 143.9 85.8
Motor Gas 8.6 6.7 4.7 3.0
Distillates 49.6 48.6 43.3 29.3
Residuals 11.6 5.1 5.7 3.8
Totals 212.0 206.5 197.6 121.9
(DFSC, 1992, p. 8)
In terms of actual sources of supply, there is a
distinctively American preference. In fact, nearly 85 percent
16
of the petroleum purchased comes from domestic and Canadian
sources. Astonishingly, less than two percent of all of the
petroleum bought by DFSC comes from the Middle East or Latin
America. (DFSC, 1992, pp. 4-12)
Although small business plays an important role in
DFSC's activities through various set-aside programs, roughly
70 percent of the contract dollars go to well known major
companies. As shown by Table II, more than 50 percent of
DFSC's total business is spread between the top ten suppliers.
(DFSC, 1992, pp. 15-18)
The Defense Fuel Supply Center is a world-wide buyer
and manager of petroleum and other energy related products
.
This global activity reflects the fact that petroleum is a
world-wide industry and DoD, DFSC's primary customer, has a
world-wide presence. To capitalize on world price
opportunities and global competition, DFSC has developed more
than 5,100 sources of supply world-wide, and relies on
competitive procurement procedures for nearly 98 percent of
its purchases (DFSC, 1992, p. 4-11).
Despite the strengths of this competitive business
practice and infrastructure base, DFSC is unable to react
quickly to world price opportunities on a routine basis. This
becomes a critical factor as Defense budgets decline and world
oil prices fluctuate dramatically. Current procurement
practices cause most of the problems.
17
TABLE II TOP TEN DFSC CONTRACTORS IN FY 92
TOP TEN DFSC CONTRACTORS IN FY 92




1. Costal $ 302.8 8.4%
2. Exxon $ 298.7 8.3%
3. Shell $ 287.2 8.0%
4. Arco $ 226.4 6.3%
5. Amoco $ 154.3 4.3%
6. Mobile $ 124.6 3.5%
7. Chevron $ 124.5 3.5%
8. Pride $ 104.5 2.9%
9. Sun Oil $ 98.4 2.7%
10. Phillips £_ 84.7 2.4%
Totals $1 r 806.1 50.3%
Total Worldwide Contract Awards = $ 3,588 .6 million
(DFSC, 1992, p. 15)
C. CURRENT PROCUREMENT PRACTICES
1 . General Handicaps
While DFSC is the single largest customer of petroleum
in the world, its procurement practices prevent it from buying
effectively and efficiently in a world of volatile oil prices.
These practices not only reduce flexibility, but add avoidable
costs to the total price the Government must ultimately pay
for its petroleum needs. Many of these practices are both
time consuming and difficult to implement, two factors that
are not strategically suitable for reacting quickly to
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transitory price breaking opportunities in the oil markets
.
Many practices result from the conflicting and diverse
requirements mandated by law. In the face of petroleum
markets that are totally unstable and unpredictable, DFSC must
promote and administer to a wide variety of Government socio-
economic programs, ensure responsibility to national security
interests, sustain a sound domestic industrial base in a
highly competitive world market, and still be held accountable
for ensuring sound financial business judgment in program
execution (DFSC, 1993).
2 . Contract Duration and Type
A typical fuel contract is written for a one or two
year period. These contracts are either based upon firm
requirements, or are left indefinite as to quantity. In both
types of contracts, limitations are placed on the minimum and
maximum delivery orders allowable. For indefinite quantity
contracts, limitations are also placed on the minimum and
maximum quantities that can be contracted. The fuel itself is
called forward through delivery orders written against the
contract. Deliveries usually occur in equal monthly
installments over the life of the contract. Contract prices
are established at the time of contract award. However, due
to the current price volatility in the petroleum markets,
prices are indexed to market indicators and readjusted at the
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time of delivery. This price adjustment mechanism will be
explained in greater detail later. (DFSC, 1991, p. 21)
Because contract prices are indexed, DFSC is unable to
take full advantage of its long-term contracting arrangements,
and is unable to lock in the most favorable price for the full
life of the contract. Instead, DFSC shares the risk of market
price fluctuations with its suppliers. While DFSC reaps the
benefit of declining prices during down markets, it is fully
exposed during periods of rising prices, and must pay the
higher adjusted market price as determined on the date of
delivery.
3. Acquisition Cycle
The acquisition process at DFSC itself is long and
tedious, with the usual Government mandated requirements at
each step in the process. As seen in Table III, it generally
takes about 180 days to award a contract (DFSC, 1992, p. 21).
Lengthy time to award is yet another factor not strategically
suitable to market volatility.
This 180 day acquisition cycle also creates an
enormous administrative burden owing to the sheer size of the
buys. In the Continental United States, bulk purchases are
split between only two major programs. The East/Gulf Program
generally starts contract negotiations in the fall. While
negotiations for the Inland/West Program are offset by six
months to ease some of this administrative burden, and to
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TABLE Ill ACQUISITION PROCESS AND TIMEFRAMES
ACQUISITION PROCESS AND TIMEFRAMES
Day 1: Receive Purchase Request
Day 15: Synopsize the Acquisition
Day 30: Issue the Solicitation
Day 65: Close / Open the Solicitation
Day 80: Open Negotiations
(not applicable to sealed bid)
Day 110: Close Negotiations
(not applicable to sealed bid)
Day 170: Finalize Award Evaluations
Day 180: Award Contract 30 Days Prior
to Beginning of Delivery
Period
(DFSC, 1991, p. 22)
ensure that at least half of the domestic requirements are
always under contract. (Hart, 1989, p. 9)
The time it takes to award a contract, and the
enormity of the administrative burden in doing so, is
extremely important. Not only does it make it difficult if
not impossible under normal circumstances for DFSC to react to
market price opportunities, but it also tends to restrict
program effectiveness.
4. Socio-Economic Programs
All Government contracts list numerous clauses aimed
at promoting a complex array of socio-economic programs
required through statute, regulation, and practice. Contracts
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written by DFSC are no exception. These contracts include
clauses for promoting equal opportunity, enforcing provisions
of the Buy American Act, ensuring fair labor standards,
promoting environmental protection, and many other objectives
too numerous to mention. (DFSC Contract Solicitation, 1993,
pp. 2-12)
5. Small Business Set-Asides
Of particular importance are the clauses aimed at
promoting small business. They greatly diminish flexibility
and add to programmatic costs. As required by the Small
Business Act, 3 Federal Agencies must set aside a certain level
of acquisitions for the exclusive competitive participation of
small business. This is normally required for acquisitions
with an anticipated dollar value of $25,000 or less. However,
set-aside goals may also be extended to larger value
acquisitions when the Contracting Officer determines it to be
in the best interest of national security, for the purpose of
maintaining or mobilizing the Nation's full productive
capacity, or for assuring that a fair proportion of Government
contracts are placed with small business firms. (Federal
Acquisition Regulation, 1989, sec. 19.000-19.502)
Recognizing these issues, DFSC has established small
business set-aside goals of between 28.6 and 31 percent for
the domestic portion of its business activities. Domestic
3 15 U.S.C. 631
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business makes up about 85 percent of DFSC's total business,
and is worth approximately $2.8 billion per year. Small
business purchases have been averaging between 28 and 29.9
percent of this domestic pool. From these set-aside figures,
12.8 percent, or almost half, has been specifically awarded to
small disadvantaged businesses at a premium over normal cost.
Another 3 . 3 percent has been awarded to women-owned
businesses. (DFSC, 1992, p. 17)
It is important to understand the method in which
these set-aside goals are established, because they are
difficult to administer, add to costs, and further complicate
the procurement process. The Small Business Act requires that
each agency with contracting authority establish an Office of
Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (SADBU)
.
Generally, the SADBU reports directly to the Agency Head, and
is responsible for establishing program goals and ensuring
compliance with the Act. The Heads of Contracting Activities
(HCAs) are responsible for effectively implementing "Small
Business," "Small Disadvantaged Business," and "Section 8(a)"
utilization programs. These HCAs are also responsible for
taking all reasonable actions that would increase small
business participation within their own contracting processes.
(Federal Acquisition Regulation, 1989, sec. 19.201)
For the petroleum refining industry, a "small
business" is defined as any firm having fewer than 1,500
employees, with a capacity to process less than 50,000 barrels
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of any combination of crude oil or other bona fide feedstock
per day. Counted capacity includes processing at any leased
facilities, or facilities made available to a firm under
exchange agreements whereby another party processes the firm's
own crude oil or feedstocks. A "small disadvantaged business"
is defined as any small business where at least 51 percent of
the firm is owned by individuals who are both socially and
economically disadvantaged. "Socially disadvantaged" means
individuals who have been subject to racial or ethnic
prejudice. "Economically disadvantaged" means individuals who
are socially disadvantaged and impaired by diminished
opportunities to obtain capital and credit as compared with
others in the same business who are not socially
disadvantaged. By specific mention, Black Americans, Hispanic
Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, and
Asian-Indian Americans are all considered to be socially and
economically disadvantaged. "Section 8(a)" firms are defined
as small disadvantaged businesses that provide goods or
services to a Government agency under a specifically defined
subcontracting arrangement through the Small Business
Administration. (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 1989, sec.
19.000-19.102)
In the Department of Defense, the Director of Small
and Disadvantaged Business Utilization is responsible for
developing overall DoD small business and small disadvantaged
business goals, which are established in close cooperation
24
with the Small Business Administration. Departmental SADBUs
within contracting agencies are then responsible for
developing and implementing program goals within their
respective agencies. (Department of Defense FAR Supplement,
1989, sec. 219.201)
While small business set-aside programs are intended
to be socially responsible, they are political in nature and
create substantial programmatic cost premiums. These premiums
manifest themselves in the form of diminished program
flexibility, handicaps to best value, longer bid processing
times, greater administrative resource requirements, and
increased prices paid as a result of Small Disadvantaged
Business awards and participation.
6. Price Adjustment Mechanism
In addition to ineffective long term contracts, long
lead times required to award these contracts, and socio-
economic goal handicaps, DFSC must also face the biggest
challenge of all, a highly volatile and unstable petroleum
market
.
Prior to 1973, world prices for petroleum products
were remarkably stable. In fact, the nominal price of crude
oil had remained fairly constant at less than three dollars a
barrel for more than 100 years (BP, 1993, p. 12). With stable
prices, it made sense to write long-term fixed-price
contracts. This is exactly what DFSC did. (Hart, 1989, p. 8)
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However, as can be seen by Figure 3, stable oil
markets ended in 1973. The catalyst turned out to be the Yom
Kippur War that was then raging in the Middle East.
Protesting Western support for Israel, the Persian Gulf
countries of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries) staged the now infamous Arab Oil Embargo and
crippled the flow of petroleum to Western industrial nations.
At the time, Western nations, including the United States,
were heavily dependent on Middle East oil. As a result, world
oil prices jumped from $2.90 per barrel in September of that
year, to $11.65 by year's end. (Yergin, 1991, p. 791)
Since 197 3, a host of factors have strongly influenced
radical movements in oil market prices. A few of these
factors include the 1979 Iranian revolution, the 1980-1988
Iran-Iraq War, the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill and North Sea
oil platform explosion that occurred later that same year, the
1990 invasion of Kuwait, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
(Yergin, 1991, p. 791)
As a result of this price volatility since 197 3, DFSC
has not been able to continue buying large volumes of oil
using fixed price contracts. Market forces, which continue to
this day, have simply rendered these contracts untenable.
Although these contracts could lock in a favorable price for
the life of the contract, they could also force either party
of the contract to accept potentially ruinous losses.
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Figure 3 Spot Crude Oil Prices
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adjustment mechanisms that are tied to various market indexes.
(Hart, 1989, pp. 8-9)
These economic price adjustments provide for both
upward and downward revisions to a stated contract price.
Adjustments are contingent upon the occurrence of particular
events like severe inflation or market price instability.
Their use is normally limited by law, but they may be used
whenever there is serious doubt that market conditions will be
stable during the period of contract performance. The
Contracting Officer must determine whether inclusion of price
adjustments in a contract is necessary to protect the
Government and the contractor from significant risk due to
potential fluctuations in labor or material costs. If
considered necessary, the Contracting Officer must choose an
adjustment mechanism that is limited to contingencies beyond
the contractor's control. (Federal Acquisition Regulation,
1989, sec. 16.203)
The Federal Acquisition Regulation allows for three
basic types of economic price adjustments. Economic
adjustments may be authorized based upon changes in published
or otherwise established prices, actual costs of labor or
materials, or indexes specifically identified in the contract.
The use of any particular index is left to the discretion of
the negotiated settlement, or may be prescribed by the agency
involved, as in sealed bid contracts. (Federal Acquisition
Regulation, 1989, sec. 14.407-16.203)
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Any price index used must be published and available
to all parties involved. For most bulk contracts, DFSC uses
monthly commercial price data collected by the Department of
Energy and published in the Petroleum Marketing Monthly . For
small local supply contracts, DFSC uses weekly commercial
price information published in industry periodicals like the
Oil Price Information Service, Computer Petroleum Corporation,
and The Lundberg Letter. These periodicals contain commercial
prices for nearly 300 local market areas across the country.
(Hart, 1989, pp. 8-9)
For overseas requirements, DFSC relies heavily upon
commercial price information derived from the major spot
markets. In Europe, commercial information from the Rotterdam
and Mediterranean spot markets are used. In the Western
Pacific and Persian Gulf regions, DFSC uses commercial price
data obtained from the Singapore exchange. (Hart, 1990, p.
35)
Contracts are negotiated in relation to the index
used. For bulk contracts, a base month is chosen, and the
contractor is asked to submit a price proposal effective as of
the base month selected. Awards consider a number of factors,
but important consideration is given to the lowest "laid down"
cost. "Laid down" cost is basically the refiner's price offer
in terms of his ability to satisfy the needs of the contract
in each of the requirement locations specified. (Hart, 1989,
p. 9) After award, the settlement price is adjusted penny for
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penny in relation to movements in the index (Hart, 1990, p.
35) .
The majority of what DFSC buys is designed
specifically for military use and has no exact commercial
equivalent. For this reason, the most similar commercial
alternative is generally used as an index base. For example,
the Navy jet fuel JP-5 is similar to the commercial product
Jet-A used by domestic air carriers. As the closest
commercial alternative, Jet-A would be used as the index base
for JP-5. In the case of the Air Force jet fuel JP-4,
commercial gasoline is currently used as the index base.
(Hart, 1989, p. 9-11)
While this price adjustment mechanism allows DFSC and
its fuel suppliers to share the risk of price volatility, it
does not allow DFSC to lock in advantageous price
opportunities. This creates a severe handicap. In fact, the
effect of the price adjustment mechanism is to merely expose
DFSC to unfavorable, uncontrollable, and unpredictable price
increases.
D. NEW PROCUREMENT STRATEGIES UNDER CONSIDERATION
1. Reasons for Examining Change
While DFSC's fuel procurement costs mirror price
movements in the market, DFSC sells this fuel to its customers
at a fixed annually determined "standard" price that generally
includes an estimated margin to cover storage, handling,
30
transportation, and other contingencies (Hart, 1990, p. 34).
In effect, while DFSC shares a portion of market price risk
with its suppliers, DFSC assumes the full burden of this price
risk for its customers.
This particular management practice, coupled with the
many handicapping procurement practices previously mentioned,
creates a tremendous budgetary dilemma, especially since
approximately 85 percent of DFSC's operating budget is tied to
product procurement costs (Lee, 1992). While DFSC assumes the
full burden of market price risk for its customers, current
budgetary constraint, forecasting imprecision, and exposure to
unpredictable market conditions logically forces DFSC, and
ultimately policy makers in Washington D.C., to consider one
or a combination of several options:
• seek additional budgetary funding,
• reduce the overall quantity of petroleum purchased to
remain within budget,
• charge customers a premium as insurance against market
price risk in the form of higher average standard prices,
• or seek new alternatives in the form of more innovative
procurement strategies.
The boon years of the Reagan administration also
marked some of the most unstable times in the history of the
petroleum markets. The average price of oil ballooned from
about $12 per barrel to nearly $35 per barrel with dramatic
and unpredictable price swings (BP, 1993, p. 12). But during
this time, no one was really concerned about reducing the
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military budget. While the operational tempo of the military
remained fairly constant, supplemental appropriations granted
to DFSC to cover unpredictable increases in oil prices were
fairly common. 4
However, the ability to seek additional budgetary
funding may be coming to an end. Since the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989, (Yergin, 1991, p. 791) Washington D.C. policy
makers have been less than sympathetic to ballooning Defense
budgets. Luckily during the Persian Gulf War, Saudi Arabia
gave the decision makers a slight reprieve by providing much
of the needed and markedly more expensive oil to DFSC free of
charge. However, this was an extremely unique situation.
Saudi Arabia was deeply concerned about its very survival in
the face of Saddam Hussein's invasive presence at its border. 5
The stark reality of the current political situation
is that there is a complete and sweeping paradigm shift in
thought. With the end of the Cold War, and the end of the
Persian Gulf War, and the election of a new Administration
with far different priorities from the past Administration,
policy makers in Washington D.C. have focused and redoubled
their efforts to dramatically reduce military budgets.
4Interview between C. Lee, Director of Market Research and
Analysis, Defense Fuel Supply Center, Alexandria, VA, and the
researcher, 23 August 1993.
5Interview between C. Lee, Director of Market Research and
Analysis, Defense Fuel Supply Center, Alexandria, VA, and the
researcher, 24 August 1993.
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Priorities have shifted toward concerns over the national
deficit, and toward improving the economy and promoting
expensive, albeit long over due, social programs like health
care reform.
In the wake of these sweeping changes, Defense
Operations and Support functions have taken the greatest
immediate budget cuts (Couture, 1992, pp. 15-28), and
operational tempo is what drives fuel requirements. As can be
seen in Figure 4, the quantity of petroleum purchased declined
dramatically from 1973 through 1976, due largely to reduced
operational requirements as the Vietnam War came to a close.
During the Carter and Reagan Administrations, from 1976
through the end of 1988, petroleum purchases remained fairly
constant as operational tempo stabilized. However, since 1989
operational tempo has been driven by budgetary reductions, and
purchases have dropped with nearly the same magnitude as had
occurred at the close of the Vietnam War.
While the amount of fuel purchased has continually and
predictably decreased, the annual cost of procurement has been
dramatically unpredictable. It has bounced between one and
ten billion dollars per year. (DFSC, 1992, p. 9)
According to Market Research Analyst Jim Hart,
Even the most sophisticated market analyst could not
predict all the various turns the market has taken of
late. (Hart, 1989, p. 10)
The bitter conclusion is that reducing the overall
quantity of petroleum purchased in an effort to remain within
33
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budget would not necessarily work from an economic standpoint,
nor would it be something that DFSC could have a great deal of
control over. The operational tempo of DFSC's customers is
the catalyst that establishes fuel procurement requirements.
Even though operational tempo drives fuel procurement
requirements, fuel costs in the form of standard prices impact
heavily on operational tempo throughout the military Services,
particularly at the field level. There is a keen awareness of
this fact at DFSC. 6 While the annual adjustment to standard
prices already includes at least some margin or premium to
withstand moderate market price volatility, 7 every customer
of DFSC faces similar concerns over the budgetary reality of
austere times. There is already a vicious cycle of
anticipatory actions and reactions to budgetary cuts that
adversely impacts on operational tempo. Shifting yet more
costs to DFSC's customers would only deepen the problem
further.
2. Strategies Worthy of Research
In January of 1992, faced with declining budgets and
no apparent solutions to the problems caused by market price
volatility, DFSC began to look for new ideas in procurement
6Interview between COL R. P. Dacey, Chief of Staff, Defense
Fuel Supply Center, Alexandria, VA, and the researcher, 24 August
1993.
7 Interview between L. C. Ervin, Industry Economist, Defense
Fuel Supply Center, Alexandria, VA, and the researcher, 24 August
1993.
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strategies. Under the visionary leadership of Brigadier
General Stephen M. Bliss, DFSC began to reexamine its
procurement practices and looked to the commercial sector for
fresh approaches to common problems. As a result of these
efforts, DFSC began to explore many ideas that could actually
take advantage of market price volatility. Unfortunately, all
of the momentum on these alternative strategies was lost when
General Bliss transferred from DFSC in July of 1993. As such,
many questions about the usefulness of each of these new
approaches remain largely unanswered and are worthy of further
research. 8
The focus of this paper, as presented in subsequent
chapters, is to reexamine one of these new strategies and to
answer some of the lingering questions that still remain.
Although a thorough examination as to the specific merits and
problems of each strategy is well beyond the scope of this
paper, a brief description as to the range of ideas that were
under consideration at the time of General Bliss ' departure is
provided below.
a. Seasonal Stock Building and Drawdown
The primary products purchased under DFSC's bulk
fuel programs are JP-5, JP-8, and F-76. JP-5 and JP-8 are
both jet fuel products while F-7 6 is used for shipboard
8Interview between CAPT L. H. Carpenter, Director of
Contracting and Production, Defense Fuel Supply Center, Alexandria,
VA, and the researcher, 25 August 1993.
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propulsion. All three are distillates similar in nature to
kerosene or home heating oil . Because these products are so
similar to home heating oil, their prices tend to be strongly
influenced by seasonal pressures. The idea of this strategy
is to build up stocks in these products during the spring and
summer months, when they are theoretically cheaper, and then
drawdown these stocks during the fall and winter months when
they are theoretically more expensive. (Lee, January 1992)
b. Timing of Procurements
This strategy also relates to the distillate
products already mentioned. The basis of this strategy is the
belief that scheduling major negotiations during the warmer
months when distillate markets are weakest, would tend to
lower supplier bids. Even though actual deliveries would
still be scheduled to occur over the course of a full year or
more, the belief is that suppliers would be more heavily
influenced during negotiations by a tighter current market at
the time of negotiations. If DFSC can lock in a lower
contractor bid with respect to the price adjustment index
used, it would lower the average price paid over the full life
of the contract. Even though the price paid would still be
tied to fluctuations in the market index, the price
differential established during negotiations would constantly
remain in DFSC's favor. (Lee, January 1992)
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c. Term/Spot Procurement Mix
Under this strategy, the quantity of products
procured under one and two year contracts would be reduced to
about 65 percent of the total required. The balance of
requirements would be bought using spot tenders, or contract
offers for immediate delivery, during periods of advantageous
market conditions. For example, if market supplies are
plentiful and prices are weak, DFSC could take advantage of
the situation by buying up to 35 percent of its requirements
on a spot basis for immediate delivery. (Lee, January 1992)
d. Lift Scheduling
To "lift" essentially means to accept actual
delivery of the petroleum product under contract. The
contract price paid is always established at the time of
actual delivery or lift, based upon the negotiated price as
adjusted by the applicable market index used. Currently, no
consideration is given to market price conditions, which
drives the market index, in scheduling tanker lifts. During
long-term price trends, cargo lift dates could be advanced or
postponed to match the direction of the market price movement.
Consideration could also be given to arbitrage opportunities.
Cheaper cost lifts intended for delivery to one port area
could be diverted to higher cost program areas if the price
plus transportation savings were advantageous. (Lee, January
1992)
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e. Posts, Camps, and Stations Deliveries
Currently, all of DFSC's customers pay an annually
determined standard price for the fuel they receive. Hence,
there is little incentive for these customers to alter their
ordering habits to conform to favorable market price
opportunities. The basis of this idea is that some method
could be devised to give major Army Posts, Marine Camps, and
Naval Stations an incentive to become aware of market price
conditions. Armed with market awareness, these large military
bases could advance or delay deliveries to match the direction
of the market price movement. (Lee, January 1992)
f. Risk Management
This strategy is the primary focus of this research
paper. Basically, DFSC could use the futures market to limit
the risk of detrimental price movements affecting its
contracts (Lee, January 1992). This is an interesting and
creative idea that will be described and evaluated in great
detail throughout the remaining chapters.
E. SUMMARY
As an Inventory Control Point under the Defense Logistics
Agency, DFSC is organized to buy and manage most of the fuel
requirements within the Department of Defense, and other
Federal and Civil agencies. While DFSC is the largest single
customer for petroleum in the world, many of its procurement
practices, some of which are mandated by law, handicap its
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ability to buy efficiently and effectively in the highly
volatile petroleum markets. While market price fluctuations
have been a problem since the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, the
political thrust in Washington D.C. since the fall of the
Berlin Wall, coupled with declining military budgets, makes
exploring new procurement strategies critical. While DFSC
began the process of reevaluating its procurement practices in
January of 1992, many questions about the potential of new
strategies remain largely unanswered and are worthy of further
research.
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III. EXAMINATION OF THE FUTURES MARKET
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This chapter focuses on the futures market and explains
how the market is structured and regulated. This chapter also
explains how the futures market functions and is used by the
two major segments of the market, hedgers and speculators.
B. STRUCTURE AND REGULATION
Prior to 1983, there was no centralized market for oil
commodities trading. For most of its history, the oil
industry had been dominated by fully integrated companies
which controlled oil all the way from the well head to the gas
pump. Thus merchants, brokers, and other intermediaries were
relatively unimportant. (Houthakker, 1976, p. 2)
Crude oil was primarily sold under long term contracts
between private firms. Contracts were typically multi-year
agreements with flexible pricing provisions and renegotiation
clauses. Sellers often offered discounts, but usually
retained some discretion over the quantities actually
delivered. This flexibility allowed sellers to shift supplies
to spot market sales when desired. (Horwich, 1984, pp. 197-
199)
The spot market, which continues to this day, is not an
organized entity. Rather than being a single forum reflecting
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world activity, like the futures market, the spot market and
spot prices reflect only a small portion of world activity in
only a few key locations. These locations usually only
include major refining and exporting centers like Rotterdam in
the Netherlands. Spot prices in these key locations are
generally reported by trade publications such as Petroleum
Intelligence Weekly and Piatt's Ollgram. During normal market
periods, spot prices tend to fluctuate in close proximity to
near-term delivery contract prices between large firms.
However, during periods of supply disruption, spot prices tend
to lead increases in contract prices. Generally, anyone able
to buy oil at a stable contract price for the long-term would
profit if spot prices increased. (Horwich, 1984, pp. 197-199)
While accounting for only five to fifteen percent of total
world activity, the spot market can be a remarkably accurate
indicator of long-term price trends . Spot markets have
signaled and often precipitated OPEC pricing actions, as well
as setting the general tone and movement for oil prices in the
mainstream consumer markets. Few if any oil companies sell
all of their oil products on the spot market. Rather, most
oil companies use the spot market to liquidate surpluses.
(Verleger, 1982, pp. 263-265)
1983 marked the first time oil commodities were widely
traded in any centralized marketplace. With the introduction
of an instrument called West Texas Intermediate (WTI), the New
York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) became the first organized
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commodities market to trade in crude oil futures. (Yergin,
1992, 724)
Today there are only three exchanges in the world that
trade in oil futures. As shown in Table IV, these are the
SIMEX Exchange in Singapore, the IPE Exchange in London, and
the NYMEX Exchange in New York. Of these, the NYMEX Exchange
in New York is by far the largest, trading nearly 80 percent
TABLE IV EXCHANGES TRADING OIL FUTURES















IPE , London Gas Oil 3,144,067 189,709
Brent Crude 5,528,676 701,894
NYMEX,






Natural Gas 1,896,689 78,113
Propane 49,351 N/A
(NYMEX, January 1993, p. 4)
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of the total world volume of oil futures contracts. (NYMEX,
January 1993, p. 4)
The NYMEX Exchange was founded in 1872 as the Butter and
Cheese Exchange of New York, trading almost exclusively in
these two agricultural products. In 1882, the name was
changed to the New York Mercantile Exchange and other
agricultural and foreign currency contracts were added (NYMEX,
January 1993). During the 1950s, NYMEX moved toward trading
industrial commodities, including platinum and palladium. In
1978, with domestic deregulation in the heating oil market,
NYMEX began trading in heating oil futures. While not traded
nearly as widely as WTI futures, heating oil futures provided
NYMEX with valuable energy commodity experience and was its
first energy complex contract. (NYMEX, Petroleum Marketers
Handbook, Appendix B)
Today, energy related trading accounts for 95 percent of
NYMEX 's total business, making it the third largest
commodities exchange in the world. It is also the only
exchange in the world that trades exclusively in strategic
industrial commodities. Figure 5 shows the volume of energy
contracts traded on the NYMEX Exchange since 1983. Appendix
G provides specific information and descriptions of each type
of energy contract traded on the NYMEX Exchange. (NYMEX,
Petroleum Marketers Handbook, Appendix B)
The New York Mercantile Exchange is a nonprofit entity
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Figure 5 NYMEX Trade Volumes
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individuals representing brokerage houses, bankers,
professional traders, and businesses with commercial interests
in commodities. The NYMEX Exchange itself never actually
owns or trades in any of the contracts or commodities it
handles. Rather, NYMEX exists as a forum to provide contract
standardization, regulation, trade processing, and trading
facilities. (NYMEX, Petroleum Marketers Handbook, Appendix B)
The NYMEX Exchange, like all commodity exchanges through
out the United States, is regulated by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC). Established by Congress in 1974,
the CFTC is directed by five Commissioners appointed by the
President. The CFTC must approve the terms and conditions of
all proposed contracts before they can be listed for
trading. The CFTC also establishes guidelines for
surveillance and reporting requirements, as well as trading
restrictions and margin requirements. (NYMEX, 1993)
The NYMEX Exchange is organized to conduct three types of
surveillance activities. These include market surveillance,
financial surveillance, and trade surveillance. Market
surveillance monitors market participants and examines
relationships between NYMEX trading activity and fundamental
factors affecting underlying commodities. It identifies
participants with large reportable positions, an example would
be 300 futures contracts for WTI, and ensures compliance with
CFTC reporting requirements. It also ensures against price
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distortion and market manipulation. (NYMEX, March 1993, pp.
2-10)
Financial surveillance audits the financial condition of
clearing members and establishes specific capitalization
requirements that must be maintained in order to remain a
market participant. There are essentially three tiers of
market participants, customers, brokers, and clearing members.
Customers place their trading instructions with brokers.
Brokers execute customer orders on the trading floor.
Clearing members act as sponsors to the brokers and ensure the
financial integrity of each trade, as well as the entire NYMEX
Exchange. Financial surveillance ensures that clearing
members maintain adequate financial margins and enforces
position limits. Clearing members pass similar restrictions
onto brokers and brokers do the same with customers. (NYMEX,
March 1993, pp. 2-10)
Clearing members must maintain a minimum working capital
of $500,000 on account with a New York City bank that also
meets NYMEX Exchange capital and rating requirements.
Additionally, clearing members must each contribute capital
ranging from $100,000 to $2,000,000 to a NYMEX Exchange
guaranty fund for the general protection of the Exchange's
financial integrity. (NYMEX, Petroleum Marketers Handbook,
Appendix B)
Trade surveillance monitors actual trading floor activity.
It prevents trading manipulation and anti-competitive
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activities. It enforces stringent trading and audit recording
procedures and uses severe fines and debarment penalties to
prevent trade abuses. (NYMEX, March 1993, pp. 2-10)
Specific trading restrictions vary between contract types
and trading strategies. Generally, these restrictions break
down into price limits, position limits, and margin
requirements. Price limits protect the exchange and market
participants from dramatic and sudden price movements. If
price movement restrictions are exceeded, they automatically
suspend trading in a particular commodity for a pre-determined
period of time. This cooling off mechanism allows time to
assess information on record breaking events. It promotes
sensible trading based upon rational thinking and complete




This mechanism was only required one time in the entire
history of the NYMEX Exchange. When Saddam Hussein invaded
Kuwait the price of WTI crude oil shot from under $20 per
barrel to over $40 in a single afternoon. The threat of panic
was so great that then President Bush called the Chairman of
the NYMEX Exchange to find out if he intended to shut the
Exchange down. By the time the Chairman had received the
President's call, trading in WTI futures had already been
9Interview between R. Seide, Marketing Manager, New York
Mercantile Exchange, New York, NY, and the researcher, 27 August
1993.
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suspended for several hours because a $15 price movement limit
had been exceeded. After a brief cooling down period, and
time to better assess information, trading resumed the same
day with only moderate subsequent price movements.
Position limits along with margin requirements ensure that
each market participant has the requisite financial capability
to sustain unexpected losses. Position limits define the
number of outstanding contracts that can be held by any one
market participant. Position limits are established based
upon the capitalization levels of each firm trading (NYMEX,
Petroleum Marketers Handbook , Appendix B) . Margin
requirements establish how much money must be kept on account
for each open contract. Margin requirements are based upon a
risk assessment of each participant's net market position.
Margins on account for each participant are recalculated
several times per day and must be readjusted and settled
instantly, usually through electronic transfer of funds.
(NYMEX, November 1992, pp. 34-35)
In general, there are two types of contracts traded in the
futures market, futures and options. A futures contract is a
standardized binding obligation to either make or take
delivery of a specified quantity and quality of a commodity at
a specified location and time in the future. An obligation to
10Interview between B. Purta, Vice President Compliance
Department, New York Mercantile Exchange, New York, NY, and the
researcher, 27 August 1993.
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make delivery is called a short position, while and obligation
to take delivery is called a long position. An options
contract gives the buyer of a futures contract the right but
not the obligation to buy or sell the underlying commodity at
a fixed "strike" price, over a specified period of time. This
right is given by the options writer, or seller, for the
payment of a one time premium. An option to buy is called a
call, while an option to sell is called a put. (NYMEX, 1993)
Figure 6 is a typical excerpt from the Wall Street
Journal. It shows how futures contract trading information is
structured. For example, the top entry shows that WTI (Crude
Oil, Light Sweet) is traded on the New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYM) . Each contract represents 1,000 barrels of
oil, and prices are listed in dollars per barrel. The entry
also shows that futures contracts are currently being traded
in the listed months of May 1993 through December 1995. The
entry lists opening prices, high, low and settlement ranges,
as well as historical highs and lows and current volumes of
trade and open contract interests. (NYMEX, April 1993)
Figure 7 shows how similar information for options
contracts is structured. For the same crude oil contract
previously described, a trader can buy an options call or put
for the months of June, July, or August. Strike prices range
from $19 to $24 per barrel, with premiums ranging from $.01 to
$2.35 per barrel. Trade volumes are listed as well. (NYMEX,
April 1993)
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Figure 7 Wall Street Journal Options Listing
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C. FUNCTION AND USE
The futures market provides two valuable functions, price
discovery and risk shifting. Futures contracts are traded
through a system called "open outcry," basically verbal bids
in public auction, on a regulated exchange. Futures contracts
are standardized, hence have tradeable value similar to stocks
or bonds. Purchases and sales prices are transmitted
immediately around the world to be seen, or discovered, by all
market participants. The prices reported on the commodity
exchanges thus reflect a world market consensus of commodity
price expectations in the future, and constantly change to
match these world expectations . Figure 8 shows the typical
flow of trading transactions, while Figure 9 shows the flow of
information as it generally occurs on the trading floor of the
NYMEX Exchange in New York. Trade activity and information
moves at an astounding pace. In fact, NYMEX regulations
require floor brokers to report each completed trade
transaction within 60 seconds of occurrence. (NYMEX, 1993)
The other valuable function performed by the futures
market is risk shifting. There are basically two types of
traders in the futures market, hedgers and speculators. A
hedger wishes to protect the value of an underlying commodity
he intends to buy or sell at some time in the future. His


























Figure 8 NYMEX Trade Transaction Flow
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Figure 9 NYMEX Trade Information Flow
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onto someone else. A speculator, on the other hand, trades in
the futures market to make a profit. A speculator wishes to
accept the risk of a future event in exchange for some premium
that can be realized at the time the futures contract is
traded. (NYMEX, 1993)
In general, a hedge is an open position taken in the
futures market, either a buy position called a long, or a sell
position called a short, that establishes a guaranteed price
in the future for a commodity that will also be bought or sold
in the spot or cash market (NYMEX, 1993). A refiner would
sell a futures contract to hedge against the possibility that
oil prices for products he intends to sell would fall in the
future. As an end user or intermediary, DFSC would buy a
futures contract to hedge against the possibility that oil
prices for products it intends to buy would rise in the
future.
From a producer's point of view, he can sell his intended
production forward, even before it is actually produced. He
locks in his price and thereby knows his level of risk in
advance. The buyer is also able to lock in his purchase price
and he thereby knows his level of risk in advance as well.
Both buyer and seller are hedging their risks against each
other with opposite positions and trading goals. Speculators
usually take positions on both sides, and are willing to
accept risk for the potential of profit. The object for each
buyer and seller engaged in hedging is to minimize his own
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risk and reduce exposure to price volatility. (Yergin, 1992,
p. 724)
Hedging, like an insurance policy, transfers risk from the
policy holder to an underwriter, in this case from a hedger to
a market filled with both speculators and other hedgers, but
with opposite investment goals. Figure 10 gives the relative
size of the various futures market participants. As can be
seen, speculators comprise only 7.4 percent of the market.
Empirically, it is the opposite trading goals of hedgers that
have the greatest impact on futures prices. However,
speculators are extremely important in the efficient operation
of the futures market. Not only do speculators assume risk in
return for potential profit, but they also provide essential
market liquidity. (NYMEX, 1993)
Because futures contracts have tradeable market value, a
futures position may be terminated or closed by a reversing
transaction any time prior to expiration. For example, the
refiner would buy a futures contract to close his hedge, while
DFSC would sell its futures contract to close its hedge. This
ability to reverse and close positions allows the trader an
opportunity to pull out the monetary savings from the hedge
without actual physical delivery of the underlying commodity.
(NYMEX, 1993)
If futures contracts are hedged against actual quantities
at risk in the physical cash or spot market, savings in the













Figure 10 Futures Market Participants
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market, and vice versa. This phenomenon is due to the
differential price that is realized through buying or selling
the actual, or underlying commodity, in the physical market at
the same time a position is held in the futures market.
Hence, the effect of a fixed-price contract is achieved
without the actual use of one. (NYMEX, 1993)
For example, suppose oil was trading for $25 in January,
but DFSC decided to take delivery in June using a contract
that was indexed to the spot market. In June DFSC would have
to pay whatever the spot price was at the time of delivery.
Suppose in January DFSC also decided to hedge its June
delivery, and bought a futures contract for $25. Suppose that
when June came, the spot price jumped to $30. In the physical
market DFSC would have lost $5 because the price went to $30,
and it would have to pay $5 more than was expected in January.
However, in the futures market, DFSC could have sold its
futures contract in June for $30, and would have gained $5
over the cost it paid in January. Hence, losses in the
physical market would be offset by gains in the futures
market, and an effective fixed procurement cost of $25 would
be achieved without using an actual fixed-price contract.
Futures contracts can also be developed in tandem with
options. Since options provide buying and selling rights
without actual obligation, for the cost of a premium, they
afford hedgers even greater protection and flexibility in
achieving individual trading goals. They also provide
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speculators another source of premium earnings to improve
their profit potential. A hedging futures contract coupled
with a put options contract, would not only offer risk
protection against market price increases, but would also
offer price participation during market price decreases. 11
Using the same example, suppose in June the spot price
dropped to $20. In the physical market DFSC would have saved
$5 because the price dropped to $20 and was $5 lower than
expected in January. However, in the futures market DFSC
would be forced to sell its futures contract in June for $20.
It would have lost $5 over the price it paid in January. In
this situation, gains in the physical market would be offset
by losses in the futures market. Unfortunately, if the spot
price dropped to $20, the effective procurement cost would
still be fixed at $25 because of the futures market position.
Suppose in January DFSC had also bought a $25 put option
for a small premium. The $25 put option grants DFSC the right
but not the obligation to sell the underlying futures contract
for $25 no matter what the spot price becomes. If the June
spot price jumps to $30, the put option becomes worthless and
the effective procurement cost becomes $25 plus the cost of
the premium paid on the put option. If the June spot price
falls to $20, DFSC can now sell the futures contract for $25
1:LInterview between R. Seide, Marketing Manager, New York
Mercantile Exchange, New York, NY, and the researcher, 27 August
1993.
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and the effective procurement cost becomes $20 plus the cost
of the premium paid on the put option. In this example, by
buying the hedging futures contract and put option together,
DFSC would be able to protect itself against spot price
increases, and would also be able to participate in spot price
decreases.
D. SUMMARY
While oil has been bought and sold in the spot market
since its discovery, futures trading in broad based oil
commodities has only occurred since 1983. Unlike the spot
market, futures market prices represent a world-wide consensus
of market price expectations. In the United States, the
futures market is heavily regulated and monitored by both the
CFTC, and the commodity exchanges. Many safeguards are in
place to prevent manipulation, and provide market stability.
There are only three exchanges in the world that trade in oil
futures contracts. The NYMEX Exchange in New York is the
largest. The futures market provides two valuable functions,
price discovery and risk shifting. The market is comprised of
both hedgers and speculators who use the market to achieve
different trading goals. The Defense Fuel Supply Center would
trade as a hedger.
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IV. FACTORS AFFECTING THE UNDERLYING PRICES OF OIL
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This chapter describes the primary factors that drive
prices in both the spot and futures markets. This chapter
also explains the primary differences that exist between the
two most popular methods of market analysis. Finally it
explains the connection between futures market prices and the
spot prices of the underlying oil commodities they represent.
B. PRIMARY FACTORS
1. Supply and Demand
There are many factors that affect the price behavior
of oil in the various markets. However, taken in aggregate
these factors create certain technical and economic conditions
that establish key relationships between oil production and
oil consumption. These key relationships then become the
basic foundation for price formulation in both the spot and
futures markets. (MacAvoy, 1982, pp. 5-39)
At its most rudimentary level, oil production is a
function of the aggregate yet independent exploration of
natural resources leading to the discovery of new oil
reserves, and their subsequent exploitation and conversion
into marketable products. Of key importance, is the size,
location, and number of proven reserves, as well as the
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productive capacity of the industrial infrastructure.
Production is heavily influenced by the rate at which existing
stocks are depleted and new reserves are discovered.
(MacAvoy, 1982, pp. 5-39)
Consumption is a function of aggregate consumer
income, population growth and economic activity. Consumption
is heavily influenced by the desirability of the oil products
produced and preferences over other energy alternatives
.
Production establishes the foundation of world oil supply
while consumption establishes the foundation of world oil
demand. In general, the interaction of supply and demand in
the presence or absence of regulatory intervention establishes
market price. (MacAvoy, 1982, pp. 5-39)
Various supply and demand relationships influence
price. Figure 11 compares the average West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) price against drilling production, refinery throughput,
and consumption. From 1973 until about 1985, oil prices were
heavily influenced by OPEC (Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries) . World production was tightly controlled
and consumption was fairly constant. In 1985, Saudi Arabian
production initially bottomed out at 2.34 million barrels per
day to support the OPEC price. Disgruntled over the
tremendous loss in revenue associated with this production
level, the Saudi Oil Ministers boosted production to fund
internal projects. With a break in the OPEC cartel, the price
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the price has generally followed the volume of activity from
both production and consumption. (Energy In the News, 1993)
Figure 12, compares the WTI price against excess
refining capacity. 12 As the price declined from 1982 through
1988, many small refineries went out of business. Statistics
collected by DFSC show a decline of nearly 100 operable
domestic refineries during this period. Most of these
refineries had a capacity of less than 50,000 barrels per day
(DFSC, 1991, p. 13). As the price began to increase in 1988,
greater profit potential brought refiners back into the
business. During this later period, DFSC statistics show a
slight increase in the number of operable domestic refineries
in the greater than 50,000 barrel category, but still show
decreases for refineries less than 50,000 barrels capacity
(DFSC, 1992, p. 13). This means that there are operating
inefficiencies and greater barriers to entry at the lower end
of the capacity scale.
Figure 13 compares the WTI price with excess
consumption. 13 From 1987 through the present, it appears as
if the general trend of excess consumption is opposite to the
price. While the price in general is rising, excess
consumption appears to be falling.
12Excess refining capacity equals refining capacity minus
throughput
.
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Figure 14 compares the WTI price with international
trade activity. Since 1986, the volume of trade appears to
precede the general movement in price.
2 . Properties and Quality
In reality, there is no single world oil price. Price
varies depending upon certain intrinsic as well as extrinsic
qualities, including sulfur content, distillation fractions,
transportation costs, and numerous other factors. (Horwich,
1984, p. 197)
Of primary importance to the price of crude oil is its
sulfur content and its API (American Petroleum Institute)
gravity. Table V provides the sulfur content and API gravity
for many common crude oils. Low sulfur crude oils, called
"sweet" crudes, are much easier to refine than high sulfur
crude oils, called "sour" crudes. A sweet crude is defined as
having less than 0.25 percent by weight of sulfur. Sweet
crude oils yield greater quantities of high value products
like naphtha and gasoline and are generally more expensive
than sour crude oils. Sour crudes have more than 0.5 percent
sulfur by weight and comprise more than 60 percent of world
production and 80 percent of the economically recoverable
petroleum reserves (NYMEX, 1993, p. 7).
API gravity measures specific gravity in terms of
weight per unit volume. The API gravity index runs from to
100, equivalent to the specific gravities of 1.076 to 0.6112
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TABLE V API GRAVITY AND SULFUR CONTENT











East Texas 38.0 0.26
Gulf Coast 22.0 0.19
West Texas 36.0 1.38














(Navy, 1979. p. 52)
(Navy, 1979, p. 52). API gravity plays a major role in
transportation costs. Oil is priced in dollars per
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barrel, but freight rates on oil are given in terms of dollars
per metric or long ton. Higher gravity crude oils, meaning
lighter ones, would represent more barrels per ton to be
transported for the same cost. In other words, higher gravity
crude oils cost less per barrel to transport than lower
gravity crude oils. (Rifai, 1975, pp. 73-74)
Figure 15 shows the API gravity and barrels per metric
ton for many common crude oil sources. Figure 15 also shows
that Bolivian oil, being much lighter because of higher API
gravity, is much cheaper per barrel to transport than Italian
oil.
3. Products and Refining
Crude oil is converted into more than 2,500 products
and over 3,000 petrochemicals (Navy, 1979, p. 52). These
include fuels, lubricants, paints, dyes, soaps, explosives,
compounds, insecticides, waxes, asphalts and other lesser
known products. Of these, the major fuels like gasoline,
heating oil, diesel fuel, and other residual fuels have become
the most prominent, both in terms of the revenue they produce
and the politics they evoke. These four categories of fuel,
determine more than 90 percent of the total value of crude
oil. Each product is traded in its own separate market and
must establish market equilibrium and price with relative
independence from every other product. What is interesting to
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Figure 15 Crude Oil Barrels per Metric Ton
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also has great bearing on its ultimate price. (Cassady, 1954,
pp. 6-28)
There is some disagreement over which price is more
important, the crude oil price, or the aggregate price of
products. From one point of view, crude oil sets the price
foundation and pace for all other petroleum products to
follow. However as a raw material, crude oil has little
intrinsic value except to a refiner. According to the tunnel
theory, crude oil's value is derived from the worth of
products which can be made from it. According to this point
of view, the key to understanding crude oil price movements is
to understand the movement of its product prices. These
product prices establish a floor and a ceiling, or a tunnel of
price ranges in which a refiner would be willing to buy crude
oil. From this theory, the marginal value of crude oil to a
refinery can be derived by determining the percentage yield
and value of all of its products. (Ervin, 1984, pp. 376-382)
The quantity and value of the product itself is
constrained by the physical chemistry of the crude oil from
which it came and the sophistication of the refinery through
which it is processed. For example, jet fuel is usually
produced from the simple distillation of light crude oil.
Gasoline is made from an entirely different process, generally
using heavy crude oil. The gasoline refining process usually
consists of either breaking up large hydrocarbon molecules, or
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combining smaller ones, much more complicated processes than
simple distillation. (Wald, 1990, p. E-7)
At the same time, Venezuelan crude oil is much heavier
than oil from Kuwait, and Saudi Arabian crude oil is much
heavier than oil from Iraq. Both Venezuelan and Saudi Arabian
crude oil have fewer of the chemical bonds required to make
jet fuel. However, these crude oils do not adversely affect
gasoline, which has chemical properties at the other end of
the physical spectrum. This is one reason why the difference
between the cost of crude oil and gasoline was 60 percent
lower after the invasion of Kuwait. Gasoline was simply being
made from a better mix or vintage of crude oil. (Wald, 1990,
p. E-7)
Figure 16 shows a basic schematic for a relatively
sophisticated refinery. Topping is the first operation in
nearly all refineries. Here light or straight run products
are distilled and separated from heavier products called
topped crude oil. The lighter products are then fractionated,
or separated by layer in a vertical column, and subjected to
high temperatures. With heat they decompose, or crack, into
smaller molecules. In the hydrogen treating process, sulfur
is removed from the fractionated products by creating hydrogen
sulfide gas. Gasolines are then sent to a catalytic reforming
unit where molecules are added to improve their octane. The
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BASIC REFINERY OPERATIONS
(Navy, 1979, p. 54)
Figure 16 Basic Refinery Operations
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form jet fuels, diesel fuels, and heating oil. (Navy, 1979,
pp. 54-57)
What determines the sophistication of a refinery is
how efficiently it can convert the heavier or topped crude to
more valuable lighter products. Catalytic cracking takes
topped crude and produces lighter products by exposing hot oil
feedstocks to a catalyst in a continuously circulating system.
Catalytic hydrocracking is a more sophisticated process done
at much higher temperatures and pressures. Hydrogen is
consumed by the feedstock as it is exposed to the catalyst,
creating new hydrocarbon molecules. Catalytic hydrocracking
gives a refinery much greater flexibility because it
significantly improves the quantity of the lighter products
produced over simple catalytic cracking. (Navy, 1979, pp. 54-
57)
Older less sophisticated refineries generally rely on
thermal cracking to break down the topped crude oil. Thermal
cracking uses high temperatures to decompose the feedstocks.
Coking and visbreaking are the only thermal cracking processes
still in use. (Navy, 1979, pp. 54-57)
The refining process produces four broad categories of
fuel. These are light gases, gasolines, distillates, and
residuals. Light gasses consist of methane, ethane, propane,
butane, and other light gasses called olefins. Gasolines are
a complex mixture of hydrocarbons designed to promote high
antiknocking qualities, low engine deposits, and prevent vapor
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lock in internal combustion engines. Distillates include jet
fuels, diesel fuels, and heating oils. Distillates have very
similar properties to kerosine. Residuals are the left over
by products and are used mostly in industrial grade steam
boilers. (Navy, 1979, pp. 58-59)
4. History and Politics
History and politics have played a major role in the
price behavior of oil. A decade after gold was discovered in
California, a different kind of gold prospecting was occurring
in a tiny Northwestern town of Pennsylvania called Titusville.
In 1859 on the shores of Oil Creek (Yergin, 1992, p. 789), a
former railway conductor named Edward L Drake, who liked to
call himself Colonel, became the first man to commercially
pump the liquid commodity which has become so intimately
intertwined with every facet of our modern society. (Ridgeway,
1980, p. 74)
However, the early years of the oil industry were
quite different from today. For nearly half a century, oil
was used almost exclusively for illumination. During that
time, John D. Rockefeller was able to parlay the profits of a
small produce business on the Cleveland docks into one of the
most powerful corporations the world has ever known.
Recognizing an opportunity, he started an oil refinery
business with a partner that he later bought out. By 1879,
his new business was refining and marketing more than 90
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percent of all the oil produced throughout the United States.
(Ridgeway, 1980, p. 75)
By 1882, Thomas Edison began to light cities with a
different form of illumination. With his much safer electric
lighting becoming more popular around the world, the oil
business was forced to look for a new identity. In 1896,
Henry Ford built his first automobile and the future of the
oil business again began to look bright. (Yergin, 1992, p.
789)
However, 1911 would prove to be a more pivotal year.
While this Nation's courts were breaking up Rockefeller's then
monopolistic Standard Oil Company into 33 smaller companies,
Winston Churchill, then first lord of the admiralty, was
making a decision in Great Britain that would change the
importance of oil in the world forever. Churchill decided
that the warships of the British Empire would no longer be
fueled with coal, but would run on oil. (Ridgeway, 1980, p.
75)
With Churchill's decision, oil became more than just
a simple commodity. While oil has always provided massive
wealth for individuals, companies, and even nations,
Churchill's decision put oil at the center of national
strategy, global politics, and world power. Oil has dominated
world events ever since. Today it is still the Holy Grail of
global politics and power. In fact, no other readily traded
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commodity has ever earned such strategic importance. (Yergin,
1992, p. 13)
While oil has fueled the pinnacle of our industrial
achievements, it has also warned us of the depth of our
dependence. No place on earth has proven us this fact more
clearly than the Middle East. As explained in Chapter II, the
nominal price of crude oil remained fairly constant for nearly
100 years. Then Western support for the Israelis during the
Yom Kippur War caused the Middle Eastern Nations of OPEC to
retaliate in protest.
The effect OPEC's actions had on the world price of
oil was swift and dramatic. In September 1972, the Rotterdam
spot price of crude oil stood at $3 per barrel. During the
next three months, through the outbreak of hostilities between
the Arabs and Israelis, the spot price of crude oil rose to
$19 per barrel. After three years of 11 percent compound
growth in output, OPEC suddenly reduced production by 10.5
percent and instituted a total embargo of shipments to the
U.S. and other Western countries friendly to Israel.
(Horwich, 1984, p. 57)
With great alarm, reduced production in this region
precipitated a world-wide supply shock, driving crude oil
prices to record highs. During the 1950s, the seven major oil
companies in the Persian Gulf region (Esso, Mobile, SoCal,
Texaco, BP, Gulf, and Shell) were already producing 53 percent
of the world's crude oil supply (Adelman, 1972, pp. 78-83).
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By the early 1970s, the major oil companies had all been
nationalized by the OPEC governments, but the Persian Gulf
region was now producing more than two thirds of the world's
crude (Yergin, 1992, p. 718).
By the time of the Yom Kippur War, OPEC was in firm
control of nearly 90 percent of the international crude oil
market and 73.3 percent of the world's proven oil reserves
(Ecbo, 1976, p. 2). With the world so heavily dependent on
Persian Gulf oil, the production shortage caused by OPEC
increased worldwide prices by 17 percent during 1973, and an
additional 211 percent during 1974 (MacAvoy, 1982, p. 2).
In 1979 and 1980 another war in the Middle East caused
similar problems. During the opening battles of the Iranian
Iraqi war, cutbacks from these two combatants caused OPEC to
reduce oil production below pre-1978 levels. The shortage
initiated by this new crisis caused worldwide prices to rise
another 63 percent in less than a year. (MacAvoy, 1982, p. 2)
Although the market power of OPEC is pervasive, as a
cartel it faces a rather unique organizational challenge. The
welfare of the group as a whole is only benefited if each of
the members coordinate production decisions to limit output
and elevate oil prices as if they were a single supplier. In
effect, they must be able to unify their respective goals,
resolve differences, and combine forces to act like a
monopoly. (Moran, 1978, p. 1-28)
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In contrast, the welfare to each individual OPEC
member is increased only if it can expand its own production
output, while still remaining under the organizational
umbrella and stability of OPEC's market power. By offering
renegade price discounts and avoiding disciplinary actions by
the cartel or causing the cartel to fall apart, an individual
member can beat the market price, attract hungry customers,
improve personal market share, and thereby improve total
revenue and profits. In effect, members are individually
better off to act in their own self-interest and cheat the
cartel as long as they can do it without some form of
organizational retaliation. (Moran, 1978, p. 1-28)
Historically, world demand for OPEC oil production as
a group had been relatively inelastic, but the world demand
for oil production from any one particular country within OPEC
can often be highly elastic. Since the marginal production
costs of any individual member are generally small when
compared to the cartel's asking price, the rewards and
incentives for cheating are great. (Moran, 1978, p. 1-28)
As a consequence, each member must exercise self
discipline for the common good and be assured that each fellow
member will do the same in order to preserve the cartel's
market strength. This mutual balance requires major economic
agreement between member nations, either explicit or implied,
as to the specific distribution of market share. It also
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requires some method of monitoring and enforcing that
distribution agreement. (Moran, 1978, p. 1-28)
In the past, OPEC had a fortuitous advantage in
dealing with the question of market share distribution and the
problems of cheating. Member governments that needed to
maximize revenues were already operating at near full
capacity. Member governments with the greatest ability to
expand output were not in need of the revenues that additional
production could have generated. Production cutbacks
necessary to balance supply and demand at prices dictated by
OPEC were shouldered by low-population, low mobilization
nations for whom the marginal utility of the foregone revenue
was very low. Cheating on the part of a few high population,
high-mobilization states was too minor to be of any
consequence, and was tolerated by the cartel with minimal
organizational detriment. (Moran, 1978, p. 1-28)
The treasure chest of OPEC's power in the past was the
huge global dependence on Persian Gulf oil. But the genuine
key to this treasure came from the cartel's relatively
painless ability to limit production. That particular key
was, in fact, dependent on Saudi Arabia and its willingness to
act as the cartel's residual supplier, cutting back whatever
exports were necessary to balance supply and demand at the
OPEC chosen price. (Moran, 1978, p. 1-28)
By 1985, the world had dramatically changed. First,
driven by the incentives of the higher prices and profits
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reaped in the 1970s, small independent oil companies called
wildcats and major firms alike pressed hard to develop new
reserves. Major finds in the North Sea, Alaska, Mexico,
Malaysia, Angola, China and even within the continental United
States began to produce and produce big. As these huge new
finds began selling in the market, they also began to
significantly reduce OPEC's slice of the available pie.
(Yergin, 1992, pp. 715-769)
Second, the massive global march toward greater
dependence on petroleum based energy was being reversed,
significantly reducing the size of the pie itself. Coal
staged an energetic reentry into the electrical generation
market. Nuclear energy and natural gas use was expanding
world-wide, and Japan was leading the way in high-tech energy
conservation and fuel efficient automobiles. (Yergin, 1992,
pp. 715-769)
Third, with greater non-OPEC supply and diminishing
world demand, Saudi Arabia resisted further production cuts,
in the face of now higher production costs and painful losses
of revenue due to collapsing oil prices. In 1981 Saudi Arabia
had earned $119 billion in oil revenues. By 1985, with
declining market share and price, Saudi Arabia was scraping to
earn $26 billion. At the time, their own infrastructure
construction and societal modernization and mobilization plans
needed funding. (Yergin, 1992, pp. 715-769)
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The build-up in non-OPEC supply and a collapse in
world oil demand reduced OPEC exports by more than 13 million
barrels per day, or 43 percent of 1979 levels. A huge world
oil glut developed that has continued until this day. Even
through the recent Iraqi embargo, horrific oil well fires, and
tremendous oil field destruction of the Persian Gulf War
(Yergin, 1992, pp. 715-769), the world was pumping as much oil
without Iraq and Kuwait as it had with them. (Wald, 1990, p.
e-7)
Current world production has temporarily crippled
OPEC's price setting power. However, while proven oil
reserves have increased from 670 billion barrels in 1984 to
over one trillion barrels today, the vast majority of proven
oil reserves are still concentrated within the Persian Gulf
region, as shown in Figure 17. While the Western nations of
the world remain the heaviest oil consumers, emerging nations
are just now beginning to industrialize. It may only be a
matter of time before non-OPEC reserves are depleted through
over production. If that happens, OPEC will again be in a
position to rule the market and demand the price that it
wants. (Yergin, 1992, p. 769)
C. MARKET ANALYSIS
The factors mentioned are but a few of the many that
affect oil prices in the various markets. There are however,



















Figure 17 Proven Reserves vs . Consumption
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fundamental analysis and technical analysis. Fundamental
analysis seeks to make better decisions through finding better
information about the underlying or fundamental factors behind
market prices. Most of the information given in this chapter
has been typical of what a fundamental analyst would consider
prior to taking a position in the marketplace. Fundamental
analysis tries to both understand the underlying economic
issues involved in a particular commodity and determine an
intrinsic price. It is considered to be the more scientific
of the two approaches, but it is far more time consuming. It
is also the approach most preferred by economists. (Francis,
1980, p. 665)
Most of the analytical work done in the Office of Market
Research and Analysis at DFSC is fundamental analysis. Most
of the effort is spent analyzing fundamental factors that
could forecast market behavior or cause market prices to rise
or fall. 14
According to DFSC, some of the fundamental factors that
could increase oil prices include:
• higher economic growth in the Western economies,
• a credible OPEC price and production pact,
• steeper decline in Russian production,
• or higher taxes in the consuming countries. (DFSC, 1993)
14Interview between L. C. Ervin, Industry Economist, Defense
Fuel Supply Center, Alexandria, VA, and the researcher, 24 August
1993.
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Some of the fundamental factors that could decrease oil
prices include:
• a renewed or deeper recession in the Western economies,
• an OPEC price war,
• unexpectedly high Russian exports,
• an early return of Iraqi exports,
• a technological breakthrough in conservation or oil
substitutes,
• or lower taxes in the consuming countries. (DFSC, 1993)
Technical analysis provides an entirely different
approach. Essentially, it looks for historical patterns in
oil price movements. Technical analysts are popularly called
"chartists" by the pundits because they generally catalogue
their observations and predictions right on the price history
chart. This technique is a favorite of many market traders.
In fact, technical analysis has become a standard industry
forecasting tool for the energy markets. (Gotthelf, 1993, p.
12)
Figure 18 is an example of a technical analyst's chart for
futures market prices. Similar to the tunnel theory
previously discussed, technical analysis tries to establish
price ranges. The first step is to identify price extremes.
The absolute low occurred in 1985 at just under $10 per
barrel. The absolute high occurred in 1990 when the price





























(Gotthelf, 1993, p. 13
Figure 18 Technical Analysis Chart
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Taken alone, these price points provide little
information. However, when compared with the next lower set
of extremes, at a low of $15 per barrel and a high of $32 per
barrel, a pattern begins to emerge. Essentially, the
historical information reveals that only extreme
circumstances, like the Saudi pumping spree of 1985 through
1986, or the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would cause prices
to reach such extremes. (Gotthelf, 1993, p. 13-14)
From 1989 through the present, the likely price range has
been between a low of $18 per barrel, called a support, and a
high of $24 per barrel, called a resistance point. More
precisely, the price has tended to gravitate toward a range of
between $20 to $22 per barrel, called a consolidation range.
A sharp drop in prices from the support level, as occurred in
1989 to 1990, is called a bust. A sharp rise in prices from
the resistance point, as occurred in 1990, is called a
breakout. Busts and breakouts are usually short lived.
(Gotthelf, 1993, p. 13-14)
Although this analysis may sound too simplistic, it is
very popular with professional traders. Many have developed
sophisticated computer models to spot and react to such trends
with varying degrees of success. Technical analysis also has
some degree of linkage to fundamental reasoning. (Gotthelf,
1993, p. 13-14)
Consider what takes place when prices meet resistance. In
simple terms, buyers are no longer willing to bid at
higher prices. As the offers of sellers fail to match
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buyers' bids, prices retreat from this area of reluctance
or 'resistance. ' From a fundamental standpoint, buyers
might be unwilling to bid higher prices because they can
find an alternative source of energy (or crude) at the
same or lower price. Or they may not have enough money to
meet higher prices. More likely, they are simply
confident that the product can be secured at the same or
lower prices. Support comes into play when sellers are no
longer willing to part with their commodity at lower
prices. Buyers make lower bids and sellers reject the
proposed transactions. Obviously, the situation is the
same as resistance in reverse. Consolidation occurs when
buyers and sellers generally agree that prices are
appropriate. In a 'consolidation triangle, ' we know that
buyers and sellers are agreeing to a narrowing range. In
a band consolidation, prices bounce off well-defined and
generally narrow support and resistance. Unless there is
fundamental change in energy production or consumption,
long consolidations represent price ranges that are likely
to repeat as consolidations. A breakout above a
consolidation suggests that prices are abnormally high and
will retreat back to the consolidation at some stage. A
bust below consolidation suggests that prices will retrace
back up to the consolidation at some point. Again, this
may sound like 'what goes up must come down.' But, there
is a twist. We have a way to determine the most likely
place prices will eventually settle. Congestion is a term
used to describe several market conditions. Over the
years, the real meaning has been blurred. However,
congestion commonly refers to a price level that has
attracted above average volume and open interest. This
may also be described as an 'accumulation' within a narrow
range. Congestion implies subsequent volatility. If
prices breakout from congestion, an unusually large number
of short sellers will be forced to cover or margin up. If
short sellers cover, their orders will force prices
higher. The same logic suggests that a bust below
congestion will result in a mass exodus of buyers.
(Gotthelf, 1993, p. 15)
Obviously, both types of analytical approaches have their
advantages . Fundamental analysis seeks to understand the
underlying market conditions. Technical analysis seeks to
identify the repeatable trends. In the final assessment, both
approaches are useful and both are widely used.
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D. CONNECTION BETWEEN MARKETS
While a futures contract is nothing more than an agreement
between two parties for delivery of a particular quantity of
a commodity at a specified place, price and time in the
future, there is some disagreement as to the actual linkage
between the futures price and the spot market price of the
underlying commodity. This disagreement basically revolves
around four different theories. Each theory predicts a
different price at the beginning of a futures contract, but
all theories converge as the contract reaches expiration.
These theories are called the expectations hypothesis, normal
backwardation, normal contango, and the net hedging
hypothesis. All four theories are depicted in Figure 19.
(Sharpe, 1981, p. 489)
According to the expectations hypothesis, the current
price of a futures contract is the same as the market
consensus expectation of what the spot price will be at the
delivery date. If this theory is correct, a speculator could
neither expect to win nor lose by taking a position in the
futures market. His expected profit or loss is the expected
spot price at delivery minus the current futures price. Under
the expectations hypothesis, this expected amount is always
equal zero. His actual profit or loss is determined at
contract expiration, and is the actual spot price at delivery
minus the current futures price. The actual profit or loss
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(Sharpe, 1981, p. 489)
Figure 19 Futures Pricing Theories
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that speculators are indifferent to risk and are happy to
accommodate hedgers without compensation. In fact, investors
seeking to diversify equity portfolios often act in a risk
indifferent manner when buying futures contracts because the
betas of futures contracts generally offset the betas of
equities. (Sharpe, 1981, pp. 486-489)
A beta is simply a measurement of how much a particular
security price will change given a general movement in the
market. Offsetting betas for a portfolio of securities allows
the portfolio to approximate market performance, thus negating
the risk of any particular holding within the portfolio. This
phenomenon is the whole reason behind diversification.
(Brigham, 1992, pp. 166-167)
John Maynard Keynes, a famous economist who also made a
fortune in the futures market, was an advocate of normal
backwardation. He suggested that on average hedgers are short
the commodity. In other words, they wish to sell the
underlying commodity in the future. According to Keynes,
hedgers wish to transfer risk to long speculators, or buyers
willing to agree in advance to future purchases. Long
speculators must be enticed by an expectation of future
profits to assume current risk. This implies that a futures
price is likely to be lower than the expected spot price at
expiration. Thus, the futures price will rise as it
approaches expiration. (Sharpe, 1981, pp. 486-489)
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Advocates of normal contango argue that on average hedgers
are long the commodity. In other words, they wish to buy the
underlying commodity in the future. These hedgers, must
transfer risk to short speculators, or sellers. Short
speculators, must also be enticed by an expectation of profit.
Since normal contango is just the opposite of normal
backwardation, it implies that a futures contract price will
likely be higher than the expected spot price at expiration,
and will decrease as it approaches expiration. (Sharpe, 1981,
pp. 486-489)
A fourth theory, the net hedging hypothesis, holds that
hedgers may need to find both long and short speculators
during different parts of the contract life. Figure 19 shows
a net hedging hypothesis futures contract that starts as
normal backwardation, crosses as an expectations hypothesis,
then converts to normal contango as it gets closer to
expiration. The premise of this theory is that the net effect
of the numbers and positions of all the hedgers and
speculators in the market at one time will determine which
hypothesis characteristic is appropriate. (Sharpe, 1981, pp.
486-489)
Whatever theory is applicable throughout the life of the
futures contract, at the time of expiration, all theories
converge and equal the spot price. This convergence occurs
because at expiration a futures contract becomes a spot
contract. This contract conversion feature is the ultimate
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link that ties futures market and spot market prices.
(Sharpe, 1981, pp. 486-489)
According to Richard Seide, Marketing Manager for the New
York Mercantile Exchange, oil futures generally exhibit normal
backwardation. 1 Empirical evidence also verifies this
observation. As shown in Figure 20, prices for successive
futures contracts in series generally are lower in each
succeeding expiration month. As contract duration gets
longer, a short hedger must accept a lower price for a
commodity he wishes to deliver in the future, exactly what is
expected under conditions of normal backwardation. This
condition favors long speculators because they initially
receive a risk premium from the short hedger in the form of
lower current futures prices to compensate for higher expected
spot prices at contract expiration. Since the Government
would always be hedging long, it could take advantage of this
market condition and benefit from the risk premium normally
given to long speculators.
E. SUMMARY
Oil prices in both the futures and spot markets are
affected by many factors. There are factors relating to
supply and demand, the characteristics and properties of oil,
15Interview between R. Seide, Marketing Manager, New York
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Figure 20 Empirical Evidence of Backwardation
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the products and refining processes involved, and the nature
of oil history and its politics. While there are basically
two different approaches to analyzing these factors, both
approaches can prove useful. The linkage between futures and
spot markets prices can be described by four different
theories. Each theory may initially produce different
expectations, but all theories converge and agree at futures
contract expiration. Finally, empirical evidence shows that
oil futures normally behave in backwardation. As a long
hedger, the Government could benefit from this market
condition by automatically receiving the risk premium normally
paid to long speculators in the form of lower futures prices.
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V. ASSESSING FUTURES PERFORMANCE
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This chapter looks at potential ways of assessing and
measuring futures trading performance. It explains basic
trading strategy design and offers a workable strategy that
could be used as a basis for developing more sophisticated
strategies.
B. ASSESSING AND MEASURING PERFORMANCE
One way of assessing futures trading is through the
economic concept of utility. Utility is best described as an
abstract measurement of satisfaction or happiness. Things
that improve your level of satisfaction, or give you greater
happiness, also give you greater utility. (Francis, 1980, p.
551)
Because utility is an abstract concept, it has no absolute
scale. In measuring utility it should be considered in the
context of relative situations. For example, wealth has
greater utility than poverty for most people. Most people
would derive greater relative satisfaction and happiness from
being comfortably well off than from being destitute. The
absolute value of utility can not be measured in either case.
However, it is possible to measure the relative utility of the
two cases with respect to each other. (Francis, 1980, p. 551)
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Futures trading essentially offers a choice between two
relative situations . This relative choice is between an
outcome that is certain versus one that is not. A futures
contract allows a trader to fix the price of a commodity that
will be bought or sold at some time in the future. Not using
a futures contract exposes a trader to the uncertainty of
future market conditions and prices. The question is, which
choice provides the greatest relative utility. The answer
depends on the risk preference of the trader and the relative
return that can be derived from each of the two situations
(Gates, 1992, pp. 3-5).
There are three risk preference behaviors that people and
organizations can exhibit. These behaviors include risk
seeking, risk neutrality, and risk aversion. Risk seekers
crave the thrill of uncertainty and willingly sacrifice the
security of a certain return for a chance at a higher
potential pay off involving an uncertain return. This
definition best describes Las Vegas gamblers and is hardly
worth considering when discussing a strategy for public sector
application. (Francis, 1980, pp. 551-570)
Risk neutral organizations and individuals are indifferent
to increasing risk. They choose the option with the highest
expected value regardless of the risks involved. This
definition best describes people and organizations with either
irresponsible attitudes towards resource management, unlimited
funds, or potentially large diversified portfolios.
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Governments as a whole may sometimes exhibit risk neutral
behavior, particularly during times of war. However, as a
general rule anyone who is forced to live within a budget or
is held accountable for their actions can ill afford to be
risk neutral. (Francis, 1980, pp. 551-570)
By far, most individuals and organizations that face the
constraints of limited resources exhibit behavior which is
risk adverse. The primary reason for risk adverse behavior is
the asymmetrical aspect of benefits that occurs as a result of
marginal resource changes. In general, the extra benefit
received from an extra dollar of income decreases the higher
one's income level becomes. Thus, the loss in benefit or
utility for a given loss in resources is much greater than the
gain in benefit or utility that can be achieved for an equal
increase in resources. This explanation may sound rather
esoteric, but the point is that risk averters will always
value a certain outcome with a certain return higher than an
uncertain outcome with the same expected return. (Francis,
1980, pp. 570-572)
We can use a common commodity bought by DFSC to illustrate
this point. Since 1986, the average price of JP-5 has been
about $25 per barrel with a standard deviation of about $5 per
barrel. During the same period, the actual price fluctuated
between a low of $16.43 per barrel and a high of $46.36 per
barrel. Appendix H gives more specific price history detail.
Suppose DFSC needed to buy JP-5 six months from now. The
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market consensus about the price in six months is expected to
be the historical average, but general experience indicates
that the price may fluctuate by as much as one standard
deviation. If DFSC waits six months to buy on the spot
market, the standard deviation price extremes of $20 per
barrel and $30 per barrel are equally likely to occur, each
with a 50 percent probability. At the same time, DFSC can buy
a futures contract now for the market consensus price of $25
and fix its six month delivery price in advance. Which choice
provides the greatest utility?
Assuming that DFSC faces a limited budget and scrutiny
from its program sponsors, DFSC would be conservative in its
actions and also risk adverse. Knowing DFSC's risk
preference, we can standardize this example and make it
universally applicable to more general situations. Utility
can be described in terms of relative return and risk.





E(U) is the expected relative utility derived from the
uncertain spot price that might be paid if DFSC waits six
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months. This expected utility is expressed as a function f of
the expected return E(r), and risk {sigma) of the expected
return occurring. In this example, the risk (sigma) is
defined as one standard deviation.
U is the actual relative utility derived from the certain
futures price paid now. This actual utility is expressed as
a function of the actual return r occurring, given the same
level of risk {sigma) of one standard deviation.
The expected return E(r) is the specific probability of
occurrence times the expected percent difference in price that
would be realized by waiting six months to buy on the spot
market. Symbolically, expected return is described as
follows:
CP —LP CP —HP




In this equation, p equals the probability of a lower
price LP occurring if DFSC waits six months and buys on the
spot market. CP equals the certain futures contract price
that can be paid now. In this example, CP equals $25. LP
equals the lowest price that is expected if DFSC waits six
months to buy on the spot market, given the anticipated level
of risk. In this example, the anticipated level of risk is
one standard deviation. Therefore, LP equals $20. The
quantity expression (1-p) equals the probability of a higher
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price HP occurring if DFSC waits six months and buys on the
spot market. HP equals the highest price that is expected if
DFSC waits six months to buy on the spot market, again given
the anticipated level of risk. Since the anticipated level of
risk is still one standard deviation, HP equals $30.
The actual return r of the futures contract is simply the
percent difference in price savings realized by buying a
futures contract now and not waiting six months to buy on the
spot market. Symbolically actual return is described as
follows:
AP -CP
__ / 6mos ^x now \
CP
In this equation, AP equals the actual price that would be
paid in the spot market if DFSC waited six months.
We can use many utility functions to describe the behavior
of risk adverse individuals and organizations. However, the
quadratic utility function can be mathematically manipulated
to show a distinct relationship between return and risk, where
risk is defined by standard deviation. When utility is
described as a function of return and risk, and risk is
specifically defined by standard deviation, the quadratic
utility function is a reasonable choice. Symbolically, it is
described by the following (Francis, 1980, pp. 579-581):
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U=f[r,o] =z-br 2
In this equation, b is chosen so that the slope of the
line associated with the last set of data observation points
is close to zero. The constant b can take any value greater
than zero, as long as one half of b is greater than r
(Francis, 1980, pp. 579-581). In this example, b equals a
value of three. In this form, the equation can be used to
estimate the utility derived by paying the certain futures
contract price now over the full spectrum of possible actual
return outcomes
.
Expected utility is symbolically described by the
following (Francis, 1980, pp. 579-581):
E(U) =f[E(r) , a] =E(r-br 2 )
This equation can also be rewritten as follows:
CP — TP CP — TP CP — ffP CP — ffP
Once in this later form, the equation can be used to
estimate the utility derived by waiting six months and paying
uncertain JP-5 prices over the full spectrum of possible
expected return outcomes. Figure 21 compares U and E(U) for
the JP-5 example just described. The top line represents the
actual relative utility that will be achieved by buying at
104
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the futures contract price now. The prices associated with
the top line represent the actual prices that would have to
occur in six months to equal to the same return as expected
under the conditions of waiting six months to buy on the spot
market. Thus, a point on the top line shows the utility
derived from the futures contract as a function of the actual
future spot price.
For example, if DFSC buys a futures contract for $25 and
the actual spot price becomes $24, the resulting utility is
given by the point labeled $24 on the top line. Similarly, if
the actual spot price becomes $26, the resulting utility is
given by the point labeled $26 on the top line.
The bottom line represents the expected utility that might
be derived by waiting six months to buy on the spot market.
Both probability of occurrence p(LP=$20) and expected prices
are given.
For example, if p equals 0.5, the expected spot price is
$25 or 0.5($20)+0.5($30) . The expected utility of buying on
the spot market is given by the point labeled 0,5/$25 on the
bottom line. Similarly, if p equals 0.4, the expected spot
price is $26, or 0.4 ( $20 )+0.6 ($30 ) . The expected utility is
now given by the point labeled 0.4/$2 6 on the bottom line.
As can be seen, for equivalent levels of return, the
futures buying strategy always has a higher utility than the
waiting strategy. For the waiting strategy to be equal to
buying the futures contract for $25 per barrel now, DFSC would
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have to expect at least a 12 percent greater return. This is
the premium DFSC should be willing to pay for more perfect
information about the future if it intended to wait six months
and buy in the spot market. Another way of looking at it is
that DFSC ' s expected price from waiting would have to drop
below $22 per barrel before it would not want to buy the
futures contract. At any expected price greater than $22 six
months from now, DFSC would be better off by buying the $25
futures contract now.
For example, consider the $25 futures contract. The point
labeled $25 on the upper line shows the actual utility for
this contract. The point labeled 0.5/$25 on the lower line
shows the expected utility of buying on the spot market where
p equals 0.5 and the expected price is $25. The difference in
utility measures the value of certainty or risk aversion to
DFSC. Alternatively, the points $25 on the upper line and
0.8/$22 on the lower line have the same levels of utility.
Thus, DFSC would have to believe that it could achieve at
least a 12 percent greater return before it would not choose
to buy the futures contract.
C. BASIC STRATEGY DESIGN
Another way of assessing futures trading performance is to
determine if the strategy adequately satisfies trading
objectives. There are basically only two objectives, to make
profit or to protect value. In support of these objectives
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there are basically only two generic types of strategies,
speculative strategies and hedging strategies. Speculative
strategies are designed for the sole purpose of making profit.
They are extremely risky endeavors that rely heavily on
supposed superior market knowledge, rapid information
response, and forecasting prowess to extract profits from the
market. Because of their inherent risk and profit motivation
objectives, speculative strategy designs are not recommended
for public sector organizations with fiduciary
responsibilities like DFSC. (Quick, 1992, pp. 44-48)
The other generic strategy type is hedging. Hedging is
essentially a way to manage the risk of uncertainty. It seeks
to protect the value of something that will be bought or sold
in the future. It is intended to stabilize budgets and
earnings over time. Hedging strategies can be used against
any uncertain outcome that has the likelihood to affect the
value of a commodity DFSC might want to protect. For example,
purchases or sales can be hedged against price, interest
rates, and even foreign currency exchange rates. (Quick, 1992,
pp. 44-48)
The primary focus of any hedging strategy should be to
improve management capabilities by providing predictable and
improved financial performance. It minimizes the risks of
making unpredictable and costly future mistakes. Hedging
strategies should thus enhance management and improve
performance in addition to reducing risk.
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The question that arises from this discussion is what
should be the primary financial elements of basic hedging
strategy design. First and foremost, it should provide price
certainty. As discussed many times throughout this thesis,
futures trading by itself does this. Second, it should
consistently provide greater intrinsic benefit or utility than
can be achieved by buying on the spot market for the same
level of expected return. From the discussion on utility,
futures trading does this as well. Third, it should minimize
disutility from future events, a concept discussed below.
Finally, it should provide real financial savings.
In order to discuss the problems of disutility, reconsider
the previous graph as presented in Figure 21. As can be seen
by this graph, when the actual price in six months AP(6mos)
falls below $25, the utility associated with the futures
contract quickly diminishes . Once DFSC buys a futures
contract it can no longer participate in the price savings
that occur when the actual spot market price drops. Again,
the loss in benefit or utility for a given loss in resources
is much greater than the gain in benefit or utility that can
be achieved for an equal increase in resources. Since one
significant drop in price may far outweigh the utility gained
from many price increases, futures contracts by themselves
could not provide an adequate hedging strategy, particularly
for DFSC. However, this disutility aspect can be corrected
with the use of an options put contract.
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Recall that a put contract is the right but not the
obligation to sell the underlying futures contract for a
predetermined strike price in the future. This right is given
in exchange for the price of a premium paid to the options
seller in advance (NYMEX, September 1992, pp. 9-11). In the
JP-5 example, the futures contract could have been balanced
by purchasing a put with a strike price of $25. This $25 put
would have allowed DFSC to sell the futures contract for $25
regardless of its subsequent price. This options feature,
would limit realizable losses to the cost of the premium paid
on the put option plus any transactions costs.
Options price premiums are based largely on measures of
risk associated with price volatility, time until expiration,
and interest rates. Generally they only result in a few
pennies per barrel but may be much higher depending upon the
perceived risk (NYMEX, September 1992, pp. 1-4). Transaction
costs depend upon volume of trade and the type of broker used,
but generally run about one or two pennies per barrel. 16 Both
of these costs tend to be substantially lower than the
potential losses that could occur due to price fluctuations.
D. A WORKABLE STRATEGY
To discuss real financial savings it is probably best to
look at a couple of bona fide strategies. The strategies
16Interview between M. Bertoncini, Associate Broker, Mercafe
Inc., New York, NY, and the researcher, 27 October 1993.
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discussed here are variations of a six month lift and roll
plan described by NYMEX. (NYMEX, 1993)
Semi-annually, futures contracts for the six succeeding
months would be bought on the first trading day of the semi-
annual period. Futures contract quantities would exactly
offset actual physical contract deliveries scheduled for each
month during the period. Each successive futures contract
would be sold during its expiration month on the first trading
day closest to the tenth of the month. This permits the
closing or lifting of open positions while avoiding the
extreme price fluctuations common on the last day of market
trading and expiration. (NYMEX, 1993)
When the futures contracts for each of the six months are
all lifted, positions are reevaluated and then rolled into the
next six months with the purchase of new futures contracts.
This lift and roll strategy provides the optimum advantage of
reducing price volatility. At the same time, it allows a
hedger like DFSC an opportunity to periodically reevaluate
positions, market conditions, and strategies before committing
to each successive six month period. (NYMEX, 1993)
Commodities actually required are rarely traded on any
regulated exchange. Therefore, for any hedging strategy to
work properly there must first be a reasonable correlation
between the price behavior of the physical commodity we
actually wish to buy or sell, and the price behavior of a
futures commodity that we can actually trade on a regulated
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exchange. This correlation, or rather the lack of correlation
is called basis risk. Basis risk is the difference between
the price of the underlying commodity being hedged and the
price of the futures commodity actually traded on a regulated
exchange. (NYMEX, 1993)
Most of the commodities managed by DFSC, like JP-5, are
not specifically traded on any regulated exchange. However,
commodities that are traded have a close enough correlation to
be useful. Closely correlated commodities could act as
surrogates for each other. Savings from one could be
transferred to the other for the purpose of hedging.
As stated in Chapter II, DFSC currently uses commercial
jet fuel to establish the economic escalator for its physical
contracts. Figure 22 shows that the correlation between JP-5
and commercial jet fuel is about 89.5 percent. Unfortunately,
commercial jet fuel is not a traded commodity and therefore is
not useful for the purposes of hedging operations. Figure 23
shows that the correlation between JP-5 and West Texas
Intermediate (WTI), a heavily traded futures commodity, is
about 82.1 to 84.3 percent. This is not substantially
different from commercial jet fuel, but vastly more useful for
the purposes of hedging. If DFSC wanted to totally eliminate
basis risk while trading in the futures market, it could
establish WTI as the economic escalator index for its physical
contracts. Not only would this eliminate all basis risk for
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Figure 22 JP-5 vs. Commercial Jet Fuel
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shifting appreciable risk onto suppliers. It turns out that
the correlation between WTI and commercial jet fuel is very
high, about 94.7 percent as seen in Figure 24.
Using WTI as a surrogate commodity, the maximum risk of
the six month lift and roll hedging strategy can be
calculated. Suppose the hedge was purposely fixed at the
height of uncertainty during Desert Shield, about October of
1990. This would fix the futures price at an historically
high level and would preclude DFSC from participating in the
huge savings that occurred as the market price plunged during
the next six months. Figure 25 shows that even with this
naive strategy, DFSC would have essentially broken even. With
trading commissions factored in, DFSC would have lost only
$.02 per barrel per year, essentially just the commission
charge itself.
However given DFSC's market analysis abilities, this is an
extremely unlikely result. Because of obvious market events,
it would have been extremely unlikely for DFSC to have
established a hedge at the highest price. Ignoring this six
month period, the naive lift and roll strategy would have
saved the Government about $104.6 million per year.
However, there is a better way to reduce the downside
risk. The top line in Figure 26 shows that using the
historical price average and a risk standard deviation equal
to one, DFSC would have expected significant disutility if it
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Figure 26 WTI Utility vs. Expected Utility
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drop below $20 per barrel. To mitigate this disutility DFSC
should establish a $20 options put trigger. In other words,
if the actual price of the futures contract ever went above
$20, eventually market pressures would drive the price back
down. Anticipating this market pressure, DFSC should buy a
put contract at whatever strike price is closest to the
underlying futures price above $20. This would protect
against the possibility of a subsequent market correction back
toward or below the historic price average.
Figure 27 shows that this simple but more complete
strategy would have saved the Government in excess of $77.7
million per year.
E. SUMMARY
Futures trading can be thought of as a choice between an
outcome that is certain and one that is not. The abstract
concept of utility can be used to show that for equal levels
of expected return, normally risk adverse organizations and
individuals would always prefer the certain outcome provided
by futures trading over the uncertain future outcome of buying
in the spot market. Futures trading strategies generically
belong to two different categories that fulfill different
trading objectives. However, a basic hedging strategy should
provide price certainty, higher utility or intrinsic benefit
that is consistently better than buying in the spot market, a































Figure 27 Refined Strategy with Options Trigger
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and real financial savings. Using a basic lift and roll
strategy with an options put trigger completely meets these
trading objectives.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC FIT
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This chapter examines the idea of futures trading in terms
of strategic fit. It describes the importance of strategic
fit, and provides a strategic planning model to shows how one
might determine strategic fit within any public sector
environment. This model is then used to determine whether
futures trading has a particular strategic fit within DFSC.
The chapter also examines some of the barriers to futures
trading implementation, and presents suggestions for
overcoming these barriers, including a proposal for
legislative language to authorize futures trading.
B. IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC FIT
A primary precondition for any strategy to be viable and
effective, is that it must also be relevant to the specific
nature and of its environment. This precondition is called
strategic fit. According to Tom Peters, famed lecturer,
consultant, and thought provoking author of numerous
bestselling books on business management, the linkage between
strategy and environment is of critical importance. Many
strategies fail from inception because they do not recognize
the environments in which they are destined to operate. Many
more fail because they remain inflexible and are neither
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adaptive, nor executable with regard to recognizable
conditions that occur within the strategic environment. These
environmental factors, if left unaddressed, become catalysts
of failure. They may pe-exist or may manifest themselves as
environments simply evolve. (Peters and Waterman, 1982, pp.
3-8)
Once upon a time, the earth was stalked by dinosaurs,
monstrous reptiles who ranged up to sixty feet in height
and weighed as much as 100 tons. Although we don't know
precisely when the colossal lizards lived, they left
footprints instead of tire tracks wherever they went, so
we are reasonably certain that they predate the invention
of the company car. The question is why they died out.
The most likely explanation is that gradual or sudden
changes occurred in the environment, and that in spite of
their size and strength, dinosaurs lacked the intelligence
to adapt to those changes. (Hochheiser, 1987, p. 62)
The plight of the dinosaurs, and their ultimate
extinction, illustrates that events in nature may have a
remarkable similarity to the behavior of organizations,
particularly large lumbering bureaucratic organizations like
those found in Government and major corporations.
Andrew Pettigrew, a British researcher, studied the
politics of strategic decision making and was fascinated
by the inertial properties of organizations. He showed
that companies often hold on to flagrantly faulty
assumptions about their world for as long as a decade,
despite overwhelming evidence that the world has changed
and they probably should too. (Peters and Waterman, 1992,
pp. 7-8)
Andrew Pettigrew 's findings, however, should not be too
surprising. It merely confirms and validates the scientific
work done several hundred years earlier by another famous
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British researcher, Sir Isaac Newton. (Hochheiser, 1987, p.
93)
Indeed, Newton's first law is as descriptive of
organizational behavior as it is of the natural world for
which it was intended.
Newton's first law states that an object at rest remains
at rest unless enough force is applied to get it moving.
Alternatively, an object moving along at a certain rate
can be slowed down or accelerated only if enough force is
applied. In each case, the required force is proportional
to the mass of the object. (Hochheiser, 1987, p. 93)
While the bureaucracies of organizations tend to slow down
their strategic reflexes to environmental changes, the
problems of achieving strategic fit may be even more basic.
For most organizations the act of merely identifying and
recognizing the specific nature and characteristics of the
strategic environment is an extremely difficult task,
particularly if the strategic environment is the driving force
behind strategy design. Private firms tend to evaluate
strategies based upon measurable indicators like profitability
and market share, but also devote enormous resources to try to
identify the strategic environment and to ensure that their
strategies fit the circumstances. Yet sometimes even after
tremendous effort, some firms can not fully achieve strategic
fit, because they can not adequately identify nor define their
strategic environment. (Peters and Waterman, 1982, pp. 3-8)
In the public sector, this idea of strategic fit is
further complicated by the need to address a broad range of
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difficult and often conflicting public policy issues. These
issues may range from the purely economic to the purely
political, but the underlying reality is that the public
sector is primarily a political arena. Decisions are rarely
made on the basis of economic merits alone, but tend to be
strongly influenced by politics, sometimes overriding economic
concerns. (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, pp. 20-22)
Judging the economic merits of futures trading, as was
done in Chapter V, is therefore only one step in determining
strategic fit, and only a small part of resolving the real
issue. The question is whether futures trading is a viable or
even wise thing for a Government entity to do. In order to
better answer this question, we must examine the idea more
broadly in terms of its public sector environment and politics
involved.
C. DETERMINING STRATEGIC FIT
The question is, how can one begin to objectively
determine the strategic fit of an idea in a public sector
environment when measurable criteria like profitability and
market share do not normally apply, and seemingly unmeasurable
aspects like politics can easily override rational ideas based
upon economic merits. John Bryson, associate director of the
Strategic Management Research Center at the University of
Minnesota, has developed a model that can do just that.
Bryson 's model, as shown in Figure 28, was designed primarily
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(Bryson, 1988, p. 50-51)
Figure 28 Strategic Planning Process Model
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to help improve the strategic planning processes within both
public and nonprofit organizations, but several of its
procedures can also be used to determine strategic fit. The
model addresses the many aspects of strategy development that
are unique to public sector environments . Bryson saw many
weaknesses in the methods of strategic planning employed by
corporations when applied to public sector organizations. In
particular, the differences in organizational goals, political
environments, and stakeholder concerns were not well addressed
in the corporate models. (Bryson, 1988, pp. xxiii-48)
In contrast, Bryson 's model provides a methodical approach
for uncovering and acting upon strategic issues that relate to
the public sector environment. Bryson defines a strategic
issue as being any fundamental policy question that may affect
an organization's mission, mandate, values, level or mix of
products or services, clients, costs, financing, or
management. Strategic issues are identified and strategic fit
is determined in each of the first five steps of the model.
Since each step represents an important element of the public
sector environment, each strategic issue ultimately reflects
the organizational and motivational differences inherent to
that environment. Strategies are developed as ways of
resolving the strategic issues uncovered, and are then
compared against practical alternatives . Strategies are
evaluated in terms of their ability to satisfy each factor
impacting on a particular strategic issue. Those strategies
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with the best strategic fit are then incorporated into the
organization's business plans or vision of the future for
eventual implementation. (Bryson, 1988
, pp. 46-70)
Thus according to Bryson 's model, the strategy of trading
in the futures market should meet the following conditions:
• It should first be seen as a practical alternative for
resolving an identifiable strategic issue that emerges
through examination of the relevant public sector
environment
.
• It should be evaluated in terms of its ability to satisfy
those factors that impact on a particular strategic issue.
• It should be compared with other alternatives.
• Finally if thought to be the best alternative, it should
be developed further for inclusion in DFSC's business
plans, or vision of the future for eventual
implementation
.
From previous discussion, radical movements in oil market
prices have been a problem for DFSC since 1973. However since
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the problem has grown
progressively worse. By Bryson 's definition, this problem is
a strategic issue, because it has the potential to impact one
or more of DFSC's missions, mandates, values, level or mix of
products or services, clients, costs, financing, or
management. From this definition and the economic arguments
presented in Chapter V, the strategy of trading in the futures
market is at least one alternative for resolving this
identifiable strategic issue. This strategy should be
compared with other alternatives, such as those presented at
the end of Chapter II, and then evaluated in terms of its
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ability to satisfy the factors that impact on this strategic
issue. If futures trading is then considered to be the best
alternative, it should be developed further.
While the other alternatives mentioned in Chapter II
require further research beyond the scope of this thesis, the
strategy of futures trading can easily be evaluated for
strategic fit by using the first five steps of Bryson 's model.
1. Initial Agreement
According to Bryson, prior to strategy development, an
organization should reevaluate itself. By the same token,
there must first be some initial agreement that a reevaluation
even needs to occur. This agreement usually results in key
decision makers or opinion leaders lending their support and
commitment to the reevaluation process, devoting essential
resources and empowering people within the organization to
proceed. (Bryson, 1988, pp. 48-49)
Much of this initial agreement has a great deal to do
with timing. According to Mark McCormack, author of What they
Don't Teach You at Harvard Business School,
Many ideas fail not because they are bad ideas, not
because they are poorly executed, but because the timing
is not correct. (McCormack, 1984, p. 94)
Futures trading is only one of the latest in a long
string of ideas relating to the general topic of acquisition
reform. Unfortunately, agreement over acquisition reform has
never been easy to come by. In fact, complaints over
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inefficient procurement practices are not particularly new.
During the Kennedy Administration over 30 years ago, Robert S.
McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, noted that a major cause
of cost overruns in Defense programs was,
...an over-reliance on contracting procedures which did
not provide incentives to reduce cost. (Robinson, Mills,
and Bower, 1974, p. 3)
Bob Stone, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Installations) once gave a frustratingly clear description of
the depth of procurement problems when he estimated that,
...a third of the Defense budget goes into the friction of
following bad regulations.... This kind of rule has two
costs. One is, we've got people wasting time. But the
biggest cost - and the reason I say it's a third of the
Defense budget - is it's a message broadcast to everybody
that works around this stuff that it's a crazy outfit.
You're dumb. We don't trust you. Don't try to apply your
common sense.... [A typical steam trap costing $100]
leaks $50 a week worth of steam. The lesson is, when it
leaks, replace it quick. But it takes a year to replace
it, because we have a [procurement] system that wants to
make sure we get the very best buy on this $100 item, and
maybe by waiting a year we can buy the item for two
dollars less. In the meantime, we've lost $3,000 worth of
steam. (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, pp. 8-10)
In March of 1986, a Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management, established by President Reagan and headed by
David Packard, called for sweeping changes to the acquisition
system, "...citing structural problems 'far costlier' than the
well-publicized coffee pots and toilet seats." (Gansler,
1989, p. 323)
However nearly ten years later, the DoD Advisory Panel
on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Law, commonly
referred to as the Section 800 Panel, spent over 16 months
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revisiting many of the same issues previously covered by the
Packard Commission report including many of the same
suggestions made but never implemented. This recent January
1993 report produced over 1,800 pages of recommendations on
over 600 acquisition statutes affecting DoD practices. Citing
many changes in the operating environments that have occurred
since the end of the Cold War, the Section 800 Panel again
called for sweeping changes to the acquisition system and
focused on recommendations designed to:
• streamline the Defense acquisition process and adopt
commercial practices wherever possible,
• codify and simplify relevant acquisition laws,
• eliminate unnecessary laws that impede buyer/ seller
relationships or alter accepted commercial accounting or
business practices,
• ensure continued financial and ethical integrity of
Defense procurement programs,
• and protect the best interests of DoD. (DoD Advisory
Panel, 1993, pp. v-8)
Specific recommendations relating to fuel and energy
would grant DFSC relief from certain contracting procedures
.
Primarily, it would allow DFSC to,
. . . sell petroleum, when in the public interest would
encourage economy and efficiency within fuel management
and acquisition.... (Acquisition Law Advisory Panel,
1993, p. 3-303)
Current procedures under Title 10 of the United States
Code, Section 2404, allow DFSC to trade unwanted fuels in
exchange for fuels more desirable (DFSC, 1992, p. 19).
However the logistical problems in finding someone, usually a
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commercial vendor, willing to take exact exchange of a non
commercial product designed strictly for military use, makes
this procedure largely impractical. 17
According to the Section 800 Panel this particular
change in law would,
. . . serve a valid purpose by providing DoD with the
flexibility necessary to adapt its petroleum purchases to
market conditions . This authority is particularly
important for fuel purchases because of the critical role
of that product in military readiness. The use of this
authority during Operation Desert Shield clearly
demonstrates that fact. (Acquisition Law Advisory Panel,
1993, p. 3-303)
This particular recommendation is mentioned because
similar rationale could be used to suggest and promote futures
trading strategies.
In a follow-up report to the Section 800 Panel, the
Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Defense Acquisition
Reform for the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) , made
broad recommendations for, "...proceeding with radical change
to the current [procurement] process...," (Hermann, 1993).
Supporting the recommendations of the Section 800 Panel, the
DSB Task Force placed great emphasis on the idea of adopting
commercial practices, and breaking down barriers and offensive
processes that interfere with those commercial practices.
(DSB, 1993, i-16)
17 Interview between C. Lee, Director of Market Research and
Analysis, Defense Fuel Supply Center, Alexandria, VA, and the
researcher, 23 August 1993.
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While the general topic of acquisition reform has been
discussed ad nauseam for many years without much result, Mark
McCormack's theory might suggest that the timing may finally
be right for true agreement on the need to proceed with it.
The major change in circumstances is that today the Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces, President Bill Clinton, along
with Vice President Al Gore, have become directly involved in
the process. Together, they have given not only support,
commitment, and resources to the idea of reform, but also
their leadership and direction to empower people within the
Government to proceed with it.
The capstone document of this new effort is the
September 7, 1993 National Performance Review report to the
President, written by Vice President Al Gore and entitled,
From Red Tape to Results, Creating a Government that Works
Better and Costs Less. Although the report speaks to all
Government programs, it also lists 20 broadly defined
recommendations for "reinventing" the procurement process.
The thrust of these recommendations in the contracting arena,
would be to encourage procurement innovation and move away
from rigid rules toward a concept of broad guiding principles
.
In fact, one of the chapters within the full report is
entitled, Using Market Mechanisms to Solve Problems . Although
this chapter does not specifically address futures trading,
clearly the intent was to encourage innovative market based
strategies in all areas of reform. (Gore, 1993, pp. i-166)
133
The assessment here is that there is probably greater
agreement now on the need for reexamining Government
processes, than probably any time since before the Civil War.
The timing for new and innovative market based strategies is
ripe. As the Nation's leadership has moved toward
restructuring and redefining Government, the resulting climate
of broad based reform clearly makes it possible to seriously
consider, and probably for the first time, non-traditional
market based strategies like futures trading.
2 . Mandates
According to Bryson, after achieving initial agreement
on the need for reexamination, an organization must clarify
its mandates. Bryson defines mandates as both the formal and
informal directed requirements confronting an organization.
These are the specific things that an organization must either
do or avoid doing in order to comply with external direction.
(Bryson, 1988, p. 49)
Chapter II discussed many of the procurement handicaps
that DFSC faces. Most of the handicaps mentioned result as a
matter of complying with Government mandates . Socio-economic
programs, small business set-asides, and acquisition lead-time
requirements all have their basis in law or regulation, and
all hamper effectiveness and efficiency in DFSC ' s ability to
react to oil market price instability.
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There is great concern that the sheer number of
mandates causes significant problems. As explained by Chris
Lee the Director of Market Research and Analysis at DFSC, when
compared with the commercial sector, Government contracting is
so constrained by law and regulation that it affords very
little creative latitude in contract administration or
enforcement. This lack of latitude forces the Contracting
Officer into significantly greater reliance on the formal
contracting document, forcing him to anticipate potentially
unpredictable problems and remedies long before they ever
occur. Left with few options but the formal contract as the
primary governing structure, the Government must generally
enforce the contract according to its literal meaning. (Lee,
1990, p. 32)
Commercial firms tend to view contracting as a sort of
marriage, and try to contract with firms of known reputation.
They often make informal adjustments that cope with
circumstances not specifically addressed in the formal
contract. The Government, on the other hand, tries to ensure
that every possible contingency is covered in a sort of
prenuptial agreement. (Lee, 1990, p. 392). Unfortunately,
petroleum markets are extremely volatile, and it is nearly
impossible to write formal contracts which correctly
anticipate all of the possible future contingencies and
provide for every appropriate contractual remedy. (Lee, 1989,
p. 27)
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Many of these mandate concerns are real, but some are
a matter of perception. Often there is a tremendous
difference between a mandate's intention and a mandate's
interpretation. As Bryson explains,
It may not be surprising, then, that many organizations
make one or both of two fundamental mistakes . Either they
believe that they are more tightly constrained in their
actions than they are; or they assume that if they are
not explicitly told to do something, they are not allowed
to do it. (Bryson, 1988, p. 49)
Currently, there is no procurement guidance anywhere
in Federal statutes or regulations relating to futures
trading. There is also no clear mandate against it (Stanley,
1993) . There is a DoD policy against the practice of
speculation (DFSC, 1993), however the futures trading strategy
under consideration has nothing to do with speculation. The
true intent of the futures trading strategy under
consideration is to hedge against market price volatility.
The purpose is to mitigate the risk consequences associated
with actual physical quantities under firm contract, not to
speculate with uncovered futures positions for profit making.
There are other concerns of interpretation as well.
Currently, there is no appropriation specifically authorizing
DFSC to spend money on futures trading. According to United
States Code 31, Section 1301 (a),
Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for
which the appropriations were made except as otherwise
provided by law. (Duval, 1993, p. 5)
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However under the "Necessary Expense Doctrine", each
spending agency has reasonable discretion to implement their
object of appropriation any way they desire. The question is,
would futures trading be considered a necessary expense
without specific clarification. The answer is, it probably
depends on interpretation. Under the Necessary Expense
Doctrine, a justified expense must meet three tests:
• it must bear a logical relationship to the appropriation
charged,
• it must not be prohibited by law,
• and it must not be within the scope of some other
appropriation. (Duval, 1993, p. 5)
While it appears as if futures trading could meet the
three tests, the General Accounting Office has never
specifically addressed the issue of futures trading and
stresses,
We have dealt with the concept of 'Necessary Expense' in
a vast number of decisions over the decades. If one
lesson emerges, it is that the concept is a relative one:
it is measured not by reference to an expenditure in a
vacuum, but by assessing the relationship of the
expenditure to the specific appropriation to be charged
or, in the case of several programs funded by a lump-sum
appropriation, to the specific program to be served. It
should be thus apparent that an item that can be justified
under one program or appropriation might be entirely
inappropriate under another, depending on the
circumstances and statutory authorities involved. . . . When
we review an expenditure with reference to its
availability for the purpose at issue, the question is not
whether we would have exercised that discretion in the
same manner. Rather, the question is whether the
expenditure falls within the agency's legitimate range of
discretion, or whether its relationship to an authorized
purpose or function is so attenuated as to take it beyond
the range. (Duval, 1993, p. 5)
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While the effect of this particular mandate owes
itself to interpretation, there are other mandates that appear
beyond interpretation. The Defense Fuel Supply Center is
required to meet specific unit cost goals under the Defense
Business Operations Fund (DBOF) Program (Duval, 1993, p. 4).
Created in October of 1991, DBOF requires activities to
identify and allocate the full annual costs of their
operations to the goods and services produced (Chapin, 1993,
p. 4) . As stated in Chapter II, product costs make up about 85
percent of DFSC's operating costs, and fuel prices to
customers are standardized for the entire year. Therefore,
volatility in market oil prices makes meeting DBOF goals
nearly impossible to predict or consistently achieve.
In the past, DFSC has easily obtained supplemental
appropriation funding whenever oil prices dictated, but a new
mandate under the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994
states that,
It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of
Defense. . .should seek personnel reductions and other
management and administrative savings that, by September
30, 1998, will achieve at least a 25 percent reduction in
Defense acquisition management costs below the costs of
Defense acquisition management during fiscal year 1993.
(National Defense Authorization Act, 1993, sec. 834)
The assessment here is that there are no clear
mandates for or against futures trading. The mandates that
are in place, are in fact, highly interpretive and subjective.
However, there are several mandates that create operational
problems during periods of market oil price volatility.
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3. Mission/Values
According to Bryson, an organization must also clarify
its mission and values. An organization's mission and values
in tandem with its mandates provide the social justification
for its existence. An organization must always be viewed as
a means to an end, not an end in and of itself. An
organization must continually justify its existence in terms
of how well it can meet the particular needs of its various
stakeholders. (Bryson, 1988, p. 49-53)
The basic mission of DFSC, as stated in Chapter II, is
to buy and manage most of the fuel requirements for DoD as
well as other Federal and Civil agencies. Yet in this
mission, DFSC has multiple responsibilities. It has a
fiduciary responsibility, primarily to the taxpaying citizens
of the Nation, to manage its affairs with the utmost
efficiency and economy, and to ferret out waste whenever and
wherever possible. It also has a social and ethical
responsibility, primarily to its petroleum suppliers, to
promote and abide by fair and equitable procurement and
business practices, and to ensure that a level playing field
is maintained throughout all of its dealings. Finally, it has
a business and program responsibility, primarily to its
customers and program sponsors, to ensure not only the utmost
efficiency and economy, but to also ensure the most effective
and predictable program execution possible.
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The occurrence of unstable oil market prices, and the
current methods of procurement and program management
adversely affect each and every one of these mission
responsibilities. For example, while contract prices are
currently indexed to the market, concerns over DBOF during
particularly volatile periods of oil market prices could force
DFSC to either:
• return to fixed price contracts and achieve DBOF goals at
the expense of placing suppliers at potentially ruinous
market price versus contract price risk,
• pass costs along to customers, already strapped by budget
cuts and lower operational tempos, in the form of higher
standard prices or more frequent and unexpected standard
price adjustments,
• or continue to request supplemental appropriations from an
already deficit weary Congress that has recently given a
"Sense of the Congress" mandate to the Secretary of
Defense to reduce operational budgets 25 percent by the
year 1998.
Clearly, there is a trade off between all three of
these responsibilities. No matter what decision DFSC could
possibly make, some stakeholder would be ill served. If DFSC
ignores DBOF, it ignores its business /program responsibilities
to its program sponsors. If DFSC returns to fixed-price
contracts during periods of particularly volatile market
conditions, it ignores its social/ethical responsibilities to
its suppliers. If DFSC passes avoidable costs along to its
customers, it ignores its fiduciary and business/program
responsibilities to both the American taxpayer and its
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customers. Finally, if DFSC continues to request supplemental
appropriations from Congress for avoidable costs, it again
ignores its fiduciary and business/program responsibilities,
but this time to both the American taxpayer and its program
sponsors. Using a futures trading strategy may help DFSC
avoid having to make one of these difficult trade-off
decisions.
An additional mission benefit of futures trading could
be experienced during periods of intense mobilization for war,
when many procurement procedures are waived due to National
necessity. The futures market could be used as an alternate
supply mechanism to ensure against supply disruptions or
fulfill rapid surge requirements. During periods of critical
supply uncertainty, the Government could simply take physical
delivery on expiring futures contracts rather than reverse
open positions. Instead of closing positions previously
established to hedge against price volatility, the Government
would let the futures contract run to term and accept delivery
of the underlying commodity as a hedge against supply
disruption. These commercial grade products could then be
further refined or exchanged for military grade fuels if
required. (Lee, 1989, p. 29) If cash market contracts are
fully hedged in the futures market, this strategy could
effectively double the available short run supply of fuel on
extremely short notice.
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The assessment here is that DFSC has conflicting
mission responsibilities which demand tradeoffs. Futures




According to Bryson, an organization must assess the
opportunities and threats present in the external environment.
These factors can usually be discovered by examining various
environmental forces and trends, stakeholder requirements, and
situations occurring with potential competitors and
collaborators. (Bryson, 1988, pp. 53-54)
Much of DFSC's external environment has already been
discussed. Political, economic, and regulatory trends, as
well as stakeholder requirements were addressed both in
Chapter II and throughout the treatment presented so far in
this chapter. However, a few external factors are worthy of
note.
As seen in the top section of Figure 29, the two
largest portions of the Federal Budget are entitlement
programs, like Social Security and Medicare, and the Defense
Budget. Entitlement programs remain politically sacrosanct
due to the strength and numbers of the politically active
aging population. In fact, entitlement funding grows
automatically every year unless Congress votes to stop it.
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Defense funding on the other hand, has become increasingly
vulnerable to budget cuts, as can be seen by the trend in the
bottom section of Figure 29. This vulnerability is due
primarily to the end of the Cold War, the shifting trends in
political emphasis toward social reform programs, and the fact
that Defense funds are discretionary and must be voted on
every year to win approval. (Gansler 1989, p. 79)
During the 1992 elections, the Federal Deficit and
National Debt became major issues as a result of the growing
appeal an political presence of billionaire Ross Perot. Perot
pointed out that all of the income taxes collected from all of
the states west of the Mississippi would be required to pay
just the interest on the National Debt. At 14 percent of the
annual Federal budget, as seen in the top of Figure 29, the
interest on the National Debt is nearly as large as the
Defense budget, and is just as large as all other
discretionary spending programs put together. As can be seen
in Figure 30, the National Debt is now over four trillion
dollars and still growing. (Perot, 1992, pp. 6-7)
All of the factors mentioned, have a tremendous impact
on the size of the Defense Budget and the composition of its
forces. As can be seen in Figures 31 and 32, the trends have
been decreasing for some time, with all of the forecasts
predicting continued cuts for the foreseeable future.
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All of these trends and forecasts spell problems for
DFSC, particularly when oil prices are unpredictable. As
budgets are squeezed, so is flexibility. While DFSC's ability
to rely on traditional procurement practices and reasoning is
diminishing, fresh opportunities to look at new approaches
like futures trading are becoming more attractive.
In the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994,
DFSC was granted authority to sell undesired petroleum
products instead of merely trading them, as was previously
recommended by the Section 800 Panel. (National Defense
Authorization Act, 1993, sec. 826)
Under provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the
Department of Energy (DOE) was directed by the Congress to
study the use of futures and options to ascertain whether they
could provide cost-effective protection for all Federal
Government fuel requirements. Federal financial exposure to
oil market volatility was estimated at the time to be between
four and six billion dollars per year. (Caruso, 1992)
The Energy Policy Act, which originated in the Senate,
was originally targeted for the Department of Health and Human
Services to stabilize its severely troubled Low Income Home
Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) . LIHEAP is a winter
heating assistance program that distributes $1.35 billion to
states, territories, and Indian tribes through block grants.
After a steep oil price increase in 1990, Congress had to
grant LIHEAP a supplemental appropriation of $50 million. In
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1991, $195 million had to be released from a contingency fund
to cover LIHEAP price increases related to the Persian Gulf
War. The House version of the Bill expanded the program to
include a Federal Government-wide approach, and was adopted in
the final version. (Caruso, 1992)
Bob Speir, from DOE's Office of Oil and Natural Gas
Policy, is conducting the Congressional study for DOE. He
plans to complete his work and make his final report to the
Congress sometime in 1994. Of particular interest in his
study is the research he has done into what the States have
done with futures trading strategies. Several states
including Texas, New York, Massachusetts and others have
already adopted successful futures trading programs. Because
many of the lessons learned from the State programs will be
incorporated in his report, it promises to be an important
body of work worthy of close examination when released. 18
The assessment here is that external factors provide
considerable threat to current business practices, but at the
same time make futures trading strategies more attractive. In
fact current trends have seen State Governments adopting
futures trading practices, trends which could provide valuable
guidance for Federal and DoD programs.
18Interview between B. Speir, Office of Oil and Natural Gas




According to Bryson, an organization must also assess
its own internal strengths and weaknesses. (Bryson, 1988, pp.
54-55) One of the more interesting findings from Bob Speir's
study of the States is not that problems in futures trading
mechanics are insurmountable, or that the risks prove too
great, in fact the opposite is true. The major problem he
found, is that in almost all cases, there is a crippling
initial internal resistance to the idea of futures trading. 9
As indicated in Chapter II, DFSC has a highly
specialized and professional workforce. This is DFSC's
significant strength. There is little doubt that DFSC already
has the capability to perform the market analysis required to
engage in futures trading. It would of course have to train
people to perform the function, and it would also have to
develop internal procedures and safeguards. However, in many
respects DFSC does not see the need to.
The Defense Fuel Supply Center identified oil market
price volatility as being a strategic issue with impact on
business operations as early as January of 1992 (Lee, 1992).
Under General Bliss, DFSC began to examine procurement
practices it felt it could change, which resulted in a number
of new strategic ideas as presented in Chapter II (Lee,
19 Interview between B. Speir, Office of Oil and Natural Ga
Policy, Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., and the researcher
26 August 1993.
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January 1992). The Defense Fuel Supply Center even went as
far as to identify the potential of mission failure as being
a possible consequence of not addressing this issue. However
the assumption currently being made by DFSC, is that it will
always be able to receive supplemental funding. According to
Dennis Stanley,
...if we have to increase the volume due to war or other
unforeseen situation, or pay higher prices due to an oil
embargo or shortage, we request supplemental funding from
DoD. The DoD in effect does not run out of money to buy
fuel because we would risk mission failure. (Stanley,
1993)
However, it was just this same sort of funding
practice by the Department of Housing and Human Services, that
prompted the Congress to direct the Department of Energy to
examine futures trading as a means of price protection in the
Energy Policy Act of 1992. (Caruso, 1992)
The final assessment here is that futures trading has
as reasonably good strategic fit but that internal resistance
may prevent the idea from going any further. An underlying
premise of this paper is that in light of all the factors
mentioned, DFSC's critical assumption about unlimited
supplemental funding should be reassessed. It is one of
DFSC's most significant weakness. The simple fact is, if DFSC
ignores the problem of price instability, it does risk mission
failure. Futures trading is only one of several alternatives
worthy of consideration.
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D. BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION
Much in line with Bob Speir's research on the problems
experienced by the States, DFSC's resistance to futures
trading centers around three primary issues, perception,
organization, and legislation. There are three primary
problems of perception, unfortunately all represent basic
misunderstandings of the market that can only be corrected
with training and exposure. One pervasive perception is the
naive notion that futures trading is gambling (Stanley, 1993).
To correct this perception, training would need to point out
the clear differences between hedging and speculation as well
as the many benefits and problems of each type of trading
practice.
An opposite but equally pervasive perception is that
hedging operations, because they manage risk, are simply a
form of insurance. Since the Government is a self-insurer,
hedging operations are unnecessary (Stanley, 1993). Training
would need to point out that the primary benefit of futures
trading is not insurance, but that it enables managers to make
better decisions based upon better information with greater
budgetary soundness. As noted in 1968 by Robert S. McNamara,
Secretary of Defense under the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations
,
Two points seem to be axiomatic. The first is that the
United States is well able to spend whatever it needs to
spend on national security. The second point is that this
ability does not excuse us from applying strict standards
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of effectiveness and efficiency to the way we spend our
Defense dollars. (McNamara, 1968, pp. 88-89)
Another perception is the idea that DFSC's trading would
somehow influence or distort the futures market (Stanley,
1993). Although a valid concern, Figure 33 shows that this
problem would be extremely unlikely. Even if DFSC were to
hedge everything it bought in a year, it would still amount to
less than .3 percent of the futures volume and 1.4 percent of
the options volume traded on the NYMEX exchange alone.
Further, while DFSC's purchases are declining, the futures
market is growing. Again, training would have to point out
the tremendous size of the futures market and the many trading
safeguards in place through both the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission and the exchanges themselves, as described in
Chapter III.
The Department of Defense has no organizational experience
in setting up or running a futures trading program.
Justifiably there are many questions surrounding structural
issues, controls, and safeguards (Stanley, 1993). However,
these types of issues are not particularly unique. Many
organizational issues have already been identified and
resolved by both industry and Government. The major
accounting firm of Coopers and Lybrand has developed a full
consulting program devoted to just such issues. Figure 34
diagrams just one example of how an organization can develop
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Figure 34 Hedge Program Development
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While some basic reporting procedures would have to be
established to keep track of outstanding physical contracts,
few if any changes would need to be made to current
procurement practices . Futures trading could be a separate
financial function totally independent of the physical
contracting function. In fact, many State Governments have
preferred this approach over integrating futures trading into
existing contracting organizations. They have discovered that
this functional separation helps to avoid problems with
organizational resistance, and generally removes futures
trading from the possibility of interpretation under contract
law. In other words, many States interpret futures trading as
a means of financing, not a means of contracting. This
financial interpretation provides invaluable flexibility
around statues that tend to slow down the contracting
function. However, it generally places futures trading as a
State Treasurer or Comptroller responsibility. 20
For hedging operations to be both nonspeculative and
effective, futures contract positions must always mirror real
delivery obligations in the physical market. If DFSC were to
adopt the comptroller approach taken by many States, it would
have to continually coordinate and monitor real time reports
of physical contract positions between the comptroller and
20Interview between B. Speir, Office of Oil and Natural Ga
Policy, Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., and the researcher
26 August 1993.
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contracting organizations. The primary purpose for this
reporting procedure would be to prevent uncovered speculative
futures positions resulting from poor information.
The final apparent barrier to implementation is a lack of
specific authorizing legislation. In fact the primary
objection to futures trading from DFSC is not so much that it
may or may not work, not so much that it may or may not have
economic benefit, and not so much that it may or may not have
strategic fit, but that it does not have specific
authorization (Duval, 1993, pp. 1-10). This single issue
appears to be the most onerous because it is the only one
which would require some degree of immediate action or
sponsorship. Currently there is no sponsorship within DFSC,
and as a result there is also no action.
E. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
On December 2, 1993, the graduating Acquisition and
Contract Management class at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA, held a roundtable discussion on the topic of
proposing possible legislative language to authorize futures
trading programs within DoD. This discussion was held as part
of a capstone policy course examination exercise designed by
the researcher. The students and instructor in attendance
included representatives from the Navy, Army, Marine Corps,
civilian Government Service, and Foreign Military Services,
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with varying degrees of contracting background and experience.
Discussion topics included:
• an overview of DFSC's primary business activity,
• a summary of procurement handicaps and problems,
• a description of futures trading strategies and benefits,
• a discussion of barriers to futures trading and other
government entity experiences,
• and a deliberation of issues that would be desirable to
include within legislation for authorizing futures trading
programs within DoD. 21
Several ideas were discussed for inclusion in a
legislative proposal. As previously noted, there are no clear
mandates for or against futures trading. The mandates that
are in place are highly subjective and interpretive, but there
is a clear DoD policy against speculation. Therefore,
clarifying language specifically authorizing futures trading
for the explicit purpose of bona fide hedging was considered
to be desirable.
Since the concept of futures trading is new and unfamiliar
to many people in DoD, some clarifying definitions of key
terms would be necessary for program implementation and also
desirable in any proposed legislation.
The idea of futures trading has never been tried within
the Department of Defense. Hence, there is no experience with
managing such a program. The initial program effort should be
21Round table discussion of graduating Acquisition and
Contract Management Students held at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA, 2 December 1993.
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coordinated, and designed to educate activities on the
benefits and potential problems of using futures trading
strategies. Time would be required to train contract
specialists, market traders, and analysts, and to develop
procedures for internal accounting, audit, and control, as
well as external reporting. It would be imprudent to initiate
into futures trading immediately without spending some time to
establish procedures, and it would also make little sense to
apply the idea globally without first prototyping it, testing
it, and obtaining lessons for latter full scale use.
It might be necessary at first to hire knowledgeable
consultants or trade through regulated brokers. Implementing
guidance with program limitations and reporting requirements
was found to be desirable, but it was felt that the entire
idea should be limited in scope to that of a pilot program
until unfamiliar issues could be resolved. The group also
felt that any legislative language for a pilot program should
contain sunset provisions to provide a possible safety valve
against unreasonable losses should the futures trading program
get out of control.
Trading in a futures market would also require specific
funding authorization, and maintenance of margins on account
with a regulated exchange or commodity broker. The group felt
that any profits gained from trading should be directed back
into fuel management programs to help defray fuel procurement
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costs. Specific language granting appropriation and
addressing these issues was considered to be desirable.
Based upon comments made at the Naval Postgraduate School
round table discussion, and language found in the state laws
of New York, Massachusetts, and Texas, the following language
is offered as a guide for use in developing legislative
proposals for authorizing futures trading within DoD: 22
1. Authority to Trade
The Secretary of Defense is authorized to engage in
energy futures trading activities for the purpose of
establishing or terminating bona fide hedging transactions to
increase protection against unanticipated surges in the price
of fuel and thereby increase the efficiency of fuel purchases
and fuel management programs.
2. Definitions
a. Energy Futures Trading Activities
"Energy futures trading activities" as used in this
legislation shall mean the trading, buying, or selling of
energy futures contracts for the purpose of establishing or
terminating bona fide hedging transactions.
b. Energy Futures Contract
"Energy futures contract" as used in this
legislation shall mean an instrument traded, bought, or sold,
22State of New York Public Law 9428 and 9431, Commonwealth o
Massachusetts H. 4664 through H. 4667, and Texas S.B. 1033.
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in a market or exchange regulated by the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission, that creates an obligation or an
obligation option to make or take delivery of a specific
quantity and quality of an energy commodity, to include crude
oil, gasoline, heating oil, natural gas, propane, or any other
energy product, at a specific location, future date and time.
c. Bona Fide Hedging Transaction
"Bona fide hedging transaction" as used in this
legislation shall mean a transaction in a market or exchange
regulated by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, where
such transaction or position normally represents a substitute
for transactions to be made or positions to be taken at the
same or later time in a physical market channel, when such a
transaction is economically appropriate to the reduction of
risks in the conduct and management of a fuel procurement
program.
3 . Implementing Guidance and Program Limitations
a. Implementation
The Secretary of Defense shall commence immediately
upon the enactment of this legislation to organize the energy
purchasing programs of all Defense agencies and authorities to
implement such procedures as are necessary or appropriate to
educate such entities on the prudent and cost-effective use of
energy futures contracts, and to establish internal safeguards
and procedures for accounting, audit, control, and reporting.
161
b. Pilot Program
The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a pilot
program of actual futures trading, commencing not later than
one year after the enactment of this legislation, or as
otherwise directed by the Congress, to ascertain the extent to
which the use of energy futures contracts could provide cost-
effective protection for Government entities from
unanticipated surges in the price of fuel. This pilot program
shall expire not more than five years after implementation, or
as otherwise directed by the Congress, during which time
program progress and lessons learned shall be reported to the
Congress not less than annually, or as otherwise determined
by the Congress. This pilot program shall terminate in the
event and at such a time as determined by Congress, cumulative
losses from the net effect of futures trading exceed an
acceptable threshold as defined by the Congress. The
Comptroller General of the United States shall have oversight
authority to ensure compliance with this legislation.
c. Limitations
The scope of this pilot program shall limit the
Secretary of Defense to not exceed a total of ten percent open
hedged positions in the futures market as compared to the
value of comparable agency contracts established in a physical
market channel for actual delivery of similar energy products,
or limits as otherwise defined by Congress.
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4. Funding Authorization and Maintenance of Margins
The Secretary of Defense shall be authorized through
appropriations, or as otherwise determined by the Congress,
such sums as may be necessary to carry out the requirements of
preparation and implementation of the five year pilot program,
and to maintain as necessary adequate trading margins on
account with an exchange or market intermediary dually
regulated by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission. Any
net profits realized from energy futures trading shall be
retained in the same appropriation account for continued use
in a fuel cost management program.
F. SUMMARY
While futures trading has a reasonably good strategic fit,
DFSC's organizational resistance may keep the idea from
proceeding any further. The barriers to implementation center
on three primary issues, perception, organization, and
legislation. Of these, legislative authorization appears to
be of primary importance. Because of this barrier, a proposal
for legislative language is offered as a guide.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This chapter briefly summarizes the intent and general
focus of the various topics discussed throughout this thesis.
This chapter also offers specific conclusions and
recommendations based upon an interpretive assessment of the
research completed. Finally, this chapter addresses and
answers each of the research questions posed in Chapter I
.
B. THESIS REVIEW
This thesis has present a logical and objective assessment
about issues surrounding the primary research question of
whether DFSC should trade in the futures market. In
discussing these difficult and often complex issues, many of
which are both economic and political, particular attention
was paid in trying to determine the viability and wisdom of
futures trading for DFSC, considering DoD's current
environment
.
In working toward these goals, this research paper
examined many of the potential benefits and problems
associated with futures trading. It also described the
context of DFSC's organization and the relevant public sector
environment. It identified problems in current contracting
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practices and described what would be required to implement
futures trading.
This thesis also explained futures trading mechanisms and
markets. It examined the various markets and factors
affecting the prices of futures contracts. It explained the
connection between prices in the futures market and the spot
prices of the underlying oil commodities they represent.
This thesis also provided ways of assessing and measuring
futures performance. It explained basic strategy design, and
illustrated a workable strategy that could be used develop
more sophisticated strategies.
Finally, this thesis examined futures trading in terms of
its strategic fit. Based upon a roundtable review of the laws
enacted in several States experienced with futures trading
programs, it offered legislative language that could be used
as a guide for developing proposals to authorize futures
trading within DoD.
C. CONCLUSIONS
Based upon the data and discussion presented throughout
this thesis, futures trading appears to be both a viable and
wise strategy for DFSC. It could reduce DFSC's exposure to
unpredictable oil market prices, and is clearly in line with
the recent thrust of Government recommendations and mandates
to move towards adopting innovative commercial practices
.
Futures trading would provide DoD with the flexibility needed
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to adapt its petroleum purchase and management programs to
actual market conditions.
Because futures trading would improve market flexibility,
it would also improve DFSC's ability to effectively and
efficiently carry out its mission. This feature is
particularly important because of the critical role that oil,
and hence DFSC, plays in military readiness. Futures trading
would provide greater budgetary certainty during unstable
market conditions. As a result, it would better serve the
needs of all of DFSC's stakeholders by reducing the tradeoffs
required to meet DFSC's various responsibilities.
Implementing futures trading would require minimal changes
to existing contracting practices. In fact, current
contracting practices would continue unimpeded by a futures
trading program. Thus, not only could implementation proceed
with few disruptions to DFSC's basic mission, but it would
actually improve mission capability during times of pre-war
surge because futures trading also offers an alternate supply
channel.
Finally, because futures trading has never been tried
within DoD, if implemented it should be done with prudent
care. Implementation would require adequate preparation and
training, appropriate safeguards and reporting procedures, and
careful attention to lessons that could be learned both before
and during the process. Implementation should be limited to
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that of a pilot project and refined over several years before
expanding to full scale use.
D . RECOMMENDATIONS
After General Bliss departed DFSC in July of 1993, all of
the momentum towards exploring alternative procurement
strategies was lost. Due to the environmental, economic, and
political factors and trends mentioned extensively throughout
this thesis, and the many disadvantages of current procurement
practices, DFSC should continue to explore alternative ideas.
Because the time for new ideas is ripe, these ideas should not
be limited to futures trading, traditional approaches, or the
ideas presented in Chapter II, but should include a quest for
ideas not yet discovered.
In particular, DFSC should seize the opportunity to
reexamine the idea of futures trading in terms of DFSC's
strategic environment, as was done in Chapter VI. DFSC should
reassess its mission objectives in terms of its
responsibilities to its various stakeholders. As a goal, DFSC
should strive to achieve budget stability and program
predictability during periods of oil price volatility. Given
the constant uncertainty of the environment, this long-term





The research questions posed in Chapter I are addressed as
follows
:
1 . Primary Research Question
• Should the Defense Fuel Supply Center trade in the futures
market? - Based upon the data and discussion presented
throughout this thesis, futures trading is both a viable
and wise strategy for DFSC, but it should also be compared
with other innovative strategies, such as those presented
in Chapter II, before implementation.
2 . Subsidiary Research Questions
• What are the potential benefits of the Defense Fuel Supply
Center trading in the futures market? - Futures trading
would reduce DFSC's exposure to unpredictable oil prices.
It improves flexibility to adapt to actual market
conditions and thereby improves DFSC's ability to carry
out its mission. Futures trading would provide greater
budgetary certainty during unstable market conditions and
as a result would better serve the needs of DFSC's
stakeholders. It also offers an alternate supply channel
feature, that would actually improve mission capability
during times of pre-war surge.
• What are the potential problems of the Defense Fuel Supply
Center trading in the futures market? - Although a common
commercial practice, futures trading has never been tried
within DoD. There are perception and organizational
problems, and legal hurdles to overcome. There are also
risks that improper speculation activities could lead to
losses if not properly prevented and managed. If
implemented, it should be carefully planned and tried on
a small scale. Time should be allowed for adequate
preparation and training, as well as to develop
appropriate safeguards and reporting procedures. Time
should also be allocated to adequately test the program.
Prudent attention should be paid to lessons that could be
learned both before and during the process. Authorizing
legislation should contain sunset provisions to stop and
reevaluate the program should it exceeds loss limits.
• What contracting practices or changes would be required to
implement a futures trading strategy? - Implementation of
futures trading would require minimal changes to existing
contracting practices. While current contracting
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practices could continue unimpeded, an accurate and real
time method of reporting or establishing the hedge base
would be critical if physical contracts are to be fully
hedged. This real time reporting would be required to
prevent speculative futures positions. Futures trading is
a highly specialized activity that would require extensive
training. Many successful State programs have made
futures trading a comptroller function as opposed to a
contracting function.
What are the price drivers in futures contracts and how do
they compare with the underlying commodity spot market? -
There are numerous factors that drive oil prices in the
commodities spot markets, as explained in Chapter IV. The
two most common approaches for determining these factors
are fundamental and technical market analysis. Generally,
futures contract prices reflect the market consensus of
commodity price expectations in the future. Four
different theories describe the actual relationship of the
futures market to the spot market. However, all four
theories agree that as a futures contract gets closer to
expiration, the futures price gets closer to the spot
price.
What are potential ways of measuring futures trading
performance? - One way of looking at futures performance
is to consider the value it gives to someone by providing
a payoff or cost that is certain as opposed to a payoff or
cost that is uncertain. This value can be approximated
using the concept of utility. Because of their fixed-
price effect, futures contracts provide a higher utility
for normally risk adverse individuals than exposure to
market price volatility. Another way of looking at
futures performance is to see if it meets some price
protection and participation objective. Futures trading
strategies can be developed that would protect against
market price increases but also allow participation during
market price decreases. These strategies could result in
substantial savings.
Does futures trading have a strategic fit within the
Defense Fuel Supply Center? - According to Bryson's eight
step model, futures trading would be considered a very
attractive alternative for resolving the strategic issues
and problems created by unpredictable oil market prices.
The strategy fits nicely within DFSC's mandates, mission,
external and internal environment, and is also in keeping
with the current timing opportunity and public sector
agreement over the need for fundamental change within
Government systems and processes.
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F. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Areas for further research were described at the end of
Chapter II. These alternative strategies include:
• Seasonal Stock Building and Drawdown,
• Timing of Procurements,
• Term/Spot Procurement Mix,
• Lift Scheduling,
• and Posts, Camps, and Stations Deliveries.
6. SUMMARY
This thesis concluded that futures trading is both a
viable and wise strategy for DFSC. Because the timing is
ripe, DFSC should reevaluate its strategies and mission
objectives and continue to explore alternative ideas to
traditional procurement approaches. These ideas should not be
limited, but should fit the circumstances of the current
environment. While futures trading is recommended, each of the
research questions posed should be carefully evaluated to
fully understand what is involved. If DFSC decides to
implement a futures trading strategy, it should do so
cautiously, and on a small scale. Futures trading requires
sufficient preparation and planning. Adequate procedures and
safeguards should be established prior to any actual trading.
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APPENDIX F - GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Account Exactsth/n - The agent of a cammij-
aion house who »=rvc» customers/traders try enter-
ing therr commodicy futures and options aiders,
reporting trade executions, advising on trading
sxnecstes-, crc
Actuals - Physical cash corrunodioei a* opposed id
tututea contDKta*
AM* - Alternative Delivery Procedure. A provision of
a futures coomct that allows buvea and sellers Co
mate and cake dchvery under terms or conditions
chat differ from those prescribed in the contract
An ADP may occur at any time dunng the delivery
period, oocc king and short futures posirioct have
been matched for the purpose of delivery.
Admlnfartrarnv* Workstation - ANTMEX
ACCESS" wofkstsiicm through which NYMEX
Clearing Members monitor all activity in accounts
they carry and set limits on their customers'
sccounts through the Trade Limit Monitoring
System.
AilorNono- An order which must be filled in its
entirety or net at all.
American Option - An option contract thai may
be cjuuiuul at any time priorw exuiraaon. This
differs from a "Enropesn option," which may only
jw» ancfapd op rir eajfaatiap date, nymex
options are *American.*
API- American Petroleum Institute The primary
VS. oil industry trade association; based in
Washington, ttC
APIOrwvtlT- Grarvuy(wd&htperurutvalijrnc)of
oils as measured by the API scale whereby:
APlGtavirv - 14L5 -13L5
specific gravity
«e60°F
Altaitiip>— The simultaneous purchase of one
commodity against the sale of another in order to
profir from fluctuation* in the usual price relation-
ships. Varkrions include die limurcsnoous pur-
chase and sale ofdifferent delivery months of the
Mme^^^.i^tiry; fJtKr. same delnrcrvnMsalh. but
different grades of lbs same commodity; and of
(aitlirrfmt n*»mfnodftJCL
[- A motion to sell. The same as Offer
>- To lest a metal or an oil for purity or quality.
1- The process by which the seller of
an option a notified of a buyer's intention to exer
cise the right's associated with the option.
Aaanclatad Qmm - Natural gas present in a crude
oil reservoir, cither separate from or in solution
with the oiL
ASTM- Ameriran Society for Testing Mater isls.
Grade and quality specifications for petroleum
products arc .Jcterrnincd by ASTM in ten method*
At-tho MaWfcwt - An order to buy or seU i futures
cormact at whatever price is obtainable whea the
order rcscbci the tnding floor. Also called a
Market Order.
At-thn Money - An option whose exercise, or
strike, price is closest to (fee futures price.
Avoirdupois uroi - Customary VS. weigho. I croy
ounce - 1.09 ounce* avoirdupois.
AwtCMMatic Eanjrclaaj — Following option expira -
don, an option which is in-the-money by $100 or
more is exercised automatically by the clearing
house, unless the holder ofthe optica submits
specific insQucriaas to the contrary.
- Market situation in which
futures prices arc lower in each succeeding deliv-
ery month. Also known as an Inverted Market.
The opposite ofContango.
CO- A daft or bill of
rxttiange accepted bya bank; payment is guaran-
teed by the accepting insrirutian.
A vessel, either motorized or cowed, used to
carry pJpouaB in navigable waterways. Inlwd riva
barges chat carry oil prodoca generally hold 25,000
hatrria Ocean-going barges range in size up to
120,000 bands.
- A unit of rdiirrie rneiwrrc used i« petrole-
um and refined producnv I barrel - 42 US. gallons.
— The differenijal that cxtso tt any rime
between the cash, or spot pries ofa given commod-
ity and the price ofthe nearest futures contract for
the same or a rcfarrcd conwnrwi ity. Basis nary reflect
JuTeieut tfaac pcrioda, product fJocna, ajaanainl or
iocanons. Cash mmus Futures equaii Baas.
fttak- The unccrtxinty u co whether the
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the time t hedge position it implemented and
liquidated.
Batch- A measured amount in which crude oil and
refined product sfupmena are lent through >
pipeline.
Botching tiquwifi - The otto in which ship-
ments arc sent through a pipeline.
Bcf- Billion cubic feet.
ftJD- Band* per Day. Usually wed to quantify a
refiner"! output capacity or an oilfield's race of
flow.
Bur- One who antJcipatei a decline in price or
volatility. Opposite of a Bull
BawSprwnd- I) The sknultaneous purchase and
sale oftwofuaires contracts in the same or related
commodities with the intention of profiting from i
decline in prices, bat at the tame tune Uniting (he
potential lota if this expectation b wrong. Thi» can
usually be accomplished by lelfing a nearby deliv-
ery and buying a deferred delivery. Z) Adeha-
negarjre option position conrpriaed oflong and
short options of the same type, either calls or puts,
designed ta be profitable in a declining marker.
An option with a lower Strike price is sold and one
with a higher strike price is bought.
Bid- A rrmtioor© buy a futures or option contract at a
specified price. Opposite ofOffer.
Block BOholoi Mocks! - An option pricing formula
initially derived by Fisher Black and Myron
Scholea for securities options and later refined by
Black for option* on futures.
Ktoltnr Room — An enterprise which often is operat-
ed out of inexpensive, low-rent quarters that uses
high pressures sales arctics, generally over the
telephone, and possibly false or misleading infbr-
maoon to solicit generally unsophisticated
investors.
Book sVassarror - Transfer oftitle without actually
deUvering the product
BoxSprood- An option market arbiaagc in which
bow a bufl spread and a bear spread are estab-
lished for a tisklesa profit. One spread includes
put options and the other includes calls.
Brook- A rapid and sharp price decline.
t- The underlying futures price
atwhich a given option strategy is neither prof-
itsble cor unprofitable. For oil options, it is the
strike price plus the premium. For put options, it
is the strike price minus the premium.
British Ttisjrmal Unit - The amount ofheat
required to increase the temperature ofa pound
of water 1° Fahrenheit. A Bcu fa used as a com-
mon measure of heating value for different fuels.
Paces ofdifferent fueb and their units ofmeasure
(dollars per barrel oferode, dollars per ton of coal,
cents per gallon ofgiaounc, cents per thousand
cubic feet of natural gas) can be easily compared
when expressed as dollars and cents per million
Bens.
Brokar - 1 ) An individual who b paid a fee or corn-
nussion for acting as an agent in making contracts,
sales, or purchases. 2)A Floor Broker is s person
who actually executes trading orders on the floor
ofan exchange. 3) An Account Executive,
Registered Copinsnrjrty Representative, or
Customers' Man who deals with customers and
their orders in corwrusjion house office*. See also
Futures Commission Merchant.
BoobW — Bottom sediment and water, often found in
crude oil and residual fuel
BtU- See British thermal unit,
BukjB)- A rapid advance in futures price*.
Bull- OnewbosrmtipHtesaniiiaeaseianriceor
volatility. Opposite of a Bear.
Bull Spread- 1) The srmiilnronrMS pitrckase and
sale of two furores contracts in the same or related




rise in prices but at the same rime lirnsring the
potential loss if thfa expectation is wiuug. Thrs
can be accomplished by buying the nearby dcrrv-
eryandseuingtiujueferred. 2> A delta-poaurre
option position composed ofboth long and short
options of the same type, either calls or puts,
designed to be profitable in a rising market. An
option with a lower strike price is bought and one
with a higher suite price is sokL
Bunks* C Fuol Oil - {or bunkering facl) Fuel used
for ships. Generally refers to a No. 6 grade of
residual fuel oil with an API gravity about 105*.
Biiyor'B Morfcot - Acotufitionc^thcrnarketui
which there is an abundance ofgoods available
(NYMEX, December 1992, pp. 4-5)
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and hence buyers can afford to be selective and
may be able to buy at tea* than cite price that had
previouify prevailed. See Seller's Market.
1 lawltfaj - Also called a long hedge. Buying
futures contracts to protect agamt possible
increased costs of comrnodices that will be
DOBBBfl in the future.
1 Spread ™ An option pmDOO com -
passed of the purchase and aalc oftwo option con-
llscls of the tame type that hare the tame strike
prices hut different expiration date*. Also known
as a HoiuomaJ, or Time, Spread.
Cadi Option - An option that gives the buyer (hold -
er) the right, but not the obligation, co buy a
future* contact (eater into a long futures position)
fara specified price within a specified period of
ome tn exchange for a one-time premium pay-
ment. It obligates the seller (writer) ofaa option to
acfl the underlying futures contract (enter into a
snort futures poaakn) at the designated price,
should the option be exercised at that price.
Cap- A supply comraa between a buyer and seller,
whereby the buyer is assured that he will not have
to pay snow than a gjvco irsrsirntim price. This
type oforssnsrTssanalrsjoua to a caJl option.
Casrrylna Cbtvoaj - The totalcott of storing a phys-
ical commodity over a period of time. Includes
storage charges, insurance, interest, and opportu-
nity costs,
Causb CasusiMtlly - The actual, physical cornmnd-
lty, Somctuncs called a Spot Cornmodiry or
Actual*.
CmhMarftBt- Toe maato fats cash ccammaiiry
where the actual physical product is traded,
Cajajlnghajsjd G— - Gas present in an col well that is
removed when it flows to the surface at the wcll'»
r- A mcsnic of the ignirahility or"
theaelfisea. Diesel fuel generally has co meet a
octane B—bet specification of40, Aa a measure of
pcrfcoruuicc, the cctanc number serves a suxuiai
purpose a* docs the octaac number ofgasoline.
CFfD- Cubic feet per day. I Jauaily used to quantify
the race offlow ofa gas wcD or pipeline.
CFTC - See Commodary Futures Trading
Cntnrntssaon.
CharrJng - The use of graphs and charts in the
t.Tslvsu of market behavior, so ss to plot trends of
price movements, average movements of price,
volume, and open interest, in the hope that such
graphs and charts will help one to anticipate and
pajBB I from price trends. Cjonenrso with
Fundamental AnaJysu,
CW - Cost, Insurance, Freight Term refers to a sale
in which the buyer agrees to pay a unit price that
includes the free on board (FOB) value at the port
of origin put* ill costs of insurance and transpoits-
DOn. This type of transaction differs from a "defiv-
etecT agreement in that it is genctairy ex-duty.
and the buyer accepts the quantity and quality
ic the towdins port raeber than pay on quality and
quantity ss dcieimiird at die rraloarBng port.
Risk and title are trauafeued from the seller to
the buyer at the loadmg port, afrhraigh the setter
ij ohhgpd (d provide msnzance in s rra naffi able
policy at the bbmb of loading.
CByflf- Generafly refers to the location at which
gas changes owaenhip or transportation i
bflky from a pipeline to a local dMbadopi
ny or gas utility.
i of Options - All cal cations, oral put
options, exercisable far the same ondertyuig
BbBbsbj contract and which expire on the same
expiration date.
I of Bwslcsj - A utility's sales categoric* such
sa rcairimnal, crxnrnrrrisl, industrial odiet, and
sales fix resale.
i Cargo - Refined products such as kerosene,
gasoline, home hearing oa,jet fad carried by
nr"fa-*», barges and cank cars. AD refined products
except banker fuels, residual fuel ou, asphalt and
COse.
•mtoer - Cicaring Members of the
New Yotk Mercantile Eschangc sccept respansi-
bdny for all trades cleared through them, and
share secondary saaponsshMky far the liquidity of
the Exchanges clearing opetaxion. They earn
eBJJBJBJSjfrjBJS. MfpUm| Hiwr fisiwswi BSSeBai
and enjoy special margin privilege*. Original mar-
gin requirements far (Trarrng Members are lower
f
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dm fa customers, and Clearing Members may
use letters ofcndk posted with the dearinghouse
is anginal margin fa customer accounts is well as
for their own trades. Clearing Membea muit
meet a minimrrm capital requirement.
CtoarinohOUM - An exdiange-assodattd body
charged with the haedpn of ™»irinfl *h^ BiMnrwi
integriry of each trade. Orders are "cleared" by
meant ofthe clearinghouse acting as the buyer ro
all seHen and the idler to all buyer*.
Ctoalnq ft—loo - A range ofprices at which trans-
actions took place at the doting of the market;
buying and idling orders at the closing might
have been filled at any point within audi a range
Collar- A supply contract between a buyer and sell-
er ofa commodity, whereby the buyer is assured
that he will not have to pay more than tome nun-
mum price, and whereby the teller is assured of
receiving some minimum pace This it analogous
» an option fence, also known as a range forward.
Combination Utility- A utility which provides
both gat and decode service.
Cosnmtulon - The fee charged by a futures broker
fa the eutiitioa ofan order.
CfllirsiMrOn HOUM - An organizarion that trades
commodities and/or futures and options contracts
fa customer accounts in return for a fee.
Cornrnhnlvn Mtwchant - One who makes a
trade, eitherfa another member ofan exchange
or forancHuTCrnberdienubutwhomakesthc
trade in his own name and become liable a* princi-
pal to the Otner-
CorruiirtiTtaatt of Opon lirtajrsjBjt — The number
ofopen or outstanding contracts fa which an indi-
vidual or emity is obligatedm the Esxhange
because that indrvidual or entity has not yet made
an offsetting sale or purchase, an actual contract
ddrvery, or, in the case ofoptions, exercised the
option.
Commodity - A» defined by the CFTC tpedfically
cnumenurd agricultural commodities, all other
goods and articles, except anions, and all services,
rights and interesa in which contracts fa future
delivery are presently, or in the future may be.
dealt.
Commodity Future* Tracing Corramlsauofi -
A federal rcgulsnory agency authorbxd under the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974 to regulate futures ending in ill commodi
oca. The commission is comprised of five camrnift
sioners, one ofwhom is designated as chairman, al
appointed by the President, subject to Senate con
ruTnatwri.ThcCFTCisindeiperidcrittrfthe
Cabinet depanmena.
Contango Markot - A market situation in which
f**"^ arr hfphrr m dw nwrrrding ^Mivny
months than m the neaicst deuvety month.
Opposite c»f Backwardation.
Cowtstljsjsicv OrrJar - An order which becomes
effetUvc oofy upon the niHillment ofsome concb-
non in the marketplace.
Contract - 1) A tram ofreference describing a cnit
of trading for a commodity future or option. 2)An
agreement to buy or adl a specified commodity,
detailing theamount and grade ofthe product and
the date on which the contract will mature and
become deliverable.
Contract GraoVa - Thar grade of product estab-
lished in the rules oft commodity futures
exchange at being suitable for delivery agaiojc a
futures contract
Contract Month* - See Delivery Month.
Contract Trading Volume - Ddry trading volume
Coiwanlon- A delta-ncutraJ arbitrage transaction
involving a long fuDjrcs. t long put optjon, and a
short call option. The put and call options have
the earoe strike price and same expiranon date,
Odvsst — To dose out a short futuns or option position .
Covorad Writing - Tbessueirfan optkm against
an exisuag position In the underlying futures con
tract For example, short call and kmg futures.
Crock Spraaula - The simultaneous purchase or
sale oferode pplrtT the sale or purchase of prod-
ucts. These spread differentiab which represent
refining margins arc noonaally quoted »n dollars pa
I isrid by converting the prorinrr prices into dollars
per band and snrjaacdngthe crude price bom the
average product paces.
Crude Oil- A mixture of hydrocarbons that exists as
a liquid m natural underground rcscrvoini and
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remains liquid ax atmospheric pressure after pass-
ing through surface separating facilities. Crude is
the raw mate™ I which is refined into gasoline,
heating oil, jet fuel, propane, petrocheiracala and
other products.
CuMcFtwt- The most comnwa measure of g»s
volume, referring to the amount of gss needed co
Oil a YOtumc ofone cubic foot at 14.73 pounds pet
square inch absolute pressure and 60° Fahrenheit.
One cubic foot of natural gaa 0000101,011 average,
1,027 Btus.
Currant DoUvsjry Month - The futures contract
which matures and becomes deliverable during
the present month or tbe month closest to deliv-
ery. Also called the Spot iMoath.
Csjsjfason Osbj — Theamountof gas required ma
storage pool to ro iinrtia sufficsenc pressure to
keep the working gas recovenhtr
laawanj Tnajsj The purchase and sale of a futures
or an option contract on the same day.
DMter Took Wagon Prico - (DTW) The once,
usually of gasoline, offered by the majors which is
branded and delivered to tbe service bubinn on a
OF basis.
Dtspsjsj Dsjy — A measure ofthe coMneo ofthe
weather {beating degree day) or it* heat (cooling
degree day) baaed on the enrol » which the daily
incaDfriu|iciiiwpfaIb bcJow or uses above 65
Fahrenheit.
DnftvuiBcfl — Often regarded as synonymous with
CIF m the ISJSSJI f 1^* mi"*| cargo rrsfl^. tta sj ihit dii
ferfrorn the latter in a number of ways. Generally,
the seller's risk* are greater in a delivered cnuuac-
tion because the buyer pays on the basis of landed
qualiry/quanttfy. Risk and tide are borne by tbe
seller and] such tune as die commodity, such as
oil, passe* from shipboard into the mnnrrrine
flange of the buyer's shore insraBatina The seller
si responsible inr clearance through nistnms and
payment of all douea. Any in-o-anot ccntanuna-
00 or loss of cargo is tbe seller ' 1 liability. In deliv-
ered cranaictjoos the buyer pays only for the quan-
tity of oil actually received in storage,
Dattrvtary — The term baa BaaalsBI meaning when
used in connccooo with futures concaca.
19
Delivery generally refers to the changing ofown-
ership or control ofa commodity under specific
terms and procedures neahhshed by the rtrhat*^
upon which the contact is traded. Typically
,
except for energy, the crrrrrrridsry must be placed
in an approved warehouse, ssasaaasj metals depos-
itory or other storage racifiry, and be inspected by
approved personnel, after which the facility issjes
« SjaaashDOBB n-nHpr ahljSjiSjSj rrrtifir*rr SJkjSSSJSjJ
certificate 0/ due btli, which becomes a transfer-
able deliTerv instrument DeUvery of che mstru-
mem nmally « piererlf*! hy | Sjaajpaj r£hmww,nrm
ro deliver. After receipt oftbe delivery instrument,
the r.esr owner typically can take possession of tbe
physical commodity , can deliver the delivery
instrument into the futures market In sarisfsctioo
of a short pdinac ot can sell the delivery mstm-
ment to another market pamapant who can use it
for delivery joto the future* market in satnfacQcin
of his short position or for cash, or can take deliv-
ery of the physical himself.
The procedure differs for energy mwtnea. Bona
fide buyers or sellers of the underiyiag energy
commodity can stand for delivery. If s buyer or
idler stands for delivery, the contract ts held
through the terminarirm of trading. The haver and
seller each file a oodce ofmsent to make or take
detrveiywiAtnebicaucuiw f>ssing Membew
who file them with the Ejcrjange. Buyers and
icUers are randomly matched by the Estrange,
Tbe delivery payment is baaed on too contact's
tutu **"** te UK r if pt ka -
Dwllvwy Month - The mooth ipedfied in a given
futures contract for delivery ofthe actual rjoyascal
srx* or cash commodity.
DsjltvajiY PaOftiCsj •• A raoooc iat.av.ntrd through an
exchange's ckaring bouse by a afcaajsjsj snranber
«niMnwv-Mig Am im»nrinn SJJ ' 1« ilia i fKp SJBSJSSj
rwanwulity iassjBSsasjiaaiCs1 * ««m—** Sasasssai'
Delivery fosrrtUl - Usessjsasjflttasjnsasja1 ^yfn
exchange at which delivery may be made in fulfill-
mentoftiwnisct 11 una
Dssjffsj — Tbe auusauvjty ox an option's issue ma
change in die pnee of the underlying futures cou-
trsct, also referred to as an option '1 futures-catui*a>
Icni position. Delias are nsssjajsaj for brjQath option
positions, or calls, and ncgaavc for bearish option
It
r
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pandora. Of puts. Delas ofdeep in-the-money
optionjareapproximately equal to one; delras of
ac-rhe-meney options arc IL5; and deltas of deep
out-of-thc-nroncy options approach zero.
Doha Neutral Spread - A spicad where the total
delta position oo the tong side and the total delta
on the soon side add up to approxiniaiEJy xero.
Depository or Warohouee Racolpt - A docu-
ment itsocd by a bank or warehouse indicating
ownership of a commodity stored ia a bank depos-
itory or warehouse. In the case of many conunodi-
ties deliverable against futures contracts, fnaifcr
ofownership ofaa appropriate depi wiuay receipt
may effect comract delivery.
PI—I Fuel - Diatiuate fuel oil used in compres-
sjon-ignition engines. It is similar to borne heaaag
ail, but must meet s cetane number tpeaficstiorj
of40 or more. SeeCame.
Dlffefoiitieaa — Price differencea between 1 lawn s,
grades end kirsfioiia of diffrrent tcurka ofthe
tame commodity.
Dirty Cargo - Those petroleum products which
leave significant amounts of residue in tanks.
Generally applies to crude oil and residual fuel 01L
iilw mini - 1)AOvwuwed adjustment in price
allowed for delivery ofstocks ofa enmmodiry of
lesser than contract grade against a futures con-
tract. Z) Sornctiincs used to refer to the price dif-
ferences between future* of different delivery
iFUwiOO- Products of refinery dutiUa-
donsornrriinescfo7cd to a» middle distillates;
kerosene, diesel fuei, and home heating oil.
DoBtorTsjat- A qnainvhre method ofdetecting
undesirable sulfur compounds in petroleum distil-
lates; that is, determining whether an oil is sour or
I
» Anunluauy rcrmiefcjnngrocotD-
rncjcjal oil and gas operations beyond the produc-
aoo phase; oil refining and mtfhcring, and natural
gaa tnmtrnitsinn and distribution.
DryGM - Gas that does not contain liquid
hydrocarbons.
>- sec Exchange of Futures far Phyiicsls.
[Trader- A person who ia authorized to
enter orders for his own account acdVbt for cus-
tomers' accojno on the NYMEXACCESS" eJec-
uuiuc Bbbbuj system.
Ertd'tJajaw — The ultimate copjubsbi of prtrnlrnTn
products or natural gat; most commonly refers to
Urge commercial industrial, or utility consumere
European Option - An option that may be exer-
cised only on its expiration date.
Exehano* Certified Stocks - Stocks ofcona-
modinea held in ticposamiie* or warehouses certi-
fied by an Exchange wppmvtwi itaTps>BMGP aiirhnft-
ty as coosunitxg good delivery against a futures
contract position. Current total certified stocks arc
reported mibe press for many tnaponantooro-
modinea such as pistinum.
Exchanp^ of Future* for Caah - Atraotacdon
in which the buyer ofa cash commodity transfers
to the seller a corresponding amount of long
futmtg <»orraca, or receives from the sclk? a cor-
rcsponding amount of short futures, a: a price dif-
ference mutually agreed upon. In this way, the
opposite hedges in futures ofboth panes are
closed out simulnmeously.
Exchange of Future* for Physicals - A future*
contract provision involving an agreement for
delivery ofphysical product that doc* not neces-
sarily yyywftimt m^^iimi sjsfli jfrciirflm in all
ir iiiw from one market parDQpant to another and
auiiaianiiaia assumption ofequal and opposite
futures positions by the tame participants at the
rime of lite agreement.
EsteftJoe- The prooeaa of converting an options
contract into a "f'lffft pusiuim.
EaareJee Pries - The price at which the BtwierJying
futures contract will be bought or sold in the event
an option is exercised. Also called the smhe price.
Expiration Dart* - The date and time after which
trading in options terminates, and after which all
contract rights or obligations became null and
void
Ertrimric Value - The amount by which the pre-
miuro exDoeda era intrinsic value. Also known as
time value.
13
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air Value - Theoretical value
Faat Marital - Tianwrriona in the pitor ring that tike
placem such vosanso tod with aaah rapidity that
pnoB icponca are besuno with price syottnasjaj so
they inert "Fast" and show a range of pnoes.
FaadatDck- The supply ofcrude oil, naruralgai
liquids, or oacural gsa to a refinery or petrochcuu-
caJ planr or chc supply ofsome refined fraction of
tmcrmcdiicc product to WMBC other mimManuring
process.
»- A long (snort) underlying position together
with a bug (short) out-of-the-cumcy put and a
short (long) out-af-tbe-numey cali All options
must expire at the anno arnc.
i — Fucures Industry Asaor istion A national not-
for-profit futures industry trade mmriitirm that
icpresents the brokerage (tmilfiunity an industry,
regulatory, pofiocal and nrinrarinnal issues,
or KffJ - An order which must be filled immedi-
ately, aodmm entirety. Failing this, the order
will be canceled.
\— The measure of the proportion of pure
metal, usually refers to precious metals such a*
plarhurm, palladium, gold and silver.
• — Utility scrrice which assumes no
interruption rurul if residential customers' sup-
ply u threatened. Oppoaite of Inrcmiptiblc
Service.
Fwal rwtrtJcw Day- The fiat day on which che
C learing Home noctfica Clearing Members of
delivery alleviations. Energy contracts have only
one notice day.
ftaor- 1) The main trading area of an exchange.
Z) A supply contract between a buyer and sellei of
a cornmodtry, whereby the seller is assured that he
will received at least some rninimurn price. This
type of contract is analogous tn a put option.
r — An exchange member who executes
orders id buy or seD futures snd options In the
rrmAlnp nrwr /ffl dw flOOftfl COOUBodideS
floor lswataw Of lasawl - An exchange member
who executes orders to buy or sell futures and
options for Ins own atMwnu
Fore* Mafrura - A standard dune wh>cb irtdemnj-
fiea either or both parties to a transaction whenev-
er events which che Exchange dedsses to be rea-
sonably bcyind the control ofeither parry occur to
prevent fulfillment of the terms ofthe contact.
Forward ConHad - A supply contract buwu-a a
buyer and aeller, whereby the buyer i» obUgsccd to
cake delivery and the idler is obligated to provide
delivery of s fixed amount ofacomrnodkyatt
predetermined pace on specified furore date.
Payment in full is due at the rime of, ot following,
dcHvery , This differs from a futures contract
where icalcoicot i» made dairy, resulting in partial
payment over the life of the QSSaMcl
F ractio rvatjon — The process whereby saturated
hydrocarbons from natural gas are separated into
distinct parti or "fractions" such as propane,
bo cane, ethane, etc.
ftwe an Board (FOB) - A transaction in which the
setter provides a commodity at an agreed unit
price, at a specified loading point within a inca-
sed period; * is the rcspofliibtliry of the buyer to
arrange for tnmsposnstion and insurance-,
Fuad OH - Refiricd petnieum products used U * fuel
for home beating and industrial and urificy bofleo.
Fed oil is divided into ewe broad cstegoriea, tusdl-
hnc fud ofl, also known sa No. Z fuel, gasoil or
chesel fuel; and residual fceJ oil, ibo known as
No. 6 fuel, or outside the Linked States, just is
fuel oiL No. 2 fuel b a fight oil used for borne
heating, in compression ignition engines and in
light Industrial triplications. No. 6 oil is a heavy
fuel used in large ccmtnrrrial, industrial and elec-
oic utility boueaa.
ftiiidasisawlal AnaUywsa - The study of pertinent
supply and demand factors which influence the
trjrrfstpfJoclsriaswfccqfoasjssasflMBi Sec also
Technical Analysis.
1*1mqilia Iorerchangeablc. Produca wbkh can be
substituted for purposes of shipment or atncigr,
FvtUTwa Corrtract — A supply contract between a
buyer and seller, whereby the buyer Is ohligatod to
take deTivety and the scfltt Is obligated co prorkre
dclivciy ofa fixed amount of a cosnatodrty at a
predetermined price at a sptcifand Inrat w ai.
Futures ennaacra are traded excluarvcfy on tegu-
r
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i-
latcd exchanges and ne seeded daily based on
their cuneni value in the marketplace.
Future* Comnrianiort Marcharrt - An PCM ia
the only industry paraapani who receives, han-
dlea and manacea customers' funds, margin pay-
ment* and commission charges. He it also respon-
sible fa crmRrnurinn of trade slips, customer
sratensenta, and gnarsntcca.
RlBHI aqUrVljamt - A term frequently uicd with
reference to speculative poiioon limits for options
on futures ooraractL The furure*-cquiv*leor of an
option pojjnao is the number of opciom multi-
plied by the previous day's risk factor or delta for
the option series. For example, 10 deep out-of
-
the money options with a risk factor of0.20 would
be considered 2 futuiea-GqiiivaJenr contracts. The
delta or risk factors used for this purpose is the
same ** thai used in delta-based Assigning and
bsk analysis systems.
I- The sensitivity of an option's delta
to changes in the price of the underlying futures
POnfTBCf.
- European designation tor No. 2 heabog ail
and difianl rneL
QaaoDuaa, straight run — Abo known a* raw
gasoline. Gasoline which b obtained dixcedy from
crude oil by fracconaJ distillation. Straight-run
gasoline generally muse be upgraded to meet
current motor fuel spcafiamoas.
Good tfll Cancatod - An order to be held by a bro-
ker until it can be filed or until canceled.
H — Astamped improwinn on the surface
ofa precious metal bar that indicates the producer,
serial number, weight and purity of metal content-
Oil- No. 2 fuel oil, a distillate fuei oil used
either for domestic heating or in modcrate capaci-
ty comraeTdal-lndustrisJ burners.
- Crude oil with a high specific grevi-
ty and a low API gravity due ru the presence of s
high proportion of heavy hydrocarbon fractions.
- The initiation ofa position in a futures or
options market that is inrended as a temporary
substirutt for tie sakwr/urdiaje ofd« actual
1*
commodity. The sale of furores contracts in antict-
psuon of future sales of cash comrmxfines as a pro-
tection against possible price declines, or the pur-
chase of futures conrntrrs In anticipation offuture
purchases ofcash commodities as a protection
against the possibility of increasing costs.
HadQar— A trader who enters the market with the
specific anient of protecting an existing or antici-
pated physical marker exposure from unexpected
or advene price fluctuations.
Hadpja Ratio - 1) Ratio of the value of futures con
tracts purchased or arid to the value ofthe cash
commodity being hedged, s computation Deces-
sary to mmimire basis risk. 2) The ratio, dctcf-
mined by an option's deka. offutures to options
required to establish a riskJess posmoo. For exam-
ple, if a Jl/harrel change in the underlying futures
price leads to a $0.2S/bsire! change in the option
premium, die hedge ratio is A (four options for
each fuaires contract).
Historical Volatility - The antwiaHrrri standard
deviation of percent changes in futures prices over
a specific period. It U an indication of past volariu-
ty in the marketplace.
Horizontal Spread - Calendar or tune spread.
HydfOCartwraa — Organic chemical compounds con-
taining hydrogen and carbon atoms. They form
the basis of all petroleum products.
ImmodiatB or Cancol - An order which must be
filled immediately or be canceled. IOC orders
need not be filled In their entirety.
Implied Volatility - A meaaujicinem of the mar-
ket s capcried price rangyofthe undedying com-
modity futures baaed on the market-traded option
premiums.
In aha Monay - An option that can be exercised
and immediately dosed out against the underlying
market for a caah credit. The option is in-tbe-
money if the underlying futures price is above a
call option's strike price, or below a put option's
srrifcff price.
Indapandont - Term generally applies to a non-
mtegnrxd oil Of natural gat company, usually
active in only one or two sectors ofthe industry.
An independent mtrkrm buys petroleum prod-
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acts from major or independent refiners and
resellsAn under his own bond wane or buys
natural gas from producers and resells ft. There are
also independents which are active exclusively
either in oil 01 gas production or refining.
Integration- A term that describes the degree in
and Co which one given company pamapates in
ail phases of the petroleum industry
.
InttfruptiM*) 8*rvtcs) - Utility service which
expects and peracs ujteii'uptauu on snort nonce*
generally in peak-load periods, in order to meer
die demand by finn service customers. latetrupt-
ible service ctistnmerj usually pay a lower ratr
than firm service customer s. Opposite ofFinn
Service.
Intrinsic Vausst) — The amount by which an option
is in-tho-money. An option which b not in the
money has no mtrinsjnvajpc. For calls, intrinsic
value equals the difference buwceu the underly-
ing futures price and the option's stake price.
Fat puu, intrinsic value equals the option's strike
price mams the underlying finora pace. Intrinsic
value b never less than aero.
Introducing IvoIdbv — A firm engaged in solidring
01 m accepting orders for the purchase or uuc of
anycommodity for future delivery.
•wtnst- A futures market is said to be
inverted when distant contract mouths are selling
st a discount to nearby counsel months; also
known as backwardation.
pptw- Uncounted srocks of s com-
modiiy in the hands of wholesaler*, msmifscn iiets
and producers which cannot be identified accu-
rately; stocks ootside cofflimercial channels but
theorerjcaily available w the marker.
nartaar — An inventory transfer of
propane held in underground caverns or storage,
e»t Aaal - Kevoaene-cype; high-quality kerosene
prodoot used prrmanry aa fuel far oornmeroial
unlay1.! and turboprop aircraft ftngmff
A middlesuau. A gasoline jobber, for
example, might buy ftum refiners and would
resell or> small djsnibuooni or cwasumcis.
I Price- The actual delivered cost of oil
m a refiner, raking nsoo arroiant all costs from pro-
duction or purchase to the refinery.
Lasi Trading Day - The final trading day for a par-
ticular delivery month futures contract or option
contract. Any futures cooaaca left open ftiUowing
this session must be Jetried by delivery.
Lifting- Refer* to tankers and barges loading car-
goes of petroleum at a terminal or fiantsh ipwen t
point.
Light Cruel*- Crude oil widi low specific gravity
and high APf gravity due tn the presence of a high
proportion of light bydiiAaitxro fracrinfi*
Light Enda- The more volatile produca of petrole
um refining, such as butane, propane, ethane.
Limit - The maiimum daily allowable arnouni a
fuoiics price may advance or Decline in any one
day's trading session.
Limit Order - A contingent order for so option or
funnxstadcsrxcilSTn^scejtimnjs^rimDmior
minimum) price, beyond which the order (buy or
sell) b not to be crooned.
Uqu»fl*d Nnturwi Osui \XMQ) - Natural gas
which baa been made liquid by reducing its tem-
perature to minus 258° Fasuenbcit at atmospheric
pressure. Its vokme is 1/600 ofga in vapor form.
iiqwlted Pcrtrateuu Gas* ON) - Propane,
butane, or propane-hnrartr naflgMCO derived from
crude ofl refining or natural gas fran>STsrion. For
umivemence of fnws|KJtmjon, these gases ate liq-
uefied through pressnrizarjon.
Liquidation - The dosing out of fumrea sod
Options positions.
UquMfty- A market is said to be liquid" when
n has a high level of I lading activity and Open
mtesest.
fLDO- Company
that distributcs natural gss primarily to end-users,
A gas utility.
— A raanccr where prices have
reached their daily trading fimk and rtading can
onry be conducted st that pbee or pricen which are
closer in die previous STlllriiiinn price.
it
r
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Long- 1) The market position ofa futures contract
buyer whose purchase obligates him to accept
delivery unless be liquidate* hii contract with an
offsetting sale 2) One who has bought i future*
contract to establish * maikct position. 3) In the
options market, position ofthe buyer of a call or
put option contract. Opposite ofShort.
Long HMtj»t>- Purchase of futures against the
future market price purchase or fixed price for-
ward sale of a cash commodity n> protect against
price increases.
Long tho P—! - A pcaon or firm that has bought
the spot commodity' and hedged with a calo of
futures b said to be tang the bans.
Lot- Any definite quantity afa futures commodity of
uniform grade; the standaid unit of trading.
M.lajor- A tenn bnudly applied U> those multina-
tional oil rntnpanirs which by virtue ofsize, age, or
degree of integration, arc among the pre-eminent
companies in the international petroleum industry.
Margin- The amount ofmoney or collateral deposit
ed by customer with his broker, or deposited by a
brokerwith a Gearing Member, orby a Gearing
Member with the Clearinghouse, for the purpose at"
insuring the brokeror Clearinghouse against
adverse price movement on open futures conoaccs.
The tnargm to not partial payment on a purchase. 1
)
Initial Margin jpd?^ n™"1^ 1"1 rf^jM^i* p*r contract
required by the brokerwhen a futures position to
opened. 2) Maintenance Margin to a turn which
matt be maintained on deposit at all times. Ifthe
canity Id a customers* account drops to, or under,
mat level because ofan advene price movement,
the broker must issue a margin call torcamfc che
customers' equity. Margins are set by the KiHisngc
bated on its analysis ofprice oak volatility in the
market at that time. See Variation Margin.
Margin Call- A demand for additional maigin
funds when futures prices move adverse ma trad-
ers position, or If tuaigui rcqinrcmcn ts are
increased. Buyers of options are not subject id
margin calls.
t CorractJon - In technical analysis, a small
reversal in prices following a significant trending
period.
Markat Makar - An independent cruder or trading
firm which is prepared to buy and sell futures or
options contracts in a designated market. Market
makers provide a two-sided (bid and ask) marker,
and greater liquidity.
Markat Oniai - An anfeTtt be fdkd immediately
at the current market price.
Mawlniism Prica Fluctuation - A commodity
exchange's standardnod maunium limits for fluc-
tuatioos in futures prices during any one trading
Mef - Thousand cubic feet.
Mlddla Dtstillata - Hydrocarbons that are in the
so-called "middle bailing range" of refinery distil-
lation. Examples arc heating oil, diesel fueis, and
kerosene.
Minimum Pries) Fluctuation - Minimum unit by
which a futures price or an option premium can
fluctuate per trade.
MMBttl — One million British thermal units, one
dckadicrm, Apprasinstefy equal to a thousand
cubic feet (Mcf) ofnatural gas.
MOQM- Industry slang for motor gasoline.
Motor Caaolina - A comphat mixture ofrelatively
volatile hydrocarbons, with or without small quan-
tities of additives, that have been blended Co form
ante) suitable for use in spark-ignition engines.
Motor Oil- Refined fabricating oil, to iially contain-
ing additives, used in internal combustion
engines.
N.lokodi- A long (short) market position taken
without having an offsetting short (long) position.
A traderwho executes one side ofa spread is said
to be naked until he executes the other side.
Naphtha - A volatile, colorless product of petroleum
rikriiiatinn Used primarily as a paint solvent
,
clean -
ir^g fluid, and blcndstock in gasoline production.
Nophthanaa- One of the three basic bydroosrbon
classifications found naturally in crude oiL
Naphthcncs are widely used as petrochemical
feedstocks.
Motional Futurea Asaocastjon - Trade asaocja-
Qon which promulgaiei rules ofconductand medi-
stea disputes between custrjmera and broken.
n
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»- A nstorally occurring mature of
hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon gsse> found in
porous rock fofmafjona. In principal component is
methane
•watumt Qm Liquid. (MOU - Apad term for
all liquid produca scpanted from natural g» in a
gat processing pknt. NGL« indude propane,
butane, ethane, and natural gsaoEac
itStback- Irxiustry term referring to the net FOB
cost of product offered an a delivered or CIF bases.
It is derived by aubaaorJng aD coats of shipment
from die landed pace.
NMPaadtlon- The difference between an individ-
ual or firm's open bag contracts and open short
contract] in any one commodity.
Mill111 8pwd - Anotber name for a ddta neutral
spread. Spread* may also be lot neutral, where the
total number of long contracts and the total num-
bcr of anon cootracts of the same type are approxi-
mately equal
Nominal Maa - The declared price for a futures
month aonicdmea used in place ofa dosing pace
when no recent trading has taken place in that par-
ticular delivery month; usually an average of the
bid and asked prices.
Won aaaoclatad Caa - Natural gas in a rcscrvoii
which contains no crude oiL
NYWIEX ACCC8S" - NYMEX ACCESS" is an
uxtcracpve data cgmmgnicatriocs oecworit for
baJdaTpjaL pflbpna md ff^^rrrfain conunodity
ruaires and options contracts offered by the New
York Mercantile Bacfaaaae for overnight trading.
NYM£X provides the user with the equipment,
loliwirc and services. ACCESS sands for
American Computerised Commodity Exchange
System and Services.
r- A measure of the resistance
of gasoline to pre-lgrure or knock when burned in
an hucflaall coBstBadoa carina
Offer- Anwciooioseilafuuiresarcrxic^conrraa
at a specified price. Opposite ofBid.
Offaatt - A mimwim whirh liqinrlatrji nr diwq qui
an open contract position. In spread poaiuons, one
ude oflsea tbo other without hqindscuig the
entire pceirioi. Risk is reduced when one side off-
sets the whet
Omnibus Account - An account carried by one
futures rnm inissiuc merchant with another in
which the aamscnom of two or more persons
are combined rather than rlrsigimcd separate ly
arulriiekleTjtiryoftheir^ivtoU^Bccounnbnot
djariuwd.
Ona Cancala tha Otaar - Two orders submitted
ssnadtaneoudy, cither of which may be filled. If
one order is tilled, the other is consxieted to be
Opwn Interact or Commitment - Tbciunnberof
open or ourstanding corrrrscts for wtucb an mdriid-
mi or entity noongated to the Exchange because
that mdividuJJ ct entity has not yet made an of&ct-
ring sale or purchase, in actual contract delivery, or,
in the case ofoptions, exercised the option.
Opaa 4>r«lar - A rearing order that is good until
canceled.
Ofjwn Outcry- Amemod tfpubfcarjctionfor
making verbal bidt and offers far contracts sn the
iiwangBaiigiaMBatfcmamano»t*'c>sAaaj i
Opening Prlca - The price for a given futures com-
modity that b generated by trading through open
ouccty during the opening range of trading on a
commodity exchange.
Optical - A contract which gives the holder the right,
but not the obligation, to purchase or to aell the
underlying futures contract ax a specified price
wrifari a sprrirVd period of rirae an rsa*fiaTVgn far a
ooc-tune premium payment. The contract also
obligates the writer, wnoioccsfiisj the utriisaim, Co
meet these obligations.
Origin*- Margin - Ttwimt3altfcT»siroffuods,ss
good faith raonses, at the outset offading a
futures contiact m order to guarantee fttlfiflraent
of its oH rgarinna Asm known ts Initial Margin.
Out-of-tha Muuay - An option wluch has no
intrinsic value. For calk, an option wteose rirrrisr
price a above the rnartaw price ofthe rsndorlymg
future. For puts, as option whose t n a ian price a
beiow the futures pace
OvailssMsulM — A techrucsJ opinion that toe n«ikrt
price has risen too steeply and too fast in relation
to imderiyrog funrUmc-ntal factors.
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OwwoM- A technical opinion that the market
price ha* declined too deeply and too fart in rela-
tion to underlying fundamental factors.
Ownnfti* Tbe wutingofnon opooosj than one
expecu K> have cxraciacd. Call options arc ovcr-
wrinen because the writer considers the underlying
overvalued. Put options arc overwritten because
the underlying b considered undervalued.
r AD (of P«DO>- Petroleum Adminiitrathra far
Defease District. Tbe United States a divided
into five distinct marketing regions in which pricei
might differ due to variations in the supply or
demand.
I- A term used to denote trade in
non-phvsical oil (future*, forwards, swaps, etc.)
markets which give a buyer or seller the right to a
oertatn quantity and quality ofcrude oil or refined
products at a future date, but not to any specific
physical lot.
Par or B—Is Qrodo - The grade or grades iped-
ficd in a given futures contract for delivery. A
contract may permit substrtubons tor and devia-
tions trotn the pax grade subject to specified pre-
miums or discounts.
Potrocbonilcol — An intermediate chemical
derived hum petroleum, hydrocafbon liquids, or
natural gas. such as ethylene, propylene, benzene,
toluene, and xylene.
PMrOaflsjni — Ageucrm name for liyuRJCaitmus,
including crude oil, natural gas liquids, refined,
and product draivanves.
PinRnsk— The risk to a trader who has sold an
option that, at expiration, has a strike price tdenti-
cal to, or pinned to, the undcriying futures price.
In this case, the trader will not know whether he
will be required to assume his opdons obligations.
Pipolhoo- A pipe through which oil or natural gas is
pumped between two points, either onshore or
onshore.
Pit or Ring- Tbe place on the floor of an exchange
vAcsea cornTnrdily hiOJTO oi options contxact is
traded by open outcry.
Point or Tick- The imalkatmonetary unit of
rltangr m a tutunu price or an option picjuiisro.
Position- The net total of a trader's open contracts,
either long or short, in a pxracuhr underlying
commodity.
PoaHlon Uatft - For a single trade/ or firm, the
maximum number of allowable open con(recti
with the same underlying commodity
Puolotl Prico - The price some refinen will pay for
crude of ace ream API gravity from a parttanai
field or area.
Pour Point - A temperature ir Fahrenheit higher
than the temperature at which crude oil or a
refined product stops Cowing.
I- l)The price or cost of an option deter-
mined competitively by buyers and setters in open
outcry trading on the exchange trading floor
2) An upward adjustment in price allowed for
delivery ofacommodity ofhigher grade against t
futures contract.
Prioo DubUlM y - The maoncrof making prices
visible and readily available to the pubhe.
Primary Stocks - Stocks ofcrude oil ox refined
products beU in stonge at leases, refineries, natur-
al gas procesrang plana, pipelines, tankfarrns, and
bulk terminals that can store at least 50,000 barrels
of refined products.
PrOCOSaina Plant - Plant which separates natural
gas into methane and tbe various other gases (eg,
propane, butane, ethane).
Pimnpt Hoiiol- Product which will move or
become available within three m four days.
Pi uuaisa — A natural hydrocarbon occurring in a
gaseous state under normal armo»phecc pressure
and temperature, however, pwpaoi is usually liq-
uefied through preatufizaiiflfl) tor oatrspoteaDon
and storage. Propane is primarily used for natal
heating and cooking and as a fuel gas in areas not
serviced by natural gas mains and as a petrochemi-
cal feed stock.
Pump'Ovor- An intra, or unei-facility transfer. For
example, when one pipeline pumps crude oil or
refined products from its tanks or rnainline into
the mainline or storage tank of the receiving
pipeline.
Put Option — An option which gives tbe buyer, or
holder, the right, but not the obugmflao, to sell a
M
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futures contract at a specific price within a specific
period ofrime in exchange fa 1 one-rime ptcrnt-
um payment. It obligates me seller, of wnn-r, of
the option id buy the underlying future* contract
at the designated price, should an option be exer-
cised at that poce. See Call Option
RaeklI Prlco - Price charged by a supplier to a
customer that buyi transport truck Joes at a termi-
nal, on an FOB ossu.
Rally- An advancing price movement Mowing a
decline m i market
Trie difference between the higheac and
lowest prices recorded during a given trading
period.
ad - Any spread where the numher of
long market cootxaco and tfac number of abort
i i^j k£t coarttat \t are mteo usf
Rsrflnar-Disrtiibutor - A company that acu a* a
wholesaler of gasoline, bearing oil or other prod-
ucts which operates its own refinery; may also
retail and bey additional supplies to supplement
iu own refining ourpux.
rtefliMfy- A plant used to lepaiaa the vinous com-
ponencj present in crude oil and coove/t them into
end-use products or feedstocks for other manufac-
turing processes.
Rafuiiiiing Pimuaa — The use ofheat and cata-
lysts so effect the rearrangement of certain hydro-
csrbon moloculei withour altering char composi-
oon app/ccishiy, for example, the conversion of
low-octane naphthas or gasolines into high-octane
number products.
R«portssb4a> Position - The number of futures
<pM rasas, '*******•"'<* *y i-k^ R™h«ng>. >. rt^
CFTC, above which a customer must be identified
daily to the Exchange and to the CFTC with
regard to the *ne of ms uusitkai by commodity, by
Jchvcr>rm>rui*ndrjyDiupoacofchcajding-
alOII- Heavy fuel oil produced from
die residue in the fracTwinal disnllmnti process
rather than faun the distilled fkacboos.
> — Opposite of Support.
n—ling OrlaVjf - An order swsy from the msiket,
waking to be executed.
Rollovwr- A specisi futures straddle cading proce-
dure involving the shift ofone month ofa straddle
into another future month while maintaining the
other contract month of the original rpecad pos i-
t ran. The shift can take place in either the long or
short scraddie month.
Round Lot- A quinary oft ccriunodiry equal in
SJaBBUhCQJQJ «[ » .i»(<m^fiiTTWT-. n.Hia.l fettle
commodity, aa riirrirtgoishcri from a job lot, which
may be krgLr or smaller dun tbe mnrnrr.
RuufHltxsrn — rbeconiulcuooofbothaprirrria^c
and tale ofa commodity future* contract.
r- A speculator on tbe trading floor ofan
exchange who boys and sells rapidly, with small
profits or losses, holding ms positions foe only a
•fcoct time during t trading session. Typically s
scalper will stand ready to buy at 1 Cracioa below
the last transaction price and m sefl u i fxacaoo
shove, thus creating market limddity.
SaWaar'a Marios* - AcotMhaooof the nasrket in
which there is a starchy of goods available and
hence tellem can obuun better coodihoo* of tale
or higher prices. See Buyer's Market.
SolBng HasJtj* <©r inert HwdkjwJ - SeBing
funnc* cooirictaco protrcc sgsfcut possible
depressed prices ofcoiaiDocgDes. Abo sec
Hedging
d+rtml Expiration - Option on the state under ly-
ing futures ooorxsct wfc jefa expire in norc cbsd
one nwath. NYMEX phtimun opoooa tare serial
BsPpWMQBsBs
8«rio*)- All oprions of the tame diss which share i
common strike once.
Sotoonsswrt or siottiino, Prios) — The price eatafa-
HsfdjBsl by the Bar isjssjb fa imi bjjbbBj (jsiiuuticcat
thedose ofeach trading ioaim aa the official
price to be used by the Qearmghotise in dctcr-
mirring net gains or tosses, tsasrgjn requirrtnrari,
and the next day's pnee limits. The torn "secdo-
nsentprjoe m ofcen asod as an approximate
equivalentm the term "closing pace." The dose
in futures trading refers to a brier period at the cod
"ofd»clrfi H«ffng»Mrt» BtjsjsjsjBstsjsj frnjTvrif'^y
akc place quickly and at s range of prices rmmc-
dianrfy before the hdl. Therefore, there frequent -
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ly a no one doting price, but * range of prices.
The settlement price u the closing price if there ia
only one dosing price When there it a closing
range, it a derived by calculating the weighted
average of prices during that period.
Short- 1) The mirket position oftfioiiiEs contract
seller whose sale obiapoa him to deliver thecom-
modity unless he liquidates ha contract by an off-
setting purchase. Z)A atder whose net position in
the futures market shows an excess ofopen sales
over open purchases. 3) The holder of t short
position. 4) In the options market, the position of
die seller of t call or a put option. The short in the
options market is obliged to eske a futures position
ifhe is assigned far exercise. Opposite of Long.
Short Sailing- Selling a contract with the idea of
delivering or of buying o> offset it at a later date.
Short th* Basis - Tie purchase offutures as a
hedge against a commitment to sell in the cash or
spot markets. Sec Hedging.
Sour OT twist Cnuhl - Industry terms which
denote the relative degree ofa given crude oil's
sulfur content. Sour crude refers to those crudes
with a comparatively high sulfur content, &5% by
weight and above; sweet resets to those crudes
with sulfur content of leas than 05%.
SoiardsM- Natural gas found with a sufficiently
high quantity of sulfur to require purifying prior to
shipment or use.
SpoclflcsjtJoiM- 1} Contract terms specified by rhc
Exchange, 2) Term referring to the properties of a
given crude oil or refined petroleum product,
which sre "specified" since they often vary widely
even within tbessme grade of product. In the nor-
mal process of negotiation, seller will guarantee
buyer that the product or crude m be sold will
meet oertain specified limits. Generally, the major
properties of oil that are guaranteed are API gravi-
ty; sulfu r, pour point; viscosity, and BSAtW.
Specific Granrrty - Therarioof the density of a
substance at 60* F. to the density ofwater at the
same Benspersmro.
Spooulathr* Position Limit - The maximum
position, cither net long or net (host, in one com-
mrxliiy futures or option, or in all futures or
options ofone commodity combined which rosy
be held or cuntrolled by an entity without t hedge
exemption a* prescribed by tn exchange or the
CTTC.
Speculator- A trader who hopes m profit from the
specific directional price move of a futures or
option corurtict, or commodity.
Spot- Term which describes one-time open market
case transaction, where a commodity is purchased
"on the spot" ar current market rates. Spot trans-
actions are in contrast to rerm aalea, which specify
a steady supply of product over a period of dme.
Spot Month — The futures crmtract closest to matu-
rity. The nearby ddivery month.
Sprood (Rtturotj - The sirnultaficous purchase of
one futures contract and sale of s futures contract
for a different month, different commodity oc dif-
ferent grade of the same commodity.
Spread {Options} - The purchase and sale oftwo
options which vary m terms of type (caB or put},
strike prices, expiration dates, or both. May also
refer to an options contract purchase (sale) and che
simultancow sale (purchase) ofa futures contract
tor the same underlying commodity.
Stock TypS> S»ttt*rn«rrt - A settlement proce-
dure in which the purchase of a contract requires
immediate and full payment by the buyer to the
seller. In stock type setdement, the actual cash
profit ot lost from a trade is not realized until the
position is liquidated. NYMKX energy and plat-
inum options have chia type of settlement proce-
dure, which diners from that in the futures market
where grins and losses sre realized on a daily basis.
Step Lsrnrt Order - An order that goes into force as
soon ss theic is a trade at the specified amp price
The order however, can only be fiBcd at the Emit
price or better. The stop price and the limit price
can be the same or different. The stop price it the
price level specified in the order.
Stop-Loos ~ A ranting order designed to close out a
losing position when die price reaches a level
specified in rite order. It becomes an at-trie-mar-
ket orderwhen the "stop1* price la reached.
Individual! also use stops to enter the market
when the prices reaches a specified leveL
Straddle (Futures! - Also known u a spread, the
purchase of one futures month against the sale of
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another futures month ofthe same commodity. A
middle trade n baaed on a price relationship
between the two months.
(Optional- The purchase or sale ofboth
a put and a call having the tame strike price and
otptra turn date. Tie buyer of a waddle benefits
from increased volatility, and the seller benefits
from decreased volatility.
Strangle- An option position consisting of the pur
chase or sale of put and call options having the
tame cxpirsrion but different strike prices.
StrlkajPrtcw- The price c whidi the underlying
futures contract a bought or sold in the event an
opcioa is exejcjsed. Also called an esrocass pi toe.
Sulfur- An element that n present in some oil and
gas ii an impurity in me farm of its various com-
pounds.
Support- In technical analysis, a poet area where
new buying is likely so come in and stem any
decline.
9yullsatic Futurwa) — A position created by corn-
bining call and pot options, A synthetic long
fiitures position is aeated by combining a long call
opriniH and a chart put optkma far the tame expi
ranori dam and tho tame strike price. A synthetic
short futures a created by combining a Jong put
and a short call with the same expiation date and
the tame strike pace.
I - A custom-tailored, individually negotiated
MaaaMJfiB A—ie«*«< w mrng*- Bnaajsfljt] ««k-, usu-
ally orer a period of one to 12 years. Swaps can be
conducted directly by two counterparties, or
through a third party such as a bank or brokerage
house. The writer ofthe swap, such as a bank or
brokcisfe bouse, may elect to assume the risk
itself, or manage in own market exposure on an
exchange. Swap transaction! include inoereu rtir.
swaps, currency swaps and pnee swaps for com
rnocbnc»,irxJudkigcncr|7indD^cafa.Inacypic»J
COnaodtty <• prfee swap, partiea rrrhangr pay-
nicnoi based uo changes in the pace of a coaunou-
iry or a market index, while fixing die price they
effectively pay far the physical commodity. The
transaction enables each party to managr exposure
to commodity prices or index values. Settlements
Uy made in cash.
I ank Train - A procedure in che rail shipment of
crude oi, refined prod ucts, and other liquids
developed by General American Transport*riot)
(Gatx). "Tank Train'' tank can are interconnect-
ed, which permits loading and imloachrigofthe
entire train of cars fiwn one connectkn.
Tariff- A acheikile of rates c< coargea permitted a
common carrier or utility; pipeline tariff* arc the
charges made by pipelines far rrarrtpornng crude
au, refined products or natural gaa from au origin
to a destination.
TatcxatiacsaJ Anaryajhl — An approach to forecasting
mmmodity prices which maa-ainra parmrw t£
price change, rates of change, and changes in trad-
ing volume and open Laterest, without regard tr>
undedying fundamental market conditions.
Thawm- 100,000 British thermal units. Aoekachcrm
B 1 million Btna.
Thawlkail Vaaaaw- St\ option '» value generated
by a awaaawitwsaBaj awJOfca given certain paaal
assumption! about the term of the option, the
fharwfTntno 0a *h* underlying futures contract,
and prevailing interest raxes.
TTwta - The sensitivity of an c^Tucm'! theoretical valoe
n> a change in the atDoont of time to expuxnon.
slkroufjlspat - 1) A term used to describe the total
volume ofraw luair.iiaw that are processed by t
plant anch as an oil refinery in a groat uei iodL
2) The tool volume of etude oil and refined prod-
ucts that are hamdied by a tank rami, pipeline or
Germinal loading raciltry
Tick- A minimum change in price, up or down.
Tlrraa tpraed - The sealing of a nearby options and
buying ofa anorc defemd option with the aarae
arrate prirc
TtsawVaaasw— Part of the option premium which
reflects the excess over the intrinsic values or the
entire premium if there is no karrnsk value. At
given price testis the option Dane value will
dedme until expiration. It is this decrease in time
value that makes options a wasting asset.
Traasw Urrsrt Monftortoo; Syataan — The syaDem
through which Qcaring Members ict and monimr
limits on then customers' NYMEX ACCESS"
SI
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account*, including maximum order sac, rami
mum position sue per •eisioo, session nadrng vol-
ume and session trading kisses.
orkatsrtJon- A NYMEXACCESS"1 work-
station through which NYMEX ACCESS" order*
are placed.
Trading- Buying and telling.
Trading Valium - The Dumber of contrace* chat
change hand* during a specified period of time,
Trauiasrianalcwi Cotnpaany — Company that moa*
parts gas for resale on ks own behalfor transports
gas for others. Also known as a pipeline company.
Trend - The general direction of price movement.
Troy Ouncsj- The measurement of weight for pre-
cious metals:
1 ounce troy - 480 grains - JL04 grams
1,000 grams - 1 aabgnun - 32.15 maces tray
1 ,000 kilograms - 1 metric ton -32,150 ounces tray
Typo Of Opdon - Either poo or call*.
W.
undoi lying — The stock, commodity, futures
contract or cash index against which the futures
or option* contract is valued.
1 «** Turn IntsMUMdiat* - A grade ofcrude
oil deliverable against the New York Mercantile
Exchange light sweet crude oil contract.
Nominally, the benchmark crude of the VS. oil
industry.
W«t Barrel- A physical barrel of crude oil or refined
product as epposed to a "paper barrel."
YVwtGac- Numral gas containing condensable
hydrocarbons.
Wrttor- The seller ofan optioiL Abo known as the
grantor of the opdon.
sold- 1) A measure of the annual return on an
investment expressed as a percentage. 2) The
proportion iifheavy or light produco whichcan be
derived fioro a given barrel ofcrude od.
•fiajtlon Margin - Payment made an a daily
ot iouaday basis by a Clearing Member to the
Clearinghouse to cover losses created by adverse
price movement in positions carried by the
Clearing Member, calculated separately for cut-
comer and proprietary positions.
The sensitivity of an option's theoretical
value to s change in volatility.
VtMoatty- A method of measuring a Riven liquid's
teaJatanoB to flow, usually decreasingwith increas-
ing temperatures. Material with higher viscosity is
mote resistant to flow.
Volatility- The market's price range and tnovc-
menr within that range. The direction ofthe price
move, whether up or down, is not relevant.
Historic volatility indicates bow much prices have
changed in the past and is derived by using daily
settlement prices for futures. Implied volatility
measures bow much the maiker thinks prices will
change in the future, and is obtained from dairy
settlement prices for options.
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APPENDIX G - FUTURES CONTRACT SPECIFICATIONS
Light Sweet Crude Oil
Future* and Options Contract Specifications
Trading Ualt Futures: 1,000 U.S. barrels (42,000 gallons).
Options: One NYMEX light sweet crude oil contract.
Trading Hours Futures and Options: 9:45 a.m. • 3:10 pjn. (New York Time).
Tradkaj Month*
Pries Quotation
Futures: 18 consecutive months plus four long-dated futures
which are initially lisosd 21, 24, 30 and 36 months prior m delivery.
Options: Six consecutive months plus two long-dated options
which are initially listed nine and 1 Z months prior u> expiration.
Futures and Options: Dollars and cents per barrel.




Futures: $15.00 per band (1 15,000 per contract) for tie first two
contract months. Initial back month limits of$1.50 per barrel rise
to $3.00 per barrel if the previous day's settlement price is at
the $150 limit. In the event of a $750 move in either of the first
two contract months, back month limits are expanded to $750
per barrel from the limit in place in the direction of the move.
Options: No price limits.
Futures: Trading terminates at the close of business on the
third business day prior co the 25th calendar day of the month
preceding the delivery month.
Options: Expiration Day is the second Friday of the month
prior to the delivery month of the underlying futures contract,
provided there are at least five days remaining to trade in the
underlying futures contract.
Note: Effective July 13, 1992. Expiration Day for all newly listed
options contracts is the Friday immediately preceding the
expiration of the underlying futures contract as long as there
are three trading days left in the futures contract. In the event
there are less than three days to futures expiration, oprion expi-
ration is the second Friday prior to futures expiration.
By a Clearing Member to the NYMEX Clearing House not later
than 6:00 p.m., or 45 minutes after the underlying futures set-
tlement price is posted, whichever is later, on any day up to
and including the option's expiration.







Exchange of Future* for,






At all times at least 17 strike prices are available for puts and
calls on the underlying futures contracts. The first 11 strike
prices are increments of $1.00 per barrel; additionally, three
strike prices are offered in the nearest $5 increments above the
nearest higher and below the nearest lower existing scrike prices.
The at-the-money strike price is nearest to the previous day's
close of the underlying futures contract. Strike price boundaries
are adjusted according to the futures price movements.
F.O.B. seller's facility, Cunning, Oklahoma, at any pipeline or
storage facility with pipeline access to ARCO, Cushing Storage or
Texaco Trading and Transportation Inc., by in-rank transfer,
inline transfer, book-out or inter-facility transfer (pumpovcr).
All deliveries are rateable over the course of the month and must
be initiated on or after the first calendar day and completed by
the last calendar day of the delivery month.
An Alternate Delivery Procedure is available to buyers and sellers
who have been matched by the Exchange subsequent to the
termination of trading in the spot month contract. If buyer and
seller agree to consummate delivery under terms different from
those prescribed in the contract specifications, they may proceed
on that basis after submitting a notice of their intention to the
Exchange.
The buyer or sellermay exchange a futures position for a
physical position of equal quantity by submitting a notice to the
Exchange. EFPs may be used to either initiate or liquidate a
futures position.
Specific crudes with 0.5% sulfur by weight or less, not less than
34° API gravity nor more dun 45° API gravity. The following
crude streams are deliverable: West Texas Intermediate, Mid-
Continent Sweet, Low Sweet Mac, New Mexican Sweet,
North Texas Sweet, Oklahoma Sweet, South Texas Sweet,
Brent Blend, Bonny Light and Oseberg.
Inspection shall be conducted in accordance with pipeline prac-
tices. A buyer or seller may appoint an inspector to inspect
the quality of oil delivered. However, the buyer or Belief who
requests the inspectioa will bear its costs and will notify the
other party of the transaction that the inspection will occur.
Margins arc required for open futures or short options








Trading Unit 1 .000 U^. barrels (42,000 gallons).














1 8 consecutive months.
US. dollars and cents per barrel.
$0.01 (1<) per band ($10 per contract).
$15.00 per barrel ($15,000 per contract) for the first two contract
months. Initial back month limits of$130 per barrel rise to $3.00
per barrel if the previous day's settlement price is at the $1.50
limit In the event of a $7.50 move in either of the fine two con-
tract months, back month limits are expanded to $7.50 per
barrel above the limit in place, in the direcooc ofthe move.
Trading terminates at the close of business on the third
business day prior to the 25th calendar day of the month pre-
ceding the delivery month.
Deliveries take place along the Texas U.S. Gulf Coast
at one ofseveral qualified marine terminals; by pipeline into
designated pipeline connections; or out-of-storage from
qualified storage facilities.
ARCO Pipe Line Co. (Texas City, Texas); Oiltanking Inc.
(Houston, Texas); Sun Marine Terminals (Nedcriand, Texas).
Rancho Pipeline (Houston area including Pasadena J uncrioa
Missouri City Junction and Genoa Junction); Texaco Trading
and Transportation Inc. (East Houston, Texas).
Amerada Hess Corp. (Houston, Texas); Oiltanking Inc.
(Houston, Texas); Sun Marine Terminals (Ncderiand, Texas);
Texaco Trading and Transportation Inc. (East Houston, Texas).
All deliveries must be initiated by the first calendar day and
completed no later than the last calendar day ofthe delivery
month.
An AltcmalE Delivery Procedure is available id buyers and sellers
who have been matched by the Exchange subsequent to the
termination of trading in the spot month contract. If buyer and
(NYMEX, November 1992, p. 12)
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seller agree to consummate delivery under terms different from
chose prescribed in the contract specifications, they may proceed
on that basis after submitting a notice of intent to the Exchange.
Exchange of Future* for. The buyer or seller may exchange a futures position of equal
or In CoiHiaction with, quantity by submitting a notice to the Exchange. BFPs mry be
Physical* (EFP) used to either initiate or liquidate a futures position.
Dalhntrsbla Orada* Deliverable grades with a minimum of 0.5% and a maximum of
2.2% sulfur by weight, not less than 26° API gravity arc:
West Texas Sour/New Mexico Sour, Alaska North Slope, Dubai,
Flotta, Iranian Light, Oman and Oriente.
Commingling these crude streams for delivery is not permitted
except for pipeline common scream designed as West Texas
Sour/New Mexico Sour. A premium of 90< per barrel will be paid
by the receiving party for the delivery of West Texas Sour/New
Mexico Sour. The other six deliverable crudes will be valued at




For marine terminal delivery, the seller selects and hires an
inspection company with international operations including in-
house laboratory facilities in both Houston and Beaumont/
Port Arthur. Inspection procedures must comply with API guide-
lines for quantity measurement (2% tolerance), gravity, bottom
sediment and water, and sulfur.
Delivery out-of-storagc ofWest Texas Sour/New Mexico Sour
affords the buyer or seller the right to inspect quantity and/or
quality at the requesting party's expense
Delivery ouc-of-storage for foreign streams require sellers to
provide an inspection report (no more than 30 days old)
from an inspection company that meets marine terminal
delivery requirements.
For pipeline deliveries, inspections are conducted in accordance
with pipeline practices. Either buyer or seller may appoint
an inspector to review the quality of the oil delivered. However,
the buyer or seller who requests the inspection will bear
its costs and notify the other party of the planned inspection.
Margins arc required for open futures positions. See page 34.
1




Futures and Options Contract Specification*
Trading Unit Futures: 42,000 U.S. gallons (1,000 barrels).
Options? One NYMEX heating oil futures contract.
Trading Hours Futures and Options: 9-SQ a.m. - 3:10 p.m. (New York Time).
Trading Mosths Futures: Trading is conducted in 18 consecutive months
commencing with the next calendar month (c&, on October 1,
1992, trading occurs in all months from November 1992 through
April 1994).
Options: Six consecutive months plus two long-dated
options which arc initially listed nine and 12 months prior to
expiration.
Pries Quotation Futons andOptions: In dollars and cents per gallon






Futures ana" Options: $0.0001 (0.01*) per gallon ($4.20 per contract).
Futures: $0.40 per gallon ($164500 per contract) for the first two
contract months. Initial back month limits of $0.04 per gallon
rise to $0.06 per gallon if the previous day's settlement price
is at the $0.04 limit. In the event of a $0.20 move in either of the
first two contract months, back month limits arc expanded
to 5020 per gallon from the limit in place in the direction of
the move.
Options: No price limit:
Futures: Trading terminates at the close of business on the last
business day of the month preceding the delivery month.
Options: Expiration Day is the second Friday of the month
prior co the delivery month of the underlying futures contract.
Notr. Effective July 13, 1992, Expiration Day for all newly listed
options contracts is the Friday immediately preceding the
expiration of the underlying futures contract as long as there
arc three trading days left in the futures contract In the event
there are less than three days to futures expiration, option expi-
ration is the second Friday prior to futures expiration.
By a Clearing Member to the NYMEX Clearing House not later
than 6:00 pjn^ or 45 minutes after the price of the underlying
futures settlement price is posted, whichever is later, on any
day up to and including the oprion's expiration.







Exsbanga of Futuraa for,







Strike prices are in increments of$0.02 (2*) per gallon. Strike
prices arc listed only as even numbers, for example $0.4800.
$0.5000, $05200, etc At all rimes at least 11 strike prices are listed.
The at-the-money strike price is closest to the previous day's
close of the underlying futures contract. Strike price boundaries
are adjusted according to the futures price movements.
F.O.B. seller's facility in New York Harbor, ex-shore. All dudes,
entitlements, taxes, fees and other charges paid. Seller's shore facul-
ty muBt be capable of delivering into barges. Delivery may also be
completed by pipeline, tanker, book transfer or inter- or inira-facilrty
transfer. Delivery must be made in accordance with applicable
federal, state and local licensing and tax laws.
All deliveries may only be initiated after the fifth business
day and must be completed before the last business day of the
delivery month.
An Alternate Delivery Procedure is available to buyers and sellers
who have been matched by the Exchange subsequent to the
termination of trading in the spot month contract. If buyer and
seller agree to consummate delivery under terms different
from those prescribed in the contract specifications, they may
proceed on that basis after submitting a notice of their intention
to die Exchange.
The buyer or seller may exchange a futures position for a physical
position ofequal quantity by submitting a notice to the Exchange.
EFPs may be used to either initiate or liquidate a futures position.
Generally conforms to industry standards for fungible No. 2
heating oiL
The buyer may request an inspection for grade and quality or
quantity for all deliveries, but shall require a quantity inspection
for a barge, tanker or inter-facili ty transfer. If the buyer does
not request a quantity inspection, the seller may request such
inspection. The cost of the quantity inspection is shared equally
by the buyer and seller. If the product meets grade and quality
specifications, the cost of the quality inspection is shared jointly by
the buyer and seller. If the product fails inspection, the cost is borne
by the seller.
Margins are required for open futures and short options
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New York Harbor Unleaded Gasoline
Futuraa and Options Contract Opacifications
Trading Unft Futures; 42,000 VJS. gallons (1,000 barrels).









Futons and Options: 9:50 a.m. - 3:10 p.m. (New York Time).
Futons; Trading in New York Harbor unleaded gasoline is
conducted in 18 consecutive months commencing with die next
calendar month (e.g., on October 1, 1992, the fust trading month
is November 1992).
Note: In May 1991 the Exchange temporarily reduced to nine the
number ofmonths traded, citing uncertain oxygenation require-
ments for gasoline sold in rbe New York Harbor area. On
June 1, 1992, trading was expanded to September 1993. which
will remain the farthest dated month until further notice
Options: Six consecutive months plus two long-dated options
which are initially listed nine and 12 months prior to expiration.
Futures and Options: In dollars and cents per gallon
(eg., $0.5022 per gallon).
Futuresand Options: $0.0001 (0.0u ) per gallon ($4.20 per contract).
Futures: $0.40 per gallon ($16,800 per contract) for the first two
contract months. Initial back month limits of $0.04 per gallon
rise to $0.06 per gallon if the previous day's settlement price is at
the $0.04 limit. In the event of a 30.20 move in either of the first
two contract months, back month limits are expanded to $020 per
gallon from the limit in place in the direction of the move.
Options: No price limit
Futures: Trading terminates at the close ofbusiness on the
last business day of the month preceding the delivery month.
Options: Expiration Day is the second Friday ofthe month
prior to the delivery month of die underlying futures contract
Note: Effective July 13, 1992, Expiration Day for all newly listed
options contracts is the Friday immediately preceding the expira-
tion ofthe underlying futures contract u long as there are three
trading days left in the futures contract. In the event there are
less than three days to futures expiration, option expiration is the
second Friday prior to futures expiration.
By a Clearing Member to the NYMEX Clearing House not
later than &00 pm, or 45 minutes after the underlying futures














settlement price is posted, whichever is later, on any day up to
and including the option's expiration.
Strike prices arc is increments of $0.02 (2 cents) per gallon.
Strike prices are listed only as even numbers, forexample $0.4800,
$05000, $0.5200, etc At all times at least 11 strike prices are listed.
The at-thc-money strike price is closest to die previous day's
close of the underlying futures contract. Strike price boundaries
are adjusted according to the futures price movements.
F.O.B. seller's facility in New York Harbor ex-shore. All djtics,
entitlements, taxes, fees and other charges paid. Seller's shore
facility muse be capable of delivering inn barges. Delivery may
also be completed by pipeline, tanker, book transfer or inter- or
intra-facility transfer. Delivery must be made in accordance
with applicable federal, state and local licensing and lax laws.
All deliveries may only be initiated after fifth business day
and must be completed before the last business day nf
the delivery month.
An Alternate Delivery Procedure is available to buyers and sellers
who have been matched by the Exchange subsequent to the
termination of trading in the spot month contract. If buyer and
seller agree to consummate delivery under terms different
from those prescribed in the contract specifications, they may
proceed on that basis after submitting a notice of their
intention to the Exchange.
The buyer or seller may exchange a futures position for a
physical position ofequal quantity by submitting a notice to
the Exchange. EFPs may be used to either initiate or
liquidate a futures position.
Generally conforms to industry standards for fungible northern
grade, unleaded regular gasoline specifications.
The buyer may request an inspection for grade and quality or
quantity tor all deliveries, but shall require a quantity inspec-
tion for a barge, tanker or inter-facility transfer. If the buyer
does not request a quantity inspection, rite seller may request
such inspection. The cost of the quantity inspection is shared
equally by the buyer and seller. If the product meets grade
and quality specifications, the cost of the quality inspection is
shared jointly by the buyer and seller. If the product fails
inspection, the cost is borne by the seller.
Margins are required for open futures or short options positions.
Sec page 34. There is no margin requirement for an options
purchaser.
1




Trading Unit 42,000 US. gallons ( 1 ,000 barrels).










Trading will be conducted in IB consecutive months
(eg., on September 17, 1992, trading occurs in all months fmra
October 1992 through March 1994).
In dollars and cents per gallon (eg. $0.6255 per gallon).
$0.0001 (O.01«) per gallon ($4.20 per contract).
$0.40 per gallon ($16,800 per contract) for the first two months,
to be implemented in two steps. Initial back month limits of
$0.04 per gallon rise to $0.06 if the previous settlement price
is at $0.04. In the event of a $0-20 move in cither of the first two
contract months, back month limits expand to $0.20 per gallon
from the limit in place in the direction of the move.
Trading terminates at the dose of business on the last business
day of the month preceding the delivery month.
All matches of buyers and sellers for deliveries of contracts in
multiples of 25 (25,000 barrels) shall be required to be made into
the Colonial Pipeline, basis Pasadena, Texas. All tenders for
deliveries of less than 25 contracts shall be required to be made
at a public terminal in the Houston/Pasadena area.
For all deliveries of 25 or more contracts (25,000 barrels) delivery
will be made F.O.B. the Colonial Pipeline at the injection
station selected by the seller at Pasadena, Houston, Hebert or
Port Arthur, Texas; Lake Charles, Krotz Springs or Baton
Rouge, Louisiana; Collins, Mississippi or Moundvillc, Alabama.
Deliveries of less than 25 contracts shall be made at public
facilities maintained by GATX Terminals Corp., Oiltanking
Houston Lux, orAmerada Hess Corp. in the Houston and
Pasadena, Texas, area ("Qualified Facility"), F.O.B. into the
buyer's segregated or fungible storage. At the seller's
option, delivery at such facility may be accomplished by any
of the fo 1 1owing methods:
(1) Intra-facility transfer by pump-over or inventory transfer;
(2) Inter-facility transfer by pump-over or inventory transfer; or






Eschongo of Futon* for,
or In Connection with.
Phytic*!* (EFP1
DoDvoroblo
If delivery is made at a public terminal, the buyer or seller
whose Notice(s) of Intention to Accept or Deliver in o quantity
not evenly divisible by 25 will be assessed a surcharge
payable to the other party of $0.0175 (1.75*) per gallon for every
contract that is not evenly divisible by 25, except that if both
parties' Notices ate not evenly divisible by 25, no surcharge
will be assessed.
For pipeline deliveries, the buyer may accept product as early
as the first day of the second Colonial cycle that commences
during the delivery month, but no earlier than the ninth
calendar day of the delivery month, and no later than the day
prior to the last business day of the delivery month. Exceptions
occur if a third Colonial cycle commences during the delivery
month which extends beyond the day prior to the last business
day of the delivery month, delivery may extend through the
last day of that cycle.
For public terminal deliveries, the buyer may accept product
as early as the ninth calendar day ofthe delivery month, and
no later than the day prior to the last business day of the
delivery month, provided, however, that in the event the buyer
nominates the front halfof the second cycle of the delivery
month, the four-day delivery window may commence as early
as two days prior to the start of the second Colonial cycle
of the delivery month.
An Alternate Delivery Procedure is available to buyers and
sellers who have been matched by the Exchange subsequent
to the termination of trading in the spot month contract. If
buyer and seller agree to consummate delivery under terms
different from those prescribed in the contract specifications,
they may proceed onthat basis after submitting a notice
of their intention to the Exchange.
The buyer ot seller may exchange a futures position for a
physical position of equal quantity by submitting a notice to
the Exchange, EFPs may be used to cither initiate or
liquidate a futures position.
Grade and Quality Specifications reflect those of Colonial
Pipeline Co. fungible Southern Grade 44, 87-ocxane unleaded
regular gasoline as amended from time-to-time by Colonial
1
P(NYMEX, November 1992, p, 24)
235
Pipeline, with the following exceptions: Re id Vapor Pressure
for this contract shall be January and February, 13.5 pounds per
square inch; March, April. May, June, Jury and August, 7-5 psi;
September and October, 113 psi, November and December,
13.5 psi. In the event that this RVP specification differs from the
Colonial Pipeline specification at the time of loading, an RVP
adjustment of 0.5« per psi per gallon for RVP of 8.7 psi and above,
or 0.75? per psi per gallon for RVP below 8.7 psi, will apply.
InafMttttaa For pipeline deliveries, inspection of product shall be made in
accordance with Colonial Pipeline practices.
For public terminal deliveries by pump-over or inventory trans-
fer, if inspection is requested by die buyer, the sella' shall
initiate inspection of the product at its designated originating
facility not later than 24 hours prior to the nominated time
of delivery.
For barge movements, seller shall initiate inspection on
dedicated barge ac the originating facility not later than 24 hours
prior to the time designated by the seller for delivery,
Ca«tom*r Maiyin
RWfUUWIMfllSt
Margins are required for open futures positions. See page 34.
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Natural Gas
Futures and Option* Contract Specifications
Tracing Unit Futvm: 10,000 million British thermal units (MMBtu).
Options: One NYMEX natural gas futures contract.
Trading Hour* 920 a.m. - 3:10 pan. (New York Tunc).
Trading Months Futnra: Trading is conducted in Inconsecutive months
commencing with the next calendar month (eg., on October 1,
1992, trading occurs in all months from November 1992 through
April 1994).
Options: 12 consecutive months.
Futara and Options: Dollars and cents per MMBtu
(e.g., $2,000 per MMBtu).






Fututrs: $0.10 (10*) per MMBtu ($1,000 per contract). There is
no maximum daily limit on price fluctuations during the month
preceding the delivery month. In the event that a settlement
price b established at the maximum daily limit on price
fluctuations, this limit will be increased subject to a variable
limits formula.
Options: No price limit.
Futurts: Trading terminates six business days prior to the first
calendar day of the delivery month.
Optwm: Tradiing terminates at the close of business on the Friday
immediately preceding the expiration ofthe underlying futures
contract as long as there are at least three days remaining to trade
in the underlying futures contract. In the event there are less
than three trading days to futures expiration, option expiration is
the second Friday prior to futures expiration.
By a Clearing Member to the NYMEX Clearing House not
later than 6 p.m. or 45 minutes after the underlying futures
settlement price is posted, whichever is later, on any day up
do and including the option's expiration.
Strike prices are in increments of $0.05 (5*) per MMBtu. At all
times at least II strike prices are available for calls and puts
on the underlying futures contracts. The at-thc-moncy strike
price is closest to the previous day's dose ofthe underlying
futures contract. Strike price boundaries arc adjusted according
to the futures price movements.
(NYMEX, November 1992, p. 28)
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Dalivary Sabine Pipe Line Co.'s Henry Hub in Louisiana. Seller is
responsible for the movement of the gas through the Hub; the




Delivery shall take place no earlier chan the Cist calendar day
of die delivery month and shall be completed no later than
the last calendar day of the delivery month. All deliveries shall
be made at as uniform as possible an hourly and daily rate
of flow over the course of the delivery month.
An Alternate Delivery Procedure b available to buyers and
sellers who have been matched by the Exchange subsequent to
the termination of trading in the spot month contract. If buyer
and seller agree to consummate delivery under terms different
from those prescribed in the contract specifications, they
may proceed on that basis after submitting a notice of their
intention to the Exchange.
i of FMura* for. The buyer or seller may exchange a futures position for a
or in Connection wtth. physical position of equal quantity by submitting a notice to the
Physical* (EfP) Exchange. EFPs may be used to either initiaie or liquidate a
futures position.
Quality Pipeline specifications in effect at time of delivery.
Margins are required for open futures and short options
Roquiramanta positions. See page 34. There is no margin requirement for an
options purchaser.




Tracing Unit 42.000 U.S. gallons (1,000 barrels).
Trading Houn 9: 15 a.m. - 3.-00 p.m. (New York Time).
Trading Month* Trading is conducted in 15 consecutive months commencing
with the next calendar month (eg., on October 1, 1992. trading
occurs in all months from November 1992 through January 1994).
In dollars and cents per gallon (eg., $02555 per gallon).





$0.40 per gallon ($16,800 per contract) for the fust two contract
months. Initial back month limits of$0.04 per gallon rise $0.06
per gallon if the previous day's settlement price is at the $0.04
limit. In the evea t of a $020 move in either of the first two
contract months, back month limits expand to $0.20 per gallon
from the limit in place in the direction of the move.
Trading terminates at the dose of business on the last business
day of the month preceding the delivery month.
F.O.B. seller's pipeline, storage, or fractionation facility in
Mont Bcfvieu, Texas, with direct pipeline access to die Texas
Eastern Transmission Pipeline in Mont Bclvicu, Texas.
Delivery may be made by in-line or in-well transfer, inter-
facility transfer or pump-over, or book transfer.
All deliveries must be initiated after the ninth business
day and completed before the second to last business day
of the delivery month.
An Alternate Delivery Procedure is available to buyers and
Won sellers who have been matched by the Exchange subsequent
to the termination of trading in the spot month contract.
Ifbuyer and seller agree to consummate delivery under terms
(NYMEX, November 1992, p. 32)
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different from those prescribed in the contract specifications,
they may proceed on that basis after submitting a notice of their
intention to the Exchange.
Exchange of Future* for. The buyer or seller may exchange a futures position for a
or In Connection with. physical position of equal quantity by submitting a notice to
Physical* (EFP) the Exchange. EFPs may be used to either initiate or
liquidate a futures position.
Grede and duality Conforms to industry standards for fungible liquified propane gas
as determined by the Gas Processors Association (GPA-HD5).
Inspection Inspection shall be conducted in accordance with pipeline practices.
CtistDmar margin Margins are required for open futures positions.
Requirement* See page 34.
(NYMEX, November 1992, p. 33)
240
Margin Requirements
MYMEX raquirM its market participants
co pose and maintain in their accounts a certain minim. im
amount of funds for each open position held. These funds arc
known as "margin" and represent a good faith deposit or per-
formance bond that serves to provide protection against losses
in die market NYMEX collects margin directly from each
of its Clearing Members who, in turn, arc responsible 'or the
collection of funds from their clients.
NYMEX uses Standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk (SPAN) to
establish minimum margin levels for Clearing Firms and their
customers. SPAN, developed by the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, has become the futures industry's standard of mar-
gining SPAN evaluates tbe risk of a trader's entire portfolio
and establishes plausible movements in futures prices over a
one-day period. The resulting effect of these "risk arrays" is to
capture respective gains or losses on futures and options
positions across the energy commodities.
One of the special characteristics of options is that a long option
position can never be at risk for more than its premium. For
SPAN to assess the risk of all positions in the portfolio
and at the same time allow credit for the premium involved,
SPAN allows the excess of the option premium over the
risk margin for any option position to be applied to the risk
margin on other positions.
Margin requirements and contract specification!an subject to change.
Please contact the New York Mercantile Exchange,
Fastfaccs, the NYMEX 24-hour market information service,




Trading in Oil Spreads
Miscellaneous Information
Any combination of energy futures contracts and/or months
may constitute a spread in (be NYMKX energy complex.
All spreads arc traded by open outcry.
Trie following arc brief definitions of the most commonly
traded spreads:
Intra-Bianwt Spread*
The simultaneous purchase and sale of a futures contract in any
one commodity, crude oil. heating oil, gasoline, propane or
natural gas, in two different months at a seated price differential.
Intar-markat Spread*
Also known as "trading across the band." Inter-maxket spreads
consist of the simultaneous purchase and sale ofmore than
one economically-related futures contracts— crude oil, heating
oil, gasoline, propane or natural gas— in one or more months
at a stated price differential.
Crack Spraads
Simultaneous purchase and sale of the crude oil contract and
contracts for refined products— either gasoline or heating oil or
both— in one or more months at a stated price differential.
The number ofcrude concracts and the combined total of product
contracts must be equal. A similar strategy involving natural
gas and propane is called a frac spread.
Spacuiattva Position Limit*
The Exchange sets limits on speculative positions (net long or
short by contract) which may be exceeded for bona Ode hedge
transactions or risk associated with commodity swap transactions.
Authorization from the President of the Exchange is required.





























Bloomberg L.P. CL SC HO HU NG PN
Bonneville Market Info CL SC HO NU NG PN
Bridge Market Dan Systems CL<l&2yr>
CP(3&4Trt
Dl HO OL NO PT
CommodityQuotegraphics CL SC HO UR RF LC
Dow Jones CL SC HO HU NG PN
EMISI McGraw Hill CL SC HO HU NG PN
FNN Data Broadcasting CL SC HO HU NG PN
Fuojresource CL SC HO HU NG PN
Knight-Ridder
GNS Dataquote CL SO HO HU NG PN
ManeyCentei CL so HO HU NG PN
TradeCenter CL so HO HU NG PN
Market Vision CL 7S HO HU GO PT











PC Quote CL SC HO HU NG PN
Plan's Global Alcn CL SC HO HU NG PN
Quotron Systems CL
CAUASyn


















CLXHATN SQCHATN HO:CHAIN HUXHATN NGlCHAIN PN.-OUTN
Shark CL SC HO HU NG PN
S&PComstock CL SC HO HU NG PN
Tekkucs Inc. CL SC HO HU NG PN
Tderatc Systems








Note: Appropriate momb codes
nran be appended to chew vendor fyrnboii
prior to any rctticval requexx.
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SELECTED OATA
APPENE H - SELECT!
Montf) JP6 WTIBuy WTISell HdgSvgo Strike Put Buy Put Sol PulSvgs Tat9vp*
088 10.43 15.18 14.03 -023 -023
N 17.04 16.35 1634 -0.01 -0.01
D 18.88 15.28 16.13 -0.13 -0.13
J87 1755 1521 10.01 S3 3.8
F 18.84 16.19 18 46 328 320
M 10.06 16.19 18.12 233 233
A 20.92 1&78 18.11 -0.07 -0.07
M 20.75 18 48 10.41 033 033
J 20.71 1827 1932 135 135
J 2323 18.14 2133 3.19 3.10
A 21.07 1835 20.73 2.68 2.68
S 22.85 1831 10.07 1.00 136
24.83 10.82 10.06 0.03 0.03
N 24.01 1033 1834 -0.59 -039
22.66 10.44 1831 -0.93 -033
J8B 23.18 1038 16.76 -2.63 -233
F 2126 1032 17.13 -2.19 -2.10
M 1939 1928 10 -320 -320
A 21.01 17.01 1730 0.88 038
M 21*4 183 17.48 0.50 038
J 22.10 1033 10.73 -0.1 -0.1
J 23.07 1O70 14.78 -1.98 -138
A 20 98 10.7 15.71 -039 -039
8 16.39 10.05 14.40 -2.10 -2.18
O 10.02 1308 13.0 0.54 034
N 18.08 12.74 1338 124 124
22oo 12.00 18.08 3.4 3.4
J89 21.94 12.08 1739 5.03 5.03
F 2423 1239 17.73 6.04 5.04
M 22J03 12.73 183 5.77 5.77
A 25.08 1936 2039 0.04 0.84
M 2728 1024 1932 028 028
J 25.44 18.72 1020 034 034
J 20J07 1820 2038 2.07 2.07
A 2149 1733 1830 036 030
8 23j08 1732 10.78 2.14 2.14
24.18 2031 20.17 0.18 20 025 -025 -030
N 2537 10.77 1034 037 037
28.02 1938 20.7 1.12 1.12
JOO 20.46 10.42 223 348 340
F 2836 1027 2233 2.78 2.70
M 27.03 10.18 2024 139 139
A 2838 20/48 1738 -23 20 037 035 0.78 -232
M 2424 203 10.02 -1.78 20 020 1 0.74 -134
J 2029 2038 1832 -4.16 20 032 323 231 -125
J 2736 2133 1834 -430 21 043 437 334 -045
A 2821 2138 2823 5.18 21 032 031 -031 437
8 34.42 2134 313 1028 21 030 031 -038 9.68
O 4134 3739 3830 13 37 2 035 -136 -035
N 4038 3731 3137 -544 37 4.17 3.11 -138 -0.5
4338 36.76 203 -635 36 43 8.42 4.12 -4.73
J01 3020 844 27.71 -039 34 4.0 831 1.71 -420
F 3231 33.15 22/47 -1038 33 4.75 1138 833 -435
M 31-49 32 1830 -1331 30 33 1039 7.19 -532
A 28.12 1020 2136 1.70 1.70
M 2528 102 2127 237 2.07
J 2430 10.12 1034 0.72 0.72
J 2834 1030 21/43 234 234
A 2824 1039 2130 2.0 23
8 28.71 10.12 21/41 229 229
O 2837 2222 2238 0.78 22 0.18 031 -0.15 031
N 29.00 22.13 2238 0.45 22 040 031 -047 -038
O 27.12 2120 1041 -237 21 030 131 122 -136
JOB 28.08 213 1823 -337 21 034 2.77 223 -134
F 2225 2131 10.78 -133 21 039 1.13 044 -139
M 2036 21.42 1030 -2.73 21 035 232 147 -126
A 28.10 1034 20 44 03 08
M 26.44 1031 21 139 1.09
J 2832 1030 2231 232 2.82
J 20.42 1034 2128 144 1.44
A 2032 10.77 2133 126 126
3 2739 10.72 2133 221 221
O 27.13 2133 223 0.47 21 033 0.01 -0.02 046
N 2723 21.74 2047 -127 21 0.10 037 0.38 -039
2730 2138 1028 -24 21 036 1.73 138 -132
JOS 2539 2138 18.78 -2.78 21 033 223 1.7 -138
F 2438 21 44 20.18 -128 21 0.06 034 0.19 -137
M 25.19 2132 2030 -033 81 0.78 033 -0.16 -138
A 2526 2032 2048 -030 20 0.01 -031 -037
M 2828 20.7 80.44 -028 20 024 033 -021 -047
J 28.77 20.78 1028 -1.48 20 033 0.74 041 -137
J 2835 20.70 18.1 -2.09 20 0.43 2.11 138 -131
0.02 3340
















J6B 2333 23.18 10.76
F 23.1 2128 17.13
M 2233 10.89 10
A 22 21.01 1730
M 2224 2134 17.48
J 2213 22.10 10.73
J 21.13 23-07 14.78
A 203 2030 15.71
8 2031 1830 1440
O 1036 1032 13.8
N 20.03 1838 1338
D 2138 2230 10.00
J80 23.76 2134 1739
F 2432 2423 17.73
M 2431 2233 183
A 2538 2638 2030
M 2433 2726 1032
J 2338 2644 1028
J 23.01 28.07 2038
A 23.08 2133 1839
8 25.01 2338 19.78
O 27.03 24.18 20.17
N 2742 2637 1934
20.4 28.03 20.7
JOO 3330 2045 223
F 2034 20.00 22.03
M 27.12 2732 2024
A 2832 2836 1738
M 2432 2424 1032
J 2334 2020 1032
J 23.14 2736 1034
A 2035 2631 2023
8 3038 3442 313
4023 4134 3839
N 4533 4638 3137
3932 4338 263
J01 3436 3929 27.71
F 31.1 3231 2247
M 2025 3149 1830
A 2435 28.12 21.05
M 2843 2528 2127
J 25.1 2439 1034
J 252 2834 2143
A 27.12 2024 2139
8 202 20.71 2141
283 2837 2238
N 2031 2038 2238
D 20.11 27.12 1041
JOS 2231 2032 1023
F 2333 2235 10.78
M 2322 2035 1830
A 2436 23.10 2044
M 20.14 2044 21
J 2733 2032 2231
J 2731 2042 2128
A 2733 2032 2133












CortSfl J*t 1 0396 0247
CortstWTl 0347 0343 1
006-JOS
CorWWTl N/A 0331 1
(DFSC&NYMEXcfcfe)
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Selected JP-5 Utility Curve Computation Data
p(LP=20) r(LP=20) (1-P) r(HP=30) r=E(r) b U E(U) E(P) AP(CP==25)
0.2 1 -0.2 -0.2 3 -0.32 -0.32 30 20
0.1 0.2 0.9 -0.2 -0.16 3 -0.2368 -0.28 29 21
0.2 02 0.8 -0.2 -0.12 3 -0.1632 -0.24 28 22
0.3 02 0.7 -0.2 -0.08 3 -0.0992 -02 27 23
0.4 0.2 0.6 -0.2 -0.04 3 -0.0448 -0.16 26 24
0.5 0.2 0.5 -0.2 3 -0.12 25 25
0.6 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.04 3 0.0352 -0.08 24 26
0.7 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.08 3 0.0608 -0.04 23 27
0.8 02 0.2 -0.2 0.12 3 0.0768 1.1E-17 22 28
0.9 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.16 3 0.0832 0.04 21 29
1 0.2 -0.2 0.2 3 0.08 0.08 20 30
(DFSC data)
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Selected WTI Utility Curve Computation Data
p(LP=16) r(LP=16) (1-p) r(HP=24) r=E(r) b E(U) E(P) AP(CP=20)
0.2 1 -0.2 -0.2 3 -0.32 -0.32 24 16
0.1 0.2 0.9 -0.2 -0.16 3 -0.2368 -0.28 23.2 16.8
0.2 0.2 0.8 -02 -0.12 3 -0.1632 -0.24 22.4 17.6
0.3 0.2 0.7 -0.2 -0.08 3 -0.0992 -0.2 21.6 18.4
0.4 0.2 0.6 -0.2 -0.04 3 -0.0448 -0.16 20.8 19.2
0.5 0.2 0.5 -0.2 3 -0.12 20 20
0.6 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.04 3 0.0352 -0.08 19.2 20.8
0.7 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.08 3 0.0608 -0.O4 18.4 21.6
0.8 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.12 3 0.0768 1.1E-17 17.6 22.4
0.9 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.16 3 0.0832 0.04 16.8 23.2
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